¶1 G. S., 4384, under which the indictment was drawn, specifies two offenses :
¶2 1. That if any official named therein “shall wilfully omit, neglect or refuse to discharge any of the duties of his office ... he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”
¶3 2. If it shall be proved that such officer “wilfully and corruptly omitted, neglected or refused to discharge any of the duties of his office, etc., . . . such officer shall be guilty of misbehavior in office, and shall be punished by removal therefrom, etc.”
¶4 The statute has been construed by this Court in several decisions. In indictments for neglect of duty corrupt intent need not be shown. S. v. Leeper, 146 N. C., 655, 61 S. E., 585; Battle v. Rocky Mount, 156 N. C., 329, 72 S. E., 354; S. v. Berry, 169 N. C., 371, 85 S. E., 387. The foundation of liability to indictment of such officers under the statute is thus expressed in S. v. Hatch, 116 N. C., 1003, 21 S. E., 430: “However honest the defendants may be (and their honesty is not called in question) the public have a right to be protected against the wrongful conduct of their servants, if there is carelessness amounting to a wilful want of care in the discharge of their official duties, which injures the public.”
¶5 It is to be observed that the essentials of the crime as prescribed are: first, a wilful neglect in the discharge of official duty; and second, injury to the public.
¶6 Applying the rules of law to the seventh and 'eighth counts in the bill of indictment, it would appear that no crime contemplated by the statute is charged in said counts. There is no allegation of injury to the public or that the defendant derived a profit from the petty labor of the patients; neither is there allegation as to the violation of any *774 specific duty imposed by any statute of tbe State or by any rule or regulation duly prescribed by tbe directors of tbe institution. Moreover, there is no allegation that any patient was injured or harmed in any manner.
¶7 These defects appear upon the face of the bill, and the motion in arrest of judgment should have been allowed. S. v. Brady, 177 N. C., 587, 99 S. E., 7; S. v. McKnight, ante, 259.
¶8 Error.