Pratt v. Griese’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The statutes recognize that land for a right of way may be acquired by purchase as well as by compulsory proceedings. When so purchased for that purpose does the railroad company hold a higher or better right than where it is acquired by virtue of eminent domain? May a railroad company purchase a strip of land extending a great distance through the country and over many farms, abandon the enterprise, and then sell the strip to those who will put it to a wholly different use — one that might be both obnoxious and menacing to the adjoining owners? Where an absolute and unqualified fee-simple title is acquired by a railroad company it may of course, in the absence of express or implied restrictions, be conveyed to another. After stating this rule Judge Elliott remarks: ‘But where there is an implied restriction, as is often the case in regard to the right of way, or the like, of a railroad company, the grant does not ordinarily vest a fee in the company, but vests such an estate, usually an easement, as is requisite to effect the purpose for which the property is required. Where the grant is of “surplus real estate,” as it is often called, that is of real estate not forming part of the railroad or its appendages, a deed effective to vest a fee in a natural person will vest that estate in a railroad company.’ (2 Ell. Rail. § 400.) “Whatever its name, the interest was taken for use as a right of way, it was limited to that use, and must revert when the use is abandoned. “. . . Th”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Gauger v. State

2. ““ ‘The general rule is that die right and title to a mere easement in land acquired by a qwosi-public corporation, either by purchase, condemnation or prescription, for a public purpose is dependent upon die continued use of die property for that purpose, and when such public use is abandoned the right to hold the land ceases, and the property reverts to its original owner or his successors in title. See Canton Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 99 Md. 202 , 57 Atl. 637 (1904), where it was said at p. 218 (quoting in part from Vogler v. Geiss, 51 Md. 407 [1879]): “ ‘ “ ‘A cesser of the use, coupled with any act clearly indicative of an intention to abandon the right, would have the same effect as an express release of the easement, without any reference whatever to time.’ ” ’ ” Pratt, 196 Kan. at 186 (quoting MA. & PA. RR. CO. v. MER.-SAFE, ETC., CO., 224 Md. 34, 39 , 166 A. 2d 247 [1960]).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Riverside Drainage District v. Hunt

3. ““Whether a right of way has been abandoned by a railroad company is largely a question of intent, and it is generally held that in order to constitute an abandonment there must be an intent to relinquish, together with external acts by which the intent is carried into effect.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 6 Kan. App. 2d 387 - Martell v. Stewart