¶1*988William W. Barron, Washington, D. C., Maxwell Hyman, Miami Beach, Fla., James T. Vocelle, Vero Beach, Fla., and Averbach & Bonney, Seneca Falls, N. Y., for appellants.
¶2Walker Liddon, Panama City, Fla., for appellees.
¶3Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and BORAH and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges.
¶5Brought by the husband, the driver and owner of an automobile, and his wife, a passenger in it, the suit, in two counts, was for the damages each plaintiff suffered as a result of the collision of a following automobile with the one in which they were riding.
¶6The claim in count one was that the defendant Sweeney, who was driving the car, with the consent and authorization of the defendant Mundy, its owner, negligently drove into the rear of plaintiff Tharp’s car, causing Mrs. Tharp serious injuries and expenses for medical attention.
¶7Count two charged the same negligence and that it had caused Mr. Tharp the loss of the comfort and society of his wife and the expense of repairing the automobile.
¶8The defenses were: (1) denials of the negligence charged and the damages claimed; and (2) pleas (a) that the driver of the Tharp car was himself negligent in not keeping a proper lookout and in suddenly stopping it without giving a warning signal, and this negligence was the cause of the injuries; and (b) that Mrs. Tharp was herself contributorily negligent in not keeping a'proPer lookout for her own safety.
¶9On these' pleadings the case was fully tried to a jury and, the evidence concluded, while plaintiffs and defendants did present special requests to charge, neither moved for a directed verdict, and, therefore plaintiffs may not attack the sufficiency oí the evidence here. Employers Liability v. Lejeune, 5 Cir., 189 F.2d 521 at page 524.
¶10The court denying some, and granting others, of. these requests, including four dealing with Mrs. Tharp’s negligence requested by the defendants, there was a verdict and judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs have appealed.
¶11While other grounds for reversal are put forward, appellants ■ place their main reliance on the giving and refusal of instructions 1 to the jury. Of these claimed *989errors, plaintiffs make the most of the submission to the jury of the issue of contributory negligence as to Mrs. Tharp.
¶12Striking at the instructions as fundamentally erroneous because there was no basis in the evidence for the submission of the issue in any form, plaintiffs, as a secondary attack upon them, bear down hard upon the argumentative and repetitious form of the instructions. Insisting that, instead of giving those charges in any form, the court should have refused them all and given instead plaintiffs’ requested charge No. 2, that, if the defendants’ negligence caused or contributed to her injuries, they should find for plaintiff, Georgiana Tharp, plaintiffs stand firmly upon their claim: that no tendency of the evidence raises the issue of the failure on the part of Mrs. Tharp to exercise care for her own safety; and that both the giving of defendants’ and the refusal of plaintiffs’ charges on that issue were highly prejudicial error.
¶13We agree.
¶14 While in a proper case, that is, a case where the evidence presents the issue, it would, of course, be correct to give a proper charge upon the failure of due care, the contributory negligence vel non, of a guest passenger, the case at bar is not such a case. Not only then because of their argumentative misleading and repetitious character, but more fundamentally because the issue of Mrs. Tharp’s contributory negligence was not raised in and by the evidence, the giving of the complained of charge and the refusal of the requested charge on that issue were errors for which the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for trial anew.
¶15In view of the fact that, on another trial, it is probable that the questions raised on the other rulings, of which the plaintiffs complained, will again arise, we shall for the guidance of the court give our views upon them.
¶16Of plaintiffs’ complaint of the submission of the issue of unavoidable accident, as contained in defendants’ requested charge No. 15, it will suffice for us to say that we do not agree with plaintiffs that the evidence did not raise it, and that it was, therefore, erroneous to charge upon that issue. Cf. Zwilling v. Harrison, 269 N.Y. 461, 199 N.E. 761.
¶17Neither was it error to give, in charge to the jury, defendants’ requested charge No. 3, that the measure of defendants’ duty was the exercise of due care or to refuse to give, in charge, plaintiffs’ requested charge No. 1.
¶18Finally, it was, we think, clear error, in the state of the evidence, to refuse to charge on the last clear chjmce or subsequent negligence doctrine, as that doctrine is understood and applied in Florida. Lindsay v. Thomas, 128 Fla. 293, 174 So. 418; Merchants Transp. Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401.
¶19The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further and not inconsistent proceedings.
¶20Reversed and remanded.