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← 196 Colo. 315 - People v. Mingo

People v. Mingo’s Empirical Analysis

1978

Citation profile

42
cited by 42 later decisions
1
states following
July 2002
most recently cited

40 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 42 later decisions — most recently July 2002 · most notably People v. Bartowsheski (1983), People v. Marcy (1981)

40 state decisions

3001978198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Starnes v. Penrod Drilling Co. · Keller v. People · United States v. Durham

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Regarding the first factor, it is obvious that a jury could reasonably conclude that discharging a gun from a distance of three feet creates such a high probability of death that death was practically certain, not merely a probable result. The trial judge seemed to conclude that evidence of additional factors which would make death even more likely was necessary. He questioned counsel as to whether the statute required more than proof that the defendant shot the victim. For example, he wondered whether evidence that the defendant had aimed at the victim’s chest was necessary. Under the circumstances, additional proof was not required to permit the judge to submit the second-degree murder charge to the jury. Since the gun was discharged in such proximity as the facts here indicate, a jury rationally could have found that the shooting was practically certain to be fatal. “As the second factor, the prosecutor must establish that the defendant was aware of the practical certainty that death would result. The evidence regarding defendant’s state of mind need not be direct. The law is clear that the judge or jury may presume an intent to cause the ‘. . . natural and probable consequences of . . . unlawful voluntary acts, knowingly performed.’ Keller v. People, 153 Colo. 590 , 387 P.2d 421 (1963). “Like intent, subjective awareness of the probability of consequences is a matter which often must be inferred from defendant’s conduct and surrounding circumstances. Here there was no ev”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[s]econd-degree murder ... is a general intent crime which entails being aware that one's actions are practically certain to result in another's death.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““A person acts ‘knowingly’ ... with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists. A person acts ‘knowingly’ . . . with respect to a result of his conduct, when he is aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause the result.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.