¶1concurring. I remain convinced that State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 482 A. 2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. , 105 S. Ct. 967, 83 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1985), was wrongly decided by the majority in that case for the reasons I stated in my dissent in that case. State v. Couture, supra, 566-72B (A. Healey, J., dissenting). My views expressed in Couture, I believe, find support in those set out by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Young, 470 U.S. , 105 S. Ct. 1038, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985), handed down after this court’s decision in Couture. In regard to Couture, it is fair to note that an opinion has significance proportioned to the sources which sustain it, and there I pointed out that the Connecticut constitution was nowhere asserted by the *35appellant in that case. State v. Couture, supra, 572A n.2 (A. Healey, J., dissenting). Our state constitution is, however, in fact asserted in this case before us. This distinction, nevertheless, cannot on analysis serve to change the conclusion that Couturewas wrongly decided.
¶2On balance, I appreciate the Homeric constitutional enigma that would occur if this appellant, who was tried in the same courtroom, before the same judge, by the same jury, with the same prosecutor as the appellant in Couture, were found, vis-a-vis State v. Couture, supra, to have received a fair trial. This counsels an unhurried assessment of that prospect. One is reminded here of what Justice Felix Frankfurter may have meant when he said: “It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.” United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69, 70 S. Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed. 653 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
¶3Accordingly, with the ink dry on the companion case of State v. Couture, supra, I concur in the result reached in the case now before us.
¶4concurring. I agree with Justice Healey that State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. , 105 S. Ct. 967, 83 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1985), was “wrongly decided” when this court ordered a new trial as a result of the inflammatory comments of the prosecutor. Neither Couture nor this defendant were sufficiently prejudiced by the remarks, egregiously improper as they were, to have been denied a fair trial under either our state or federal constitution in view of the overwhelming evidence of their guilt, which rendered the error harmless. “[I]t is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including most constitutional violations . . . .” United States v. *36Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983); see United States v. Young, 470 U.S. , 105 S. Ct. 1038, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985). Insofar as Couturemay stand upon the duty of this court to deter prosecutorial misconduct under our general supervisory power, the court did not give appropriate weight to other relevant considerations, such as the reopening of old wounds on the part of the families of the victims by resurrecting their harrowing experiences, a consequence likely to ensue from a new trial with its attendant publicity. See United States v. Hasting, supra, 507. A more appropriate remedy for this marked departure from the high standards ordinarly followed by prosecutors in this state would have been a recommendation for disciplinary proceedings rather than the expensive exercise in futility that a new trial in this case entails.
¶5Despite my disagreement with Coutureand the portions of the majority opinion now approving that decision, it would be most incongruous and unfair that a different result should be reached in the present case simply because of a change in the composition of this court. Both cases should have been heard together on appeal, since there was a joint trial in the lower court and the same claims of error are raised. Again I agree with Justice Healey that it would be unjust to deny this defendant the same relief granted to Couture.
¶6Accordingly, I agree with the result.