Louis Dean Cosco’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiffs, seven inmates of the Wyoming State Penitentiary appearing pro se, appeal from the district court's order dismissing their civil rights suit without prejudice. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and affirm. Plaintiffs are all long-term inmates who have acquired considerable amounts of personal property over the years. Plaintiffs filed both grievances and this suit under 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 to challenge a proposed administrative regulation that would have instituted severe restrictions on the types and amounts of personal property any inmate could keep in his cell, and under which plaintiffs claimed they would have been unconstitutionally required to dispose of much of their property without compensation. After the suit was filed, defendants informed the district court that they had decided not to adopt the proposed policy as originally drafted. Instead, to resolve the numerous grievances challenging the policy, defendants added a "grandfather" clause to allow inmates already in possession of property in excess of the new limits, including plaintiffs, to keep their property, subject to forfeiture later for various disciplinary infractions. Seq, eg., R. Vol. II, doe. 17, attachment ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cosco v. Lampert

2. “[W]e do not see how the Supreme Court could have made clearer its intent to reject the Hewitt analysis outright in the prison context. Indeed, if we are to avoid Heioitt’s “two undesirable effects” ((1) creating disincentives for states to codify management procedures and (2) entangling the federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons) in the context of prison property interests, Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482 , 115 S.Ct. 2293 , ... and return the focus of our due process inquiry from “the language of a particular regulation” to “the nature of the deprivation” as Sandin mandates, id. at 481 , 115 S.Ct. 2293 , ... we must conclude that the Supreme Court foreclosed the possibility of applying the Hewitt methodology to derive protected property interests in the prison conditions setting. The Supreme Court mandate since Sandin is that henceforth we are to review property and liberty interests claims arising from prison conditions by asking whether the prison condition complained of presents “the type of atypical significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty [or property] interest.” Id. at 486 , 115 S.Ct. 2293 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. David Pickelhaupt v. Andrew Jackson

3. “but ruling that the prisoner had no property interest in the prison job because state law left the employment of prisoner to the discretion of prison officials and the prisoner”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cosco v. Lampert