Sroczynski v. Milek’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"[w]aiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right." Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177 [ 836 A. 2d 794 ] (2003) (citing W. Jersey Title & Guar. Co. v. Indus. Trust Co., 27 N.J. 144, 152 [ 141 A. 2d 782 ] (1958)). See also Shotmeyer v. N.J. Realty Title Ins. Co., 195 N.J. 72, 89 [ 948 A. 2d 600 ] (2008). It is beyond question that "[a]n effective waiver requires a party to have full knowledge of his legal rights and inten[d] to surrender those rights." Knorr, supra, 178 N.J. at 177 [ 836 A. 2d 794 ] (citing W. Jersey Title & Guar. Co., supra, 27 N.J. at 153 [ 141 A. 2d 782 ]). A waiver cannot be divined but, instead, must be the product of objective proofs: "The intent to waive need not be stated expressly, provided the circumstances clearly show that the party knew of the right and then abandoned it, either by design or indifference." Ibid. (citing Merchs. Indem. Corp. of N.Y. v. Eggleston, 68 N.J.Super. 235, 254 [ 172 A. 2d 206 ] (App.Div.1961), aff'd, 37 N.J. 114 [ 179 A. 2d 505 ] (1962)). That benchmark standard leaves little room for doubt, as "[t]he party waiving a known right must do so clearly, unequivocally, and decisively." Ibid. (citing County[Country] Chevrolet, Inc. v. Twp. of N. Brunswick Planning Bd., 190 N.J.Super. 376, 380 [ 463 A. 2d 960 ] (App.Div.1983)). See also Shotmeyer, supra, 195 N.J. at 89 [ 948 A. 2d 600 ] (quoting Knorr, supra ). Specifically, "waiver `presupposes a full knowledge of the right and an intentional surrender; wa”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Marino v. Marino

2. “(1) the lack of prejudice to the defending party; (2) a series of steps taken to comply with the statute involved; (3) a general compliance with the purpose of the statute; (4) a reasonable notice of petitioner's claim[;] and (5) a reasonable explanation why there was not a strict compliance with the statute. [ Id. at 305 , 716 A. 2d 1158 (quoting Bernstein v. Bd. of Trs. of Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 151 N.J.Super. 71, 76-77 , 376 A. 2d 563 (App.Div.(1977))).]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 425 N.J. Super. 600 - Schmidt v. CELGENE CORP.

3. “waiver `presupposes a full knowledge of the right and an intentional surrender; waiver cannot be predicated on consent given under a mistake of fact.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Marino v. Marino