Reader v. Hirsch & Co.’s Empirical Analysis
1961
Citation profile
12 federal appellate · 1 district · 5 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 38 later decisions — most recently January 2007 · most notably 288 F. Supp. 453 - Moscarelli v. Stamm (1968), Kavit v. A. L. Stamm & Co. (1974)
12 federal appellate · 1 district · 5 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 77A (§ 1 of the Securities Act of 1933) · 15 U.S.C. § 77I (§ 9 of the Securities Act of 1933) · 15 U.S.C. § 77N (§ 14 of the Securities Act of 1933) · 15 U.S.C. § 77V (§ 22 of the Securities Act of 1933) · 15 U.S.C. § 78A (§ 1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 15 U.S.C. § 78C (§ 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 15 U.S.C. § 78F (§ 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 15 U.S.C. § 78G (§ 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)
Relies on Wilko v. Swan · Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc. · Brooklyn Sav Bank v. O'Neil Dize · Philadelphia Baltimore Washington Railroad Company v. Theodore a Schubert · Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““The Securities and Exchange Act does not expressly give a right or remedy to a private person injured by § 7(c) of that Act. But such a right may nonetheless be implied. * * * Broadly stated, the rule is that where defendant’s violation of a prohibitory statute has caused injury to plaintiff the latter has a right of action if one of the purposes of the enactment was to protect individual interests like the plaintiff’s. “That rule applies to the case at bar. Undoubtedly ‘the main purpose’ of § 7 of the Securities and Exchange Act was ‘to give a government credit agency an effective method of reducing the aggregate amount of the nation’s credit resources which can be directed by speculation into the stock market.’ House Com.Rep. 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. No. 1383. But Congress recognized that ‘protection of the small speculator by making it impossible for him to spread himself too thin * * » will be achieved as a byproduct of the main purpose.’ Ibid. In short, the intent of the enactment was in part to protect an individual like plaintiff from losing his equities in stocks pledged to a broker, dealer or bank, due to his having a lower margin than the level approved by the Federal Reserve Board.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Whereas the 1933 Act is concerned primarily with the distribution process, the 1934 Act has to do with post-distribution trading. It has four basic purposes: to afford a measure of disclosure to people who buy and sell securities; to prevent and afford remedies for fraud in securities trading and manipulation of the markets; to regulate the securities markets; and to control the amount of the Nation’s credit which goes into those markets. [Emphasis added]”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“The Securities Act of 1933 . . . was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealings.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.