Quirk v. McDonnell

<p>Abstract of the Decision.</p> <p>1. Vendor and purchaser, § 333*—when evidence inadmissible in action to recover bade purchase price payments. Where by the provisions of an agreement to sell real estate it appears that vendor will not be required to make conveyance for a period of more than two years, testimony as to the reasonableness of or the time taken by vendor to perfect his title is irrelevant.</p> <p>2. Vendor and purchaser, § 164*—when purchaser to have possession. An agreement to sell real estate wherein it is provided that vendor shall make certain repairs, and that vendee shall pay taxes and other assessments before conveyance, evidences an intention of the parties that vendee shall have possession of the premises before such conveyance.</p> <p>3. Vendor and purchaser, § 164*—when possession to be given in reasonable time. Where an agreement to sell real estate shows an intention of the parties that vendee shall have possession before conveyance, and the agreement fixes no definite time when such possession is to be delivered to vendee, the law implies that such possession shall be delivered within a reasonable time.</p> <p>4. Vendor and purchaser, § 164*—where parol agreement as to delivery of possession valid. Where an agreement to sell real estate requires that possession be delivered to vendee before conveyance but fixes no time for such delivery, the parties may validly make a parol contract as to what shall be deemed such reasonable time.</p> <p>5. Evidence, § 350*—when parol evidence of collateral agreement admissible. Where an agreement to sell real estate requires that possession be delivered to vendee before conveyance, but fixes no time for such delivery, parol evidence of a contract fixing such time for delivery is competent, and has no tendency to vary the terms of a written instrument.</p> <p>6. Vendor and purchaser, § 164*—when delay in delivery of possession unreasonable. Where an agreement for the sale of real estate dated March 25th gave vendor a period of more than two years in which to make conveyance, but was construed to require delivery of possession to vendee within a reasonable time, and where there was evidence of a verbal agreement to deliver such possession April 15th, a finding that vendor unreasonably delayed to deliver such possession held warranted by the evidence, where it appeared that as late as May 18th such possession had not been delivered, although there was evidence that at such last mentioned date vendor had not perfected his title, for the reason that under the agreement the time for conveyance and the time for delivery of possession were not the same, and therefore failure to perfect title did not excuse vendor for unreasonable delay in delivering possession to vendee.</p>