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194 Ga. 689

22 S.E.2d 514

Durden v. Johnson

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided October 13, 1942

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1942-10-13

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“a clear, definite, and certain voluntary contract releasing her right to the child to a third person...”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 150 Ga. App. 408 - Maddox v. Queen, 90 Ga. App. 601 - Altree v. Head

“Until majority, the child shall remain under the control of the father, who is entitled to his services and the proceeds of his labor. This parental power shall be lost by: 1. Voluntary contract, releasing the right to a third person. 2. Consenting to the adoption of the child by a third person. 3. Failure of the father to provide necessaries for his child, or his abandonment of his family. 4. Consent of father to the child's receiving the proceeds of his own labor, which consent shall be revocable at any time. 5. Consent to the marriage of the child, who thus assumes inconsistent responsibilities. 6. Cruel treatment of the child.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 90 Ga. App. 601 - Altree v. Head

Relies on Bently v. Terry · Griffin v. State · Eaves v. Fears

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1942-10-13

How this case has been cited

Cited by 28 later decisions — most recently February 2025 · most notably Stills v. Johnson (2000), Fortson v. Fortson (1943)

28 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Jenkins, Justice.

¶1 1. Except as related to controversies between the father and the mother of a child, it is the rule that until majority the child shall remain under the control of the father unless the parental power shall be lost, which, among other ways, may be by “voluntary contract, releasing the right to a third person.” .Code, § 74-108; Cannady v. Yawn, 193 Ga. 270 (18 S. E. 2d, 461).

¶2 2. Where, after the death of the father, the mother becomes entitled to the custody and control of a child, such parental power and right may be lost by her just as in the case of the father (City of Albany v. Lindsey, 11 Ga. App. 573, 575, 75 S. E. 911, and cit.; Code, § 74-106) ; and a clear, definite, and certain voluntary contract releasing her right to the child to a third person becomes binding upon her, and is not subject to revocation without good cause shown. Bently v. Terry, 59 Ga. 555 (1, 3), 557 (27 Am. R. 399); Janes v. Gleghorn, 54 Ga. 9 (2), 14; Eaves v. Fears, 131 Ga. 820, 822, 826 (64 S. E. 269); Ogletree v. Ellington, 142 Ga. 636 (1, 2, 4) (83 S. E. 520); Richards v. McHan, 129 Ga. 275, 277 (76 S. E. 32); Looney v. Martin, 123 Ga. 209, 211 (51 S. E. 304), and cit.

¶3 3. In this habeas-corpus proceeding brought by the mother of a child against her deceased husband’s sister and the sister’s husband, the evidence authorized a finding by the judge that the mother had lost her parental custody and control of the child, by a clear, definite, and certain contract voluntarily releasing her right to the respondents. The judge found, under abundant evidence, that the respondents were suitable and proper persons qualified as to moral fitness and ability to support the child, and that the child would be well cared for by them, and did not err in recognizing the binding force and effect of the mother’s contract of relinquishment. There is no merit in the exception that the judge should have exercised his discretion in awarding the child to whichever of the contestants might, in his opinion, have been thought best qualified to serve the welfare of the child, and that in so doing he should have considered the natural ties between mother and child.

¶4 Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Hewlett, J., not participating.
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