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196 Colo. 578

595 P.2d 217

People v. Waggoner

Supreme Court of Colorado

Decided May 29, 1979

Supreme Court of Colorado · decided 1979-05-29

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““When such a motion [for judgment of acquittal] is before the judge, the issue is whether the relevant evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations omitted.] Only when the evidence is such that the jury must necessarily have a reasonable doubt should the judge direct a verdict in favor of the defendant. The trial court must give the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference which might be fairly drawn from the evidence. Finally, the trial court should not attempt to serve as a thirteenth juror or invade the province of the jury in determining the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to various segments of the evidence.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including People v. Ray

Relies on People v. Bennett · Wilson v. Wiman · People v. Kirkland

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1979-05-29

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently December 2017

9 state decisions

4019791980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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MR. JUSTICE KELLEY

¶1delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶2This is an appeal by the People from a judgment of acquittal entered by the District Court of Las Animas County after trial to a jury resulted in the jury’s being discharged without reaching a verdict. The constitutional provision on double jeopardy prohibits a retrial of the defendants under the circumstances. The greatest relief we can grant the People is to disapprove the judgment entered by the trial judge, and we grant that relief.1

¶3Defendants Kent and Dennis Waggoner and Max Yocam were charged under section 18-3-203(l)(c), C.R.S. 1973, with assault on a peace officer. Evidence presented at their trial established that there had been an altercation during a dance at the school gymnasium in Kim, *580Colorado, and Deputy Sheriff Joseph Lujan had been severely injured during the course of the fight.

¶4The People’s witnesses testified that Officer Lujan, while wearing his uniform and chaperoning the dance, had been struck by Kent Waggoner, “jerked down” by Dennis Waggoner, and kicked repeatedly by Max Yo-cam when he attempted to intercede in a fight. At the conclusion of the People’s case, the judge granted Dennis Waggoner’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground of insufficient evidence.

¶5I.

¶6The leading statement of the standard for determining whether a judgment of acquittal should be granted is contained in People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 515 P.2d 466 (1973). The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, should be sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Once a prima facie case has been established, it becomes impregnable against a motion for judgment of acquittal. People v. Contreras, 195 Colo. 80, 575 P.2d 433 (1978); Ruark v. People, 164 Colo. 257, 434 P.2d 124 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1044, 88 S.Ct. 1644, 20 L.Ed.2d 306 (1968).

“A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if . . . With intent to prevent one whom he knows, or should know, to be a peace officer .. . from performing a lawful duty, he intentionally causes bodily injury to any person. . . .” Section 18-3-203(1)(c), C.R.S. 1973.

¶7The People’s case established an assault on a uniformed officer acting in the course of his duties. The intent of the perpetrators could be inferred from the circumstances. Thus, a prima facie case of assault had been established. Whether or not the witnesses were credible and how much weight was to be accorded their testimony, were questions for the jury to resolve. By granting Dennis Waggoner’s motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial judge erroneously usurped the function of the jury. People v. Martinez, 191 Colo. 428, 553 P.2d 774 (1976).

¶8ÍÍ.

¶9The case proceeded as to Kent Waggoner and Max Yocam. Defense testimony contradicted the People’s case in a number of respects. There was some doubt cast as to whether Lujan had been wearing his uniform, as to whether he had been kicked, and about the identity of the assailants and their intent. The case was submitted to the jury. After deliberations, the jury informed the judge it was unable to reach a verdict. The defense then moved for judgment of acquittal as to Kent Waggoner and Max Yo-cam, which was subsequently granted.

¶10The situation presented by the second acquittal differs from Bennettand its progeny because the acquittal here was granted after the *581jury deliberated and found itself unable to reach a verdict.2 However, the same standard for determining whether an acquittal should be granted applies here. Crim. P.29(a) states that the court “shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal ... if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense . . . . ” This evidence is to be weighed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and given “every reasonable inference which may fairly be drawn [from it]. . . .” People v. Martinez, supra.

¶11[§] The evidence presented at the trial, when considered in a light most favorable to the prosecution, was legally sufficient to overcome a motion for acquittal. All the necessary elements of the crime with which Waggoner and Yocam were charged had been established by direct or circumstantial evidence. The trial judge clearly acted as a trier of fact. This was not his function in a jury trial situation. Thus, judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence was improper.

¶12Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is disapproved.

¶13MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON concurs in the result.

¶14MR. JUSTICE PRINGLE does not participate.

¶15 We reiterate and emphasize our position in People v. Kirkland, 174 Colo. 362, 483 P.2d 1349 (1971): an appeal after a judgment of acquittal due to insufficiency of the People’s evidence is ordinarily an exercise in futility and serves no useful purpose.

¶16 Crim. P. 29(c) provides in part, “If no verdict is returned, the court may enter judgment of acquittal.”

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