Jones v. Marcum’s Empirical Analysis
2002
Citation profile
1 federal appellate · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently July 2022
1 federal appellate · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation · Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Anderson v. Creighton
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““[A] defendant might resist a lawful arrest, to which the arresting officers might respond with excessive force to subdue him. The subsequent use of excessive force would not negate the lawfulness of the initial arrest attempt, or negate the unlawfulness of the criminal defendant’s attempt to resist it. Though occurring in one continuous chain of events, two isolated factual contexts would exist, the first giving rise to criminal liability on the part of the criminal defendant, and the second giving rise to civil liability on the part of the arresting officer.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“For example, assume that the plaintiff alleges that the defendant hit him over the head with his heavy-duty flashlight during an arrest for shoplifting, despite the fact that the plaintiff had put up no resistance. If the defendant denies the allegations and moves for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, the motion would have to be overruled. Not only would there be a genuine issue of material fact on exactly what occurred, but the court would also have no problem finding ample authority holding, if the plaintiffs version of the facts proved to be true, that the defendant’s conduct was unreasonable and he should have appreciated the fact that it was unreasonable at the time he was hitting the plaintiff. In other words, on those facts, the law, as well as the plaintiffs rights thereunder, is clearly established. In such a case, Brandenburg controls, and Saucier is inapplicable. By contrast, assume that in the example above, the detention of the plaintiff had taken place after a long foot chase, that the plaintiff was assumed by the defendant officer to be armed, and that the plaintiff does not dispute that the chase took place. Assume further that, as it turned out, the plaintiff was not armed, but that he does not dispute he had a lumpy metal object in his back pocket. If the plaintiff alleges that at the end of the chase, the defendant officer tackled him and shoved his head against the ground with excessive force, it might very well present a question of fac”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Johnson v. Wolgemuth“Conceding that reasonable minds might disagree on whether the force used was excessive under the circumstances, the Supreme Court nonetheless concluded that under that set of facts, the law was not settled as to whether it was excessive, and, therefore, that a reasonable officer, acting in the heat of the moment, might have found it reasonable to act as he did. [533 U.S. at 207-08, 121 S.Ct. 2151 .] It is important to note that the Court considered the factual nuances in reaching its conclusion: [The officer] did not know the full extent of the threat [the detainee] posed or how many other persons there might be who, in concert.with [him], posed a threat to the security of the Vice President. There were other potential protestors in the crowd, and at least one other individual was arrested and placed into the van with [him]. In carrying out the detention, as it has been assumed the officers had the right to do, [the officer] was required to recognize the necessity to protect the Vice President by securing [the detainee] and restoring order to the scene. It cannot be said there was a clearly established rule that would prohibit using the force [the officer] did to place [the detainee] into the van to accomplish these objectives. [Id. at 208, 121 S.Ct. 2151 .]”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Johnson v. Wolgemuth
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.