Michael G. Schroyer’s Empirical Analysis
1999
Citation profile
1 district · 7 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 60 later decisions — most recently May 2020 · most notably B-Real, LLC v. Chaussee (In Re Chaussee) (2008), Taylor v. First Resolution Invest. Corp. (Slip Opinion) (2016)
1 district · 7 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Blum v. Stenson · Sedima Sprl v. Imrex Company Inc · Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. · Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education · Mart Corporation v. Cartier Inc 47th Street Photo Inc
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[C]onsidering § 1692a(6) as a whole, it is clear that Congress intended the "principal purpose" prong to differ from the "regularly" prong of its definition of "debt collector." See Garrett v. Derbes , 110 F.3d 317 , 318 (5th Cir.1997) (per curiam). Thus, one "may regularly render debt collection services, even if these services are not a principal purpose of his business." Id. As another court has explained, "the word 'regular' is not synonymous with the word 'substantial.' Debt collection services may be rendered 'regularly' even though these services may amount to a small fraction of the firm's total activity." Stojanovski v. Strobl & Manoogian, P.C. , 783 F.Supp. 319 , 322 (E.D.Mich.1992). Under this interpretation of "regular" or "regularly," an attorney may be a "debt collector" under the FDCPA even when the ratio of his debt collection efforts to other legal efforts is small. Id.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“for a court to find that an attorney or law firm “regularly” collects debts for purposes of the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show that the attorney or law firm collects debts as a matter of course for its clients or for some clients, or collects debts as a substantial, but not principal, part of his or its general law practice.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“the requirements of the statutes are similar.... Thus, to determine whether Defendants are ‘suppliers’ under the OCSPA, this Court must ask essentially the same question that it must ask to determine whether Defendants are ‘debt collectors’ under the FDCPA: Did debt collection activities fall within Defendants’ regular and usual course of business so that they were ‘engaged in the business of debt collection?”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.