Volume 194 — United States Reports

This suit was brought by the predecessor of appellant in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado to set aside a lease of certain lots in the city of Denver, Colorado, and the subsequent surrender and cancellation of said lease, as ultra vires of the power of the National Bank of Denver, and for an accounting, and that the amount found due on the accounting be decreed a prior lien upon the lots and the building erected thereon by the bank..

This is an appeal from’ an order .made in the Circuit Court •of the United States for the Southern District of New'York in the matter of the' petition of the Interstate Commerce Commission for orders requiring the testimony of witnesses and the production of certain -books, papers and documents.

<p>Consent of parties can never confer jurisdiction upon a Federal court. If the record does not affirmatively show jurisdiction in the Circuit Court, this court must, upon its own motion, so declare, and make such order as will prevent the Circuit Court from exercising an authority.not conferred upon it by statute. .</p> <p>A State is not a citizen within the meaning of the provisions of the Constitution or acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of the Federal courts.</p> <p>Under existing statutes regulating the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, a case cannot be removed from a state court, as one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, unless the plaintiff’s complaint, bill or declaration shows it to be a case of that character.</p> <p>While an allegation in a complaint filed in a Circuit Court of the United States may confer jurisdiction to determine whether the case is of the class of which the court may properly take cognizance for purposes of a final decree on the merits, if, notwithstanding such allegation, the court finds, at any time, that the case does npt really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy within its jurisdiction then, by the express command of the act of 1875, its duty is to proceed no further. And if the suit, as disclosed by the complaint could not have been brought by plaintiff originally in the Circuit Court, then, under the act of 1887-1888 it should not have been removed from the state court and should be remanded.</p> <p>The intention of the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209, was to limit direct proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations of the Anti-Trust Act as cause injury to the general public, or to all alike, merely from the suppression of competition in trade and commerce among the several States and with foreign nations, to those instituted in the name of the United States, under § 4 of the act, by District Attorneys of the United States, acting under the direction of the Attorney General; thus securing the enforcement of the act, so far as such direct proceedings in equity are concerned, according to some uniform plan,, operative throughout the entire country.</p> <p>A State cannot maintain an action in equity to restrain a corporation from violating the provisions of the act of July 2, 1890, on the ground that such violations by decreasing .competition would depreciate the value of its public lands and enhance the cost of maintaining its public institutions, the damages resulting from such violations being remote and indirect and not such direct actual injury as is provided.for in § 7 of the act.</p> <p>Article IV of the Constitution of the United States only prescribes a rule by which courts, Federal and state, are to be guided when a question arises in the progress of a pending suit as to the faith and credit to be given by the court to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of a State, other than that in which the court is sitting. It has nothing to do with the conduct of individuals or corporations.</p>

On July 23, 1903, a grand jury of the Circuit Court .of the United States for the Eastern District of New York found and returned an indictment under section 1781, Rev. Stat„ charging George W. Beavers, an officer of the governmént of the United States, with having received money for procuring a contract with the government for the Edward J. Brandt-Dent ' Company.

This was a bill in equity originally filed in the Supreme Court of the -District of Golumbia by the firm of. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., against the Postmaster General, praying that a certain publication, known as the Riverside Literature Series, be entered and transmitted through the mails as second class mail matter, and for an injunction to restrain the cancellation of a certain certificate of entry, previously issued, allowing such transmission.

This was also a bill, filed by the firm of Street & Smith, to enjoin the Postmaster General from cancelling certain certificates of entry admitting the publications of complainant firm to the mail as second class mail matter. This case took the same course as the preceding one.

<p>Where the decision of questions of fact is committed by Congress to the • judgment and discretion of the head of a department, his decision thereon is conclusive; and even upon mixed questions of law and fact, or of law alone, his action will carry with it a strong presumption of its correctness, and the courts will-not ordinarily review it, although they have the power, . and will occasionally exercise the right of so doing.</p> <p>As to what is second class mail matter, Houghton, v. Payne, p. 88, followed.</p>

This is an appeal directly from the ,Circuit Court. The appellant asserts rights under the Constitution of the United States, in that a contract alleged to exist between it and the council of the city of Los Angeles, granting appellant a franchise under the statute hereinafter mentioned, was impaired by the action of the council. Also that the property of appellant. was taken without due process of law.

