Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission’s Empirical Analysis
196 F.2d 803 · 1952
Citation profile
19 federal appellate · 8 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 34 later decisions — most recently June 2004 · most notably Municipal Light Boards of Reading & Wakefield Massachusetts v. Federal Power Commission (1971), Richard A. Williams and Alfred S. Trask v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, D.C. Transit System, Inc., Intervenor. Democratic Central Committee of the District of Columbia, Leonard N. Bebchick and Daniel W. Gottlieb v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, D.C. Transit System, Inc., Intervenor. D.C. Transit System, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission (1969)
19 federal appellate · 8 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 717C · 15 U.S.C. § 717D · 16 U.S.C. § 824D (§ 205 of the Federal Power Act of 1920)
Relies on Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. · Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp. · United States v. CIO · ICC v. Parker · American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““A¥ith changes in economic conditions rates must be changed from time to time, and the lag which necessarily accompanies the mating of changes may result to the benefit of the utility as well as to its detriment. * * * It is true, of course, that a utility is entitled to rates that are just and reasonable; but this is not to say that rates must fluctuate automatically with every- change in economic conditions or that a reasonable time may not be allowed for determining the reasonableness of a proposed increase in rates before it is allowed to go into effect. Any loss sustained by a maintenance of the status quo while such determination is being made is properly considered, not as a violation of constitutional right, but as a necessary incident of rate regulation so long as the period of suspension does not ‘overpass the bounds of reason.’ See American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232, 247 , 57 S. Ct. 170, 177 , 81 L. Ed. 142 ; Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U. S. 464, 475 , 70 S. Ct. 266 , 94 L. Ed. 268 .””
5 later decisions quote this exact passage“where provisions of one statute have been adopted by another, the interpretation which has been authoritatively placed upon the former applies to the latter also.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage““The Commission’s power to fix rates under section 5(a) is prospective only, and rates so fixed are applicable only to the future. * * * The Commission is given no power to enter reparation orders with respect to rates. Its power over rates, which is prescribed by section 5(a) * * * is to determine after a hearing whether existing rates are unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential, and, if so, to prescribe the just and reasonable rate ‘to be thereafter observed and in force’. If it suspends a proposed new rate under section 4(e), and enters upon a hearing pursuant to that section, it can make only such orders with respect thereto ‘as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had become effective’, i. e. a proceeding under section 5(a).””
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.