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196 F.2d 597

Docket No. 11135.

National Mutual Ins. v. Liberty Mutual Ins.

District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued Jan. 16, 1952.

Decided April 24, 1952.

District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1952-04-24

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““III. Definition of Insured “The unqualified word ‘insured’ includes the named insured and also includes any person while using an owned automobile or a hired automobile * * * provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or with his permission * * * The insurance with respect to any person or organization other than the named insured does not apply: * * * * * “(d) with respect to any hired automobile, to the owner thereof or any employee of such owner; “3. Automobiles Defined, trailers, two or more automobiles. “(a) Automobile. Except where stated to the contrary the word ‘automobile’ means a land motor vehicle or trailer as follows: “(1) Owned automobile — an automobile owned by the named insured; “(2) Hired automobile — an automobile used under contract in behalf of, or loaned to, the named insured provided such automobile is not owned by or registered in the name of (a) the named insured or (b) an executive officer thereof or (c) an employee or agent of the named insured who is granted an operating allowance of any sort for the use of such automobile; “(3) Non-owned automobile — any other automobile.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Butler v. Maryland Casualty Company

“Definition of Insured: "With respect to the insurance for bodily injury liability and for property damage liability the unqualified word 'insured' includes the named insured (Stanford) . . . and also includes any person while using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is . . . with the permission of (the named insured). . . .”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Carolina Casualty Insurance Company v. Insurance Company of North America T II Refrigerated Transport Co Inc

Relies on George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co. · Lumber Mutual Casualty Ins. v. Stukes · War Emergency Co-op. Ass'n v. Widenhouse

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1952-04-24

How this case has been cited

Cited by 84 later decisions — most recently December 2012 · most notably 281 So. 2d 728 - Karam v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (1973), Carolina Casualty Insurance Company v. Insurance Company of North America T II Refrigerated Transport Co Inc (1979)

21 federal appellate · 13 district · 25 state decisions — followed in 12 states

3201952196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*598Cornelius H. Doherty, Washington, D. C, with whom Alfred L. Bennett, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.

¶2Paul R. Connolly, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Howard Boyd, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellees.

¶3Before CLARK, BAZELON and WASHINGTON, Circuit Judges.

¶4WASHINGTON, Circuit Judge.

¶5This is a controversy between two insurance companies over which of them shall bear the burden of a loss.

¶6Jennie Emens, the victim of a highway accident, recovered a judgment in New Jersey against James Mench, Jr., the owner and driver of a trailer-truck. Mench was insured under a policy issued to him by the National Mutual Insurance Company, and that company took charge of his defense. The judgment against Mench was never satisfied, and the present litigation arose when Jennie Emens brought' suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Mench’s insurer, the National company.

¶7Under the terms of Mench’s policy, National’s liability did not begin until all other insurance available to the insured had been exhausted — that is, the policy was “excess” insurance. At the time of the accident, Mench’s truck was under lease to Elliott Bros. Trucking Company and was being driven by Mench on its business. Appellant National takes the view that insurance was available to Mench under a policy issued to Elliott Bros, by the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Believing itself therefore not to be liable under the policy it had issued to Mench, appellant lodged a third-party complaint against Elliott Bros, and the Liberty company. This complaint recited that National “presents” Liberty and Elliott Bros, as “parties to this action upon which recovery may be had by plaintiff,” and prayed that in the event of a judgment against National it be gjven judgment against appellees (third-party defendants) for the amount thereof. It is from the dismissal of this third-party complaint on summary judgment that the present appeal was taken.

¶8Since 1946, Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., has permitted a defendant to move for leave to serve a third-party complaint only upon a person “who is or may be liable to him [the defendant] for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him.” (Emphasis added.) No longer is it possible to bring in a person simply because he is or may be liable to the original plaintiff.1 To the extent, then, that the third-party complaint rested on the theory that appellees were liable to Jennie Emens, it was unauthorized by the Rule and properly dismissible.

¶9Appellant suggests, however, that the third-party complaint can be read as relying on the theory that appellees are or may be liable to appellant, defendant below, on the basis of “subrogation.” But there is no basis for subrogation in the present case. On principle, the loss has fallen *599squarely where it should — on Mench, the negligent driver of the vehicle, and on his insurer. They cannot shift it to the innocent employer-lessee, Elliott Bros., or to the latter’s insurer, simply because Mench was driving the vehicle on Elliott' Bros.’ business at the time of the wrongdoing. See Kennedy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 127 Misc. 665, 217 N.Y.S. 261; American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Penn Mutual Indemnity Co., 3 Cir., 161 F.2d 62. Compare George’s Radio v. Capital Transit Co., 75 U.S.App.D.C. 187, 126 F.2d 219.

¶10Nothing in the insurance contracts here involved calls for a different result. There might perhaps be subrogation if Mench were covered as an insured by the Elliott Bros, policy, since recourse to Liberty’s liability might then be required before resort to the “excess insurance” provided by appellant’s contract with Mench. Cf. Builders & Mfrs. Mutual Cas. Co. v. Preferred Automobile Ins. Co., 6 Cir., 118 F.2d 118. But Mench was not an insured under the Elliott Bros, policy. The omnibus coverage clause of that policy does state that “the unqualified word ‘insured’ includes the named insured [Elliott Bros. Trucking Company] and also includes any person while using an owned automobile or a hired automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof … But it goes on to say that °“The insurance with respect to any person or organization other than the named insured does not apply: … (d) with respect to any hired automobile, to the owner therof or any employee of such owner; …

¶11Mench, as the owner of the vehicle hired by Elliott Bros., was thus excluded from the definition of the term “insured.” 2 The intent is clear: if an injured party sues the named insured [Elliott Bros.] and recovers, the insurance company will be liable ; but if he brings suit solely against the owner of a hired vehicle [Mench], the company assumes no responsibility either to the owner of the vehicle or to the injured party.

¶12Nor is this result changed by the so-called “ICC endorsement” included in the policy which Liberty issued to Elliott Bros. The endorsement provides:

“In consideration of the premium stated in the policy to which this endorsement is attached, the company hereby agrees to pay any final judgment recovered against the insured for bodily injury to or the death of any person … resulting from the negligent operation, maintenance, or use of tíre motor vehicles under certificate of public convenience and neces*600sity or permit issued to the insured by the Interstate Commerce Commission”.”

¶13The endorsement was required by the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 315, for the protection of members of the public; it doubtless would have enured to the benefit of Jennie Ernens, had she chosen to sue Elliott Bros.3 But it hardly serves to shift Mench’s liability from his own insurer to Elliott Bros.’ insurer. Nor does it make it Menc'h an “insured” under the Liberty policy; that is still a matter governed by the express provisions of the body of the contract.

¶14There being no genuine issue of material fact, and the third-party complaint being subject to dismissal under Rule 14(a), the grant of summary judgment was proper. The judgment of the District .Court will accordingly be

¶15Affirmed.

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