The tacts are stated in the opinion of the court. Under the laws of Mexico, a clearly defined right of action exists for damages arising from injuries resulting in the death of a person, against the person whose negligence was the proximate cause of such injuries, there being no contributory negligence on the part of the person injured; such action lies in favor of the surviving.wife and minor children of herself and her husband, whose death so resulted.

' Carson, a Resident of: Greenville County, South Carolina, brought- this suit in.the Court of Common Pleas of that county against the Southern Railway Company, a corporation chartered under the laws of the State of Virginia and engaged in running trains through several States as a common carrier, and J. C. Aiwood and J. D. Miller, residents of Greenville.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED' STATES FOB THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.</p> <p>Kirby filed his first original amended petition in the District Court of Dallas County, Texas, against the American Soda Fountain Company, averring tha’t he was induced by false representations by defendant to agree to exchange his soda fountain apparatus for the soda fountain apparatus of de^. fendant and-pay defendant $2,025 in addition, and signed a memorandum in relation thereto, which, however,' plaintiff alleged did not contain all the terms of the contract; that the exchange was made, but defendant’s soda fountain apparatus, instead of being superior in value by $2,025, was, as matter of fact, less by $2,500; and plaintiff prayed for the cancellation of the obligation to pay $2,025, for $2,500 damages, and for general relief. The original petition sought damages .merely, and in the sum of $1,500.</p> <p>On application of defendant the cause was removed to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas.</p> <p>The case was entered in that court May 12, 1902, and on that day defendant filed its answer, denying all charges of fraud, and setting up the written contract between plaintiff and itself, which it alleged contained all the terms of the agreement between them, whereby defendant agreed to manufacture and ship to plaintiff and plaintiff purchased of defendant a certain soda fountain machine at the price of $3,219; and defendant agreed to take plaintiff’s machine in part payment at the sum of $1,194, leaving a balance of $2,025, which plaintiff agreed to pay, and which was secured by a mortgage lien on the property. That defendant- manufactured and shipped the machine to plaintiff and set it up in his store, and fully complied with the contract, but plaintiff, after paying $325 on account of the $2,025, failed and refused to further comply with the contract or to pay anything more thereon.-</p> <p>Defendant said plaintiff ought to take nothing by his suit, and prayed judgment for-the sum of $1,700 and for foreclosure of its mortgage lien. Together with its answer defendant filed its cross complaint, setting up the facts in detail and praying for judgment in the sum of $1,700, and interest, and for a decree establishing its mortgage lien on the property and for foreclosure and sale, and such further relief as equity might require. '</p> <p>Subpcena on the cross complaint was issued and served May 13,1902.</p> <p>June 20, 1902, plaintiff moved to transfer the cause to the law docket; and on that date the following order was entered of record ““Complainant coming and asking that the original bill of complaint be dismissed without prejudice, and it appearing to the court that said request should be granted. It is therefore ordered that the original- bill of complaint herein be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to proceed further on the cause of.action set forth in said bill hereafter as he may be advised. It is further ordered that the costs of the original bill and proceedings thereon herein be adjudged against complainant for which' execution may issue.”</p> <p>July 24, 1902, plaintiff, as defendant in the cross complaint, filed his plea thereto, in which he averred that the-original bill filed by him had been dismissed, and that the cross bill was not within the jurisdiction of the court because the amount sought to be recovered did not exceed two thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs. February 13, Í903, the plea to the jurisdiction of the court was argued and overruled, and plaintiff,' defendant in the cross bill, was ordered to file an answer to said cross hill on or before the rule day of the court occurring in April, 1903. No further answer or plea to the cross bill having been interposed by the defendant therein, a decree pro confesso was rendered against him April 21.</p> <p>On May 27, 1903, the court rendered a decree on the cross bill, which recited the various proceedings; found the allegations of the cross complaint and exhibits to be true; that Kirby was justly indebted to the American Soda Fountain Company in the sum of $1,700, with interest; and that a valid mortgage lien to-secure that sum existed; and decreed payment of the amount within sixty days, and that, if not paid, the property should be sold and the proceeds applied, with judgment for deficiency, if any.</p> <p>• An appeal from this decree was prayed and allowed, and'the question of jurisdiction was certified. The case came on in this court on motions to dismiss or affirm.</p>

Held: the convention met and entered upon the discharge of its duties. An appeal to this court from the order of dismissal made by the Circuit Court of Appeals was dismissed on the ground that the object of the suit could no longer be attained.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES .FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA.</p> <p>Argued simultaneously with and by the same counsel as Jones v. Montague, p. 147 ante.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The statutes of Hawaii from 1839 down on the subject of fisheries, have given property iñterests.in the.fisheries to the adjoining landowner. History, and usage are to be looked at in considering these statutes. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367. These acts are not to be construed as are conveyances between individuals. They are laws as well as grants.

