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196 F.2d 986

Docket No. 13056.

Olinger v. Partridge

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided May 15, 1952.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1952-05-15

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““ * * * The theory of exhaustion of administrative remedies by default is without support in precedent or in reasoning. The authorities are all to the effect that the judicial machinery may not be invoked until all administrative remedies have been unsuccessfully pursued. Johnson v. United States, 8 Cir., 1942, 126 F.2d 242 . Olinger’s inaction does not exhaust his administrative remedies, but rather amounts to a waiver of any rights which he may have claimed under the Selective Service Act.””

quoted by 3 later decisions, including Crusen v. United Air Lines, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 171 - United States v. Dorn

““Notice of Right to Appeal “Appeal from classification by Local Board must be made within 10 days after the mailing of this notice by filing a written notice of appeal with the Local Board. “Within the same 10-day period you may file a written request for personal appearance before the Local Board. If this is done, the time in which you may appeal is extended 10 days from the date of mailing of the new Notice of Classification after such personal appearance.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including 121 F. Supp. 171 - United States v. Dorn

Relies on Falbovs v. United States · Johnson v. United States · United States ex rel. La Charity v. Commanding Officer of United States Army Induction Center

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1952-05-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently May 1997 · most notably Kuhn v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, Branch 5 (1976), Davis v. Nelson (1964)

21 federal appellate · 3 district · 4 state decisions

14019521960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Nicholas Ferrara, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellants.

¶2Walter S. Binns, U. S. Atty., Clyde C. Downing, Asst. U. S. Atty. Chief, Civil Division, Robert K. Grean, Asst. U. S. Atty., all of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.

¶3Before STEPHENS, HEALY and ORR, Circuit Judges.

¶4STEPHENS, Circuit Judge.

¶5It is claimed in the petition of Ruth Huffman for habeas corpus on behalf of A. Paul Olinger that he was licensed as a first assistant engineer of steam vessels on November 9, 1948, and that since the Korean War began in June, 1950, and the President proclaimed a National Emergency on December 16, 1950, he is not liable to the Selective Service draft, Title 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 451 et seq. because of an exemption under the provisions of Title 46 U.S.C.A. § 225, enacted May 28, 1896.1 He was inducted into the Army of the United States on February 6, 1951, through the Selective Service system and his contention is that since he has not been assigned to nor has he been performing the duties of a first assistant engineer of the Merchant Marine he is illegally restrained by Army officials in violation of Title 46 U.S.C.A. § 225. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the judgment of dismissal is here on appeal on behalf of Olinger.

¶6Local Draft Board No. 126, Long Beach, California, hereinafter referred to as “draft board”, acting under authority of the Selective Service Act and Regulations of the United States, classified Olinger as 1-A on October 8, 1948, and mailed to him *987a notice of that classification on October 11, 1948. The classification form which was sent contained a notice that an appeal from the classification must be made within 10 days.2 During the years 1948 and 1949 Olinger did not appeal from the classification and made no effort to appear and discuss his classification or to present new information to the draft board.

¶7In August, 1950, upon receipt of a notice to report for a physical examination and prior to the date fixed for the physical examination, Olinger personally appeared at the draft board and orally requested a reclassification. No action has been taken on the request.

¶8He failed to report for his physical examination on August 15, 1950, and on September 7, 1950, an order to report for induction on September 18, 1950, was mailed to him. He was unable to report on that date since he was at sea. On February 3, 1951, Olinger again appeared at the draft board to discuss his classification. At that time he was notified to report for induction as a delinquent on February 5, 1951, and was inducted into the Army on the next day.

¶9Olinger argues that he has exhausted his administrative remedies by not pursuing them. We quote from his brief: “The sole question therefore presented by this appeal is whether appellant A. Paul Olinger who had not taken an administrative appeal from his classification by the local board, but had undergone actual induction into the military service, may by habeas corpus proceedings obtain a judicial review of the legality of his classification and induction.” The cases cited in support of this contention are all cases where the administrative remedies have been exhausted, including appeals provided in the Selective Service Regulations, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 460(b)(3), 32 C.F.R. § 1626. Falbo v. United States, 1944, 320 U.S. 549, 64 S.Ct. 346, 88 L.Ed. 305, is one of them. The theory of exhaustion of administrative remedies by default is without support in precedent or in reasoning. The authorities are all to the effect that the judicial machinery may not be invoked until all administrative remedies have been unsuccessfully pursued. Johnson v. United States, 1942, 8 Cir., 126 F.2d 242. Olinger’s inaction does not exhaust his administrative remedies, but rather amounts to a waiver of any rights which he may have claimed under the Selective Service Act.3

¶10Furthermore, as of the date of his classification, Olinger was a merchant seaman and as such was not exempt from the draft under the Selective Service Act of 1948.4

¶11Affirmed.

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