196 W. Va. 56 - Meadows v. Meadows’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “At common law, no party or person interested in the results or outcome of the judicial proceedings was permitted to testify. The interest of a witness was an absolute disqualification which precluded the witness from giving any testimony. “Thus, as a result of inordinate concern about the possibility of witness perjury, the persons having the greatest knowledge of the facts in dispute were often denied the opportunity to relate that information to the trier of fact. Because such sweeping rules of incompetency could cause significant injustice, they were a target for early reformers of the law of evidenee[.]” Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 6.1 at 498 (1995). (Footnote omitted). In 1843, the disqualification of interested persons was removed in England by statute. 6 and 7 Viet. c. 85 (1843). England started the reform that led to the statutory removal of these qualifying elements in practically every state, including West Virginia. The West Virginia statute, now codified as W.Va.Code, 57-3-1, first was adopted in 1868. It states in pertinent part: “No person offered as a witness in any civil action, suit or proceeding, shall be excluded by reason of his interest in the event of the action, suit or proceeding, or because he is a party thereto[.]” Like Rule 601, the statute sweeps away the traditional objection to competency of witnesses, but with the following one exception known as the “Dead Man’s Statute”: “No party to any action, suit or proceeding,”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Robin Skinner Prinz · Hicks v. Ghaphery

2. “[T]he exclusion of the testimony of a party merely because of interest more likely will result in widespread injustices than would a rule of admissibility subject to the traditional adversarial testing. See Gentry v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512, 527 , 466 S.E.2d 171, 186 (1995) (“‘[vjigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence’”), quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 , 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2798 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469, 484 (1993); State v. Thomas, 187 W.Va. 686, 691 , 421 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1992) (“[c]ross-examination is the engine for truth”).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Robin Skinner Prinz · Hicks v. Ghaphery

3. “[I]n reviewing a circuit court’s application of the Dead Man’s Statute, we utilize a bifurcated process. First, we review a circuit court’s fact finding for clear error and give due deference to the circuit court’s application of the statute to the facts applying an abuse of discretion standard. McDougal v. McCammon, 193 W.Va. 229, 235 , 455 S.E.2d 788, 794 (1995); Michael v. Sabado, 192 W.Va. 585, 595 , 453 S.E.2d 419, 429 (1994); Grillis v. Monongahela Power Co., 176 W.Va. 662, 666-67 , 346 S.E.2d 812, 817 (1986). To the extent the exclusion of the evidence was based either upon a legal precept or an interpretation of a statute, our review is plenary. In other words, we review a circuit court’s ruling on the admissibility of testimony under an abuse of discretion standard, but to the extent a circuit court’s ruling turns on an interpretation, meaning, or scope of the statute or a rule of evidence our review is de novo. Gentry v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512, 517-18 , 466 S.E.2d 171, 176-77 (1995).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Robin Skinner Prinz