Held: nor must we -now be understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing *181 the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ' due process of law’ as understood at the time of the adoption, of the Constitution.- One of these principles is that no person shall be deprived of- his liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be…

This is an appeal from the Court of Claims. The claimant is a retired rear admiral. This action was prosecuted to recover the difference between three-fourths the pay of a brigadier general and that of a major general of the Army, accorded by statute to retired rear admirals. The Court of Claims dismissed the petition, holding the claimant entitled to three-fourths the pay of a brigadier general.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>For counsel and abstracts of arguments, see p. 184, ante.</p>

Held: in United States v. Gee Lee, 50 Fed. Rep. 271 , and that the Circuit Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the judgment of the District Court under section sixr of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891.

The plaintiff in error is a corporation organized under, acts of Congress and engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire in street cars operated on public highways in the District of Columbia. The- defendant in error was received as a passenger on one of such cars, and, in alighting from the one in which she was riding, was thrown to the ground and seriously injured.

Held: in Wright v. Henkel, 190 U. S. 40 , 58, 61, which was a case of extradition under the same treaties as those here involved. In that case' the alleged fugitive criminal from the justice of Great Britain was found in New York.

On December 12, 1877, A. D. Searl and seven associates made a location of placer mining ground near the new mining camp of Leadville. The claim embraced at that time 157.02 acres of land. The original locators shortly conveyed all their interest to Searl, who applied for a patent on July 5, 1878. The application was met at the land office with a multitude of adverse claims.

This was a suit brought by the appellee (hereinafter called the Montana Company) agginst the appellants (hereinafter called the St. Louis Company) in the Circuit' Court of the United States for the District of Montana, for ah injunction restraining the further prosecution of a tunnel.

This was a libel filed in' the District Court for the Northern District of California by Matthew Bridges against the ship Iroquois; to recover damages for a failure of the master to provide suitable surgical treatment and care for the libellant, who had suffered injury by a fall from the main yard to the .deck of the vessel. ■ The facts of the case were substantially as follows: The Iroquois left New York on December 27, 1899, bound for the port of San Francisco, with a full…

The plaintiffs in error, being, the administrator, together with the heirs at law of Rufus Wilsey, deceased, commenced this suit in the state court of South Dakota against the defendants, and upon the trial the complaint was dismissed, upon the merits; that judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State, and the plaintiffs have brought the case here.

Held: Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 , that.the words “ due process of law,” in the Fourteenth Amendment, do not require an indictment by a grand jury in the prosecution by a'State for murder.- We have also held, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 , that the trial of a person in a state court, accused as a Criminal, by a jury of only eight persons instead of twelve, and his subsequent conviction and imprisonment, did not…

Missouri, Kansas, [sic] & Texas Railway Company of Texas v. Clay May, 194 U.S. 267 (1904), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court which held that a Texas law did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by penalizing only railroad companies for allowing certain weeds to mature and go to seed on their land.

APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR ■ THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

Loren M. Hewit, as trustee in bankruptcy of Ciará'-E. Kellogg, applied to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for an order of sale of certain real estate, buildings and machinery.

The certificate in this case is as follows: “This cause comes here upon a writ of error for the review of the judgment of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, entered.upon the verdict of a jury in favor of the defendant in error, The International Tooth Crown Company, sustaining the validity of a patent and awarding • damages for infringement.

Held: are hereby invested with appellate - jurisdiction' of controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings from the courts of bankruptcy from which they have appellate jurisdiction in other cases. The Supreme Court of the United States shall exercise a like jurisdiction from courts of bankruptcy not within any organized circuit of the United States and from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. 6.

