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← 196 F.2d 828 - Leimer v. Woods

Leimer v. Woods’s Empirical Analysis

196 F.2d 828 · 1952

Citation profile

67
cited by 67 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
5
states following
April 1997
most recently cited

30 federal appellate · 7 district · 7 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 67 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 1997 · most notably Beacon Theaters Inc v. C Westover (1959), Monroe Auto Equipment Co. v. Heckethorn Manufacturing & Supply Co. (1964)

30 federal appellate · 7 district · 7 state decisions

36019521960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2111

Relies on Porter v. Warner Holding Co. · City of Morgantown v. Royal Insurance · Hodges v. Easton · Shields v. Thomas · Ring v. Spina

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 67 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““ * * * a federal court may not under the Rules of Civil Procedure, in a situation of joined or consolidated equitable and legal causes of action, involving a common substantial question of fact, deprive either party of a properly demanded jury trial upon that question, by proceeding to a previous disposition of the equitable cause of action and so causing the fact to become res judicata, unless there exists special reasons or impelling considerations for the adoption of such a pre-empting procedural course in the particular situation.” 12”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Any person who demands, accepts, receives, or retains any payment of rent in excess of the maximum rent prescribed under the provisions of this Act * * * shall be liable to the person from whom such payment is demanded, accepted, received, or retained * * * for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as determined by the court, plus liquidated damages in the amounts of (1) $50, or (2) not more than three times the amount by which the payment or payments demanded, accepted, received, or retained exceed the maximum rent which could lawfully be demanded, accepted, received, or retained, as the court in its discretion may determine, whichever in either case may be the greater amount: Provided, T.hat the amount of such liquidated damages shall be the' amount of the overcharge or overcharges if the defendant proves that the violation was neither willful nor the result, of failure to take practicable precautions against the occurrence of the violation.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““In view of the fact, however, that the case must go back for the rendition of a proper legal judgment, it seems appropriate in the situation to allow the trial court to reopen the case for jury trial, if the evidence was in fact such as to have entitled appellant to have had it submitted to a jury, had his demand for a trial by jury not been denied. This can be done through the court’s undertaking to consider the situation initially on a remand as a question of summary judgment (emphasis mine), as to the violations for which a damage right exists, on the basis of the transcript of the previous evidence.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.