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195 Mass. 184

Richards v. Keyes

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Decided April 2, 1907

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1907-04-02

<p>Equity Jurisdiction, Equitable estoppel. Probate Court. Trust, Duties and powers of trustee. Constitutional Law.</p> <p>The beneficiary of a trust, who joined in a request in writing under seal to the trustee to deliver a deed of certain land belonging to the trust to a preceding beneficiary of the trust under whom she claims and to take back a mortgage for the purchase price, and who, after such a deed and mortgage had been executed and delivered without express authority from the Probate Court, with a full knowledge of the circumstances joined in a request for the granting of a petition to the Probate Court under R. L. e. 148, § 24, for a confirmation of the deed and mortgage, upon which a decree of confirmation and confirmatory conveyances in pursuance thereof were made, is estopped in equity as well as at law to deny the validity of the transaction and cannot maintain a bill in equity to set aside the deed and mortgage, whether the first deed and mortgage were invalid or voidable by the plaintiff or not.</p> <p>The provision of R. L. c. 148, § 24, for a decree of ratification by the Probate Court, where the authority or validity of an act of a person acting as executor, administrator, guardian or trustee is drawn in question, expressly applies where the question relates to an alleged “ want of authority ” of a trustee.</p> <p>R. L. c. 148, § 24, giving the Probate Court power to make a decree of ratification, where the authority or validity of an act or proceeding of the Probate Court or of a person acting as executor, administrator, guardian or trustee is drawn in question by reason of an alleged irregularity, defective notice or want of authority, is constitutional.</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1907-04-02

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently January 1991

3 state decisions

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Hammond, J.

¶1If the first deed from Keyes the trustee to Mary L. Richards and the mortgage back were valid, then the plaintiff has no case. If they were invalid, or voidable at the election of the plaintiff, then it is clear that she is estopped in equity to set up such a claim, because, first, as appears from the paper of October 16, 1894, signed by her and her mother, she requested the delivery of such deed and mortgage and agreed to indemnify the trustee against all loss, trouble and expense on that account; and, second (which is the stronger reason), she with full knowledge of the circumstances joined in the request for the granting of the petition of Keyes subsequently filed in the Probate Court for the decree confirming said sale.

¶2The plaintiff urges that this case is not within R. L. c. 148, § 24, which provides for confirmation of certain proceedings by the Probate Court, and that the statute refers only to those cases where there is an alleged irregularity or want of notice. This position, however, is untenable. The statute applies also where the “ want of authority ” “ is drawn in question ”; and it is apparent that such was this case.

¶3*187It is further urged that the statute is unconstitutional. No authority is cited by the plaintiff in support of this proposition. The statute confines the exercise by the Probate Court of this confirmatory power to cases where’ the act or proceeding to be ratified or confirmed is such as might have been “ passed or authorized in the first instance upon due proceedings.” There can be no doubt that the act which was finally confirmed, namely, the sale by Keyes to Mary L. Richards, was such an act. That such a statute is constitutional is too clear for discussion.

¶4The ruling, therefore, that “ the plaintiff, after joining in said petition for confirming the said sale and mortgage, after the decree of the Probate Court thereon and after the execution by her of said instrument [of October 16,1894], . . . could not now complain of the act of the trustee in making said sale, giving the deed, and taking back the mortgage ” was correct.

¶5 Exceptions overruled.

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