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← 197 Miss. 366 - McCaslin v. Willis

McCaslin v. Willis’s Empirical Analysis

1944

Citation profile

5
cited by 5 later decisions
2
states following
February 1972
most recently cited

3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently February 1972

3 state decisions

201944195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Gordon v. Munn · Cooper v. Bower · McCaw v. Turner · Dencer v. Jory · Horn v. Nicholas

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““We have no privileged communications statute as to attorney and client, other than section 8665, Code 1942, which requires attorneys ‘to maintain inviolate the confidence and, at every peril to themselves, to preserve the secrets of their clients.’ In other words, we have no statute regarding privileged communications between attorney and client which expressly provides that a disclosure cannot be made except with the consent of the client, as is true under section 1697, Code 1942, supra, relating to .those between a physician and patient, which was before the Court as aforesaid in the case of McCaw v. Turner, supra. At any rate, we are of the opinion that under the rule stated in 20 Am.Jur. p. 521, hereinbefore quoted, the witness, even though occupying the relation of an attorney for Mr. McCaslin as well as that of a trustee in the deed of trust, was competent to testify under the circumstances to refute the contention when made that said deceased had made the alleged statement against interest that the debt had been paid.” (19 So.2d p. 754.)”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““ § 160. Instrument — how discharged. A negotiable instrument is discharged: (5) When the principal debtor becomes the holder of the instrument at or after maturity in his own right.” “ § 163. Renunciation by holder. The holder may expressly renounce his rights against any party to the instrument, before, at or after its maturity. An absolute and unconditional renunciation of his rights against the principal debtor made at or after the maturity of the instrument discharges the instrument. But a renunciation does not affect the rights of a holder in due course without notice. A renunciation must be in writing, unless the instrument is delivered up to the person primarily liable thereon.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““In the absence of statute, the death of a declarant is not in itself a ground for invoking an exception to the hearsay rule, which renders unsworn statements inadmissible in evidence. Under certain circumstances, however, statements made by a person since deceased are admissible under an exception to such rule, based on the ground of necessity. * * * * * * “On principle, such declarations are not admitted as of necessity if other competent evidence is available.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.