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← 196 W. Va. 559 - Brown v. Gobble

196 W. Va. 559 - Brown v. Gobble’s Empirical Analysis

1996

Citation profile

60
cited by 60 later decisions
4
states following
June 2019
most recently cited

60 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 60 later decisions — most recently June 2019 · most notably Grace v. Koch (1998), 196 W. Va. 692 - Powderidge Unit Owners Ass'n v. Highland Properties, Ltd. (1996)

60 state decisions

320199620002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Mathews v. Eldridge · Anderson v. City of Bessemer City · In the Matter of Samuel Winship · Addington v. Texas · Schneiderman v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]he deference accorded to a circuit court sitting as factfinder may evaporate if upon review of its findings the appellate court determines that: (1) a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is not considered; (2) all proper factors, and no improper factors, are considered, but the circuit court in weighing those factors commits an error of judgment; or (3) the circuit court failed to exercise any discretion at all in issuing its decision.”
    7 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “[Hollowing a bench trial, the circuit court’s findings, based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be overturned unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the circuit judge to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. W.Va.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Under this standard, if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, we may not reverse it, even though convinced that had we been sitting as the trier of fact, we would have weighed the evidence differently. We will disturb only those factual findings that strike us wrong with the “force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.” United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309, 1319 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1010 , 115 S.Ct. 1327 , 131 L.Ed.2d 206 (1995).”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “[i]t is well settled in this jurisdiction that in a case tried without the aid of a jury, the trial court, and not the appellate court, is the judge of the weight of the evidence. Actually, in a nonjury trial, the trial judge has usually been regarded as a surrogate for the jury, and his or her findings are accorded corresponding weight. Subject only to W.Va.R.Civ.P. 52(a)’s clearly erroneous standard, this standard precludes a reviewing court'from reversing a finding of the trier of fact simply because the reviewing court would have decided the case differently. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 , 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). In fact; it is ■ clear that the burden on an appellant af tempting to show clear error is especially strong when the findings are primarily based upon oral testimony and the circuit' court has viewed the demeanor and judged the credibility of the witnesses. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Conley, 156 W.Va. 391, 395 , 194 S.E.2d 170, 172 (1972).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.