Roda v. Williams’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 2 district · 53 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 63 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““. . . From the cold printed record it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess the impact of improper jury argument in every case. This is best left to the trial judge in the first instance who is in position to take immediate corrective action. Moreover, in this case no objection was made to the argument until upon motion for new trial. “The trial court should, of course, of its own motion without waiting for objection from opposing counsel protect litigants from misconduct of counsel, particularly where the misconduct is so prejudicial that it must influence the jury. If the court fails to act of its own motion, then an objection should be made and a ruling thereon had in order to take advantage of the error in such improper conduct (88 C. J. S., Trial, § 196b). Such misconduct may be waived by failure to object (88 C. J. S., Trial, § 196e). This rule has been applied by this court.” (p. 515.)”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Wood v. Gautier · Skelly Oil Co. v. Urban Renewal Agency

2. “then the injured workman has the right to receive compensation under the act and also to pursue his remedy by proper action in a court of competent jurisdiction against such other person, with appropriate subrogation rights. And the phrase”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Tully v. Estate of Gardner · Scott Ex Rel. Administrator v. Hughes

3. ““At common law, fellow employees mutually owed to each other the duty of exercising ordinary care and each was liable for a failure in that respect which resulted in injury to a fellow employee. “The history of the Kansas Workmen’s Compensation Act reveals there has never been any complete abrogation of previously existent common law and statutory rights against a negligent third party other than an employer. Rather there has been recognition and preservation of those rights with varying abridgments and adjustments where compensation might also be recovered. “A co-employee is to be considered as ‘some person other than the employer’ as contemplated in K. S. A. 44-504.” (Syl. ¶¶ 1, 2 and 6.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Watson v. W. S. Dickey Clay Manufacturing Co.