<p>Under § 35 of the act of April 12, 1900, this court can review on writ of .error a final judgment of the District Court of the United States for Porto' Rico, where the amount in dispute exceeds $5,000, and a final judgment in' a like case in the Supreme Court of one of the Territories of the United States could be reviewed by this court.</p> <p>An-action, which could be brought under the Tucker Act against the United States in either a District or a Circuit Court of the United States is within the cognizance of the District Court of the United States of Porto Rico. Qucere, and not decided, whether, a foreign corporation can maintain any action under the Tucker Act in any court in view of the provisions of the act that the petition must be filéd in the District where the plaintiff resides.</p> <p>The seizure and detention by the military and naval forces of the United States during the war with Spain, of a vessel owned by Spanish subjects, was a seizure of enemy’s property and an act of war within the limits of military operations, although the owners were not directly connected with military operations, and a claim for damages for such seizure and detention is not founded on the Constitution of the United States, or on any act of Congress, or regulation of an Executive Department, or on any contract express or implied, and an action based thereon is not sanctioned by the Tucker Act , and cannot be maintained thereunder.</p> <p>The fact that the vessel was retained pending negotiations for a treaty of peace and during a cessation of hostilities does not connect the original seizure with an implied contract to compensate the owners for the detention of the vessel.</p> <p>If the owners had any claim against the United States it was relinquished by the stipulation in the treaty of peace relinquishing claims, such stipulation covering all claims arising prior to thé exchange of ratifications of the treaty.</p> <p>In case of a conflict between a statute and treaty the one last in date prevails.</p>

. This case is before us on questions certified by the Circuit Court' of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Held: upon great unanimity of authority, both in this country and in England, that the person receiving and the person causing the injury did not occupy the relative position of fellow servants. ‘ See also Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U. S. 213 ; Union Pacific Railway v. Daniels, 152 U. S. 684 .”' In Union Pacific Ry.

This was an action of ejectment commenced in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas, based upon the same title which was presented in Muse v. Arlington Hotel Company, 168 U. S. 430, and Filhiol v. Maurice, 185 U. S. 108. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained on the ground of want of jurisdiction and a judgment entered for the defendant, and thereupon the case was brought directly to this court on writ of error.

This 'proceeding was originally instituted by a criminal complaint filed by the city of St. Louis against Fischer in the Police Court for a violation of an ordinance of the city in erecting, building and establishing on certain premises occupied by'Fischer, at Nos. 7208 and'7210 North Broadway, a 'dairy and cow stable without first having obtained permission so to do from the municipal assembly by proper ordinance, and for maintaining .such dairy and cow stable without…

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEARS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The relator, plaintiff in error, filed his petition in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, praying a writ of mandamus directed to the then and presént Secretary of State of the United States. In substance it was averred that Holzendorf, prior to and since May, 1898, had been a naturalized citizen of the United States, and while on a visit to Germany, his native country, he was wrongfully imprisoned in an' asylum for the insane at Dalldorf, near Berlin, from May 11, 1898, to July 8, 1899, when he was released by the judgment of a German court, as being “perfectly sound in mind and body.” The grievance complained of was alleged to have been the act of the German Empire, and it was averred that said grievance “ was manifestly in contempt of his rights as a citizen of the United States,” which “oppressively deprived him of liberty, reputation and time, greatly to his cost, loss, damage and injury.” Alleging a refusal by the defendant in. mandamus “ to proceed, on the part of the United States, to seek to obtain redress' of grievance in behalf of your petitioner,” it was prayed that a writ of mandamus issue, “ addressed to said defendant, John Hay, the Secretary aforesaid, commanding and requiring him forthwith to institute vigorous and proper proceedings against the Empire of Germany, or Kingdom of Prussia, or both, that is to say, against the Emperor, for the recovery of five hundred thousand dollars damages, in behalf of your petitioner.”</p> <p>The matter was heard and' an order was entered dismissing the petition. An appeal was allowed, and the Court of Appeals of the District affirmed the judgment. 20 App. D.' C. 576. By writ of error the'cause was then brought to this court.</p>

Held: the entire succeeding twelve months or for a portion of such time. • Sec. 5. Where cattle are held by g, citizen and mortgaged to a non-citizen, not in good faith but for the purpose of evading the payment of taxes, said cattle shall be considered as owned or held by such non-citizen, and subject to these regulations and taxes. Sec. 6.

APPEAL PROM THE COURT, OP CLAIMS.- ' The United States appeals from.' a-judgment- condemning, it to. pay fifteen .thousand dollars. The- essential facts stated in the findings are as follows: .In 1856 Congress ,granted to-the State of Alabama public lands to aid in the construction of various railroads referred to in the first and sixth sections of the act.

Held: that it was not necessary under the act of March 3, 1885, that the individual members of the tribes mentioned in the act should be actually residing on the reservation at the' time of the passage of the act, .and that ■ as her selection was prior to that of anyone else, she was entitled to the allotment originally selected and that her right thereto had not been lost by the selection of other lands.

. The plaintiff in error commenced this action in the proper state. court to procure a decree cancelling a deed of the prem- ■ ises mentioned in the complaint, .executed by the defendant Hammel to the defendant Rhodes, and also directing that a deed should be executed to the plaintiff by defendant Hammel or Burr, or both, conveying the same property to the plaintiff, which had been purchased by him under the sale in foreclosure hereinafter mentioned.

This is an action to recover the value of cotton delivered by plaintiff to defendant, to be transported over its railroad from Texarkana, Texas, to New Orleans. The cotton was destroyed by fire while in the custody of defendant. The action was originally brought in the Civil District Court of the Parish of Orleans and removed on the petition of defendant to the Gircuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Held: approving ihe decision of the trial court, (‘there was negligence in the defendants permitting the cotton to be exposed all night on the levee, to theft, fire and other acci- . dents, without some person to take care of it.” It was not the care, the court further observed, that .a prudent person would take of his own property, and the custom proved was not a good excuse.

■' APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS POR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.' Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution gives Congress power to establish uniform laws on bankruptcy. ■ No other sovereignty —state or foreign — can exercise any control over the bankrupt’s property. The power granted is a sovereign power, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; it admits of only one system. Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 492.

The plaintiff .in error was committed to custody upon a warrant for'violating the law of Ohio called the “Beal Local Option Law.” He petitioned in habeas corpus for his discharge .to one of the' judges of,the State having jurisdiction.' On hearing he was remitted to custody and the judgment was affirméd by the Supreme Court of the State. This writ of error was then sued out.' The question involved is the constitutionality of the lhw.

CERTIFICATE* FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. This case came here on a certificate of which the following is the material portion: “The plaintiff is a citizen of Montana and-the owner by assignment of three causes of action (for goods sold and on a promissory note) against the Obelisk Mining and Concentrating Company, a Montana corporation.

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus commanding the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to reinstate and take jurisdiction of a writ of error filed by the petitioner in that court,- by which it sought to have reviewed an order of the Circuit Court for the -Southern. District of New York adjudging the petitioner guilty of contempt.

The plaintiff in error was indicted in the District Court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico as constituted by the act of Congress of April 12, 1900, entitled “An act temporarily to provide revenues- and a civil government for Porto Rico, and for other purposes.” 31 Stat. 77, c. 191. The indictment was based upon certain sections of the Revised Statutes of the United States relating to crimes committed by persons employed in the postal service.

<p>Section 4 of the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 556, for the adjustment of forfeited railroad grants' providing for issuing patents under the conditions specified for lands sold by the grantee company to purchasers in good faith, has no reference to any unearned lands purchased after the date of the act from a company to which they had never been certified or patented, although such company might have acquired an interest in them had it completed its road. Nor can one who purchased unearned lands from a grantee company whose grant was made by .Congress through the State in which its road was to be built, be regarded as a purchaser in good faith, within the meaning of the act of 1887, when the purchase was made after the passage of the act and after the State had, by legislative enactment, resumed its title to the' lands and then relinquished them to the United States on account of the failure to complete its road.</p>

<p>While it may not be within the power of Congress by a special system of license taxes to obtain, from a Territory of the United States, ■ revenue for the-benefit of the Natioñ as distinguished from that necessary for the support of the territorial government, Congress has plenary power, save as controlled by the provisions of the Constitution, to establish a government of the Territories which need not necessarily be the same in all Territories and it may establish á revenue system applicable solely to the Territory for which it is established..</p> <p>The fact that the taxes are paid directly into the treasury of the United States and are ,not specifically appropriated for the expenses of the Territory, when the sum total of all the revenue from the Territory including all. the taxes does not equal the cost and expense of maintaining the govem- . ment of'the Territory, does not make the taxes, unconstitutional if it satisfactorily appear that the purpose of.the taxes is to raise revenue in that Territory for the ^Territory itself. ,</p> <p>The license taxes provided for in -§ 460, Title II, of the Alaska Penal Code,are not in conflict, with the uniformity provisions of § 8 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States. • •</p> <p>The general rule that debates of Congress are not appropriate sources' of information from which to discover the meaning of the language of statutes' passed by that body does not apply to the examination of the reports of committees of either branch of Congress with á view of determining the scope of Statutes' passed on^the strength of such reports. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 464.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT. COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA.</p>

<p>The power vested in Congress to establish post offices and post roads embraces the regulation of the entire postal system of the country; Congress may designate what may be carried in, and what excluded from, the mails; and the exclusion, of articles equally prohibited to all does not deny to the owners thereof any of their constitutional rights.</p> <p>Due process of law does not necessarily require the interference of judicial power nor is 'it necessarily denied because the disposition of property is affected by the order of an executive department.</p> <p>Each executive department of thé Government has certain public functions. and duties the performance of which- is absolutely necessary to the existence of the Government and although it may temporarily operate with seeming harshness upon individuals; the rights of the public must, in these particulars, overrule the rights of individuals- provided there be reserved to them an ultimate recourse to' the judiciary.</p> <p>Where a person is engaged in- an enterprise which justifies the Postmaster General in issuing a fraud order, it is not too much to assume that •prima facie at least all of his letters are-identified with the business and § 3929, • Rev. Stat., as amended by the act of September 19, 1890, is not unconstitutional because the Postmaster General in seizing and detaining all ' letters under a fraud order may include some having no connection whatever with the prohibited enterprise.</p> <p>The rights of the sender, and the addressees of letters returned to the sender under a fraud order issued by the Postmaster General are not affected by the order except so far as the same is a refusal on the part of Congress to extend the facilities of the Post Office Department to the final delivery of the letter, and § 3929, Rev. Stat., as amended, is not unconstitutional and d,oes not operate as a confiscation of the property of the'person against whom the order is issued.</p> <p>The misrepresentation of existing facts is not always necessarily involved in a scheme or artifice to defraud and where, after examination made, the Postmaster General has issued a fraud order on the ground that the defendants were engaged in a scheme for obtaining money or property by means of false representations, and the master iri the court below has found that the scheme was, in effect, a lottery, the significant fact is that the parties were engaged in a scheme within the meaning and prohibition of §§ 3929 an’d 4101, Rev. Stat., and this court will not hold that the Postmaster General exceeded his authority in making the fraud order.</p>

This ' suit was brought in the Circuit Court to restrain the enforcement of an ordinance of the city of Cleveland, passed October, 1898, fixing the rates of fare to be charged by the appellee on a portion of its line of street railroad. .

<p>Decided on authority of Cleveland v. City Railway Co., ante, p. 517.</p>

Dimmick, the appellant, presented his petition for á writ of habeas carpus to the Circuit Court of the United States, Northern District of California. The petition was. denied and an appeal taken to this court from the. order denying the application.

This bill was filed in the . Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio, against the defendant, as the treasurer of the county of Franklin, in the State of Ohio, to enjoin him from taking any proceedings towards the collectipn of the balance of an assessment for a local improvement ujpon land belonging to the appellants near -the city of Columbiis, in the State of Ohio, because, among other grounds alleged /in the bill, the assessment to pay for the…

Held: in Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 , that the act was virtually one of “general amnesty,” and the protection of the Constitution was “fully accomplished by the statutory immunity.” As in Counselman v. Hitchcock a witness before a grand jury which was investigating alleged violations of the Interstate Commerce Act, claimed that questions addressed to him “would tend to accuse and incriminate him.” Upon proceedings in…

<p>An action cannot be maintained in thé Federal courts to set aside tax sales on the ground that the sales are void, where the property has been bought, ■ .and is claimed, by the State without making the State a party, and where there is no statutory provision permitting such an action it cánnot be • maintained against the State under the Eleventh Amendment.</p> <p>A state statute providing for the procedure in, and naming the officials who are necessary parties to, actions to set aside tax sales the language whereof clearly indicates that the legislature contemplated that such actions should only be brought in the courts of the State, will not be construed as permitting such actions to be brought in the Federal courts.</p> <p>An action to enjoin the enforcement of tax liens cannot be maintained ■ against a state official who has retired from office.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The consolidation carried the exclusive franchise to the néw company. 2 Clark & Marshall, §355a; Phila. & Wil. R. R. v. Maryland, 16 How. 376; New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650; Citizens’ Ry. Co. v. Memphis, 53 Fed. Rep. 713; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens’ Gas Co., 115 U. S. 683; New Orleans Water Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674. The franchise was not repealed by the passage of the Covington city charter.

Held: that the suit was virtually- one against the United States and the Circuit Court of the United, States, has not the power to grant an injunction against the defendant restraining the use of the machines pending the leased period. Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10 , followed.

Held: to prevent the States from classifying the subjects of legislation and making different regulations as to the property of different individuals differently situated. The provision of the Federal Constitution is satisfied if- all *622 persons similarly situated are treated alike in privileges conferred or liabilities imposed.