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← 198 F.1d 72 - Munson v. McClaughry

Munson v. McClaughry’s Empirical Analysis

198 F. 72 · 1912

Citation profile

33
cited by 33 later decisions
5
states following
June 1973
most recently cited

18 federal appellate · 2 district · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 33 later decisions — most recently June 1973 · most notably Morgan v. Devine (1915), Ebeling v. Morgan (1915)

18 federal appellate · 2 district · 5 state decisions

1101912192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Ex parte Lange · Gordon v. State · Wilson v. State · People v. Devlin · Lewis v. President of the Bank of Kentucky

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[W]here one attempts to break into or breaks into a post office building with intent to commit larceny therein, and at the same time commits the larceny, his criminal intent is one, and it inspires his entire transaction, which is itself in reality but a single continuing criminal act. It seems to be unauthorized, inhumane, and unreasonable to divide such a single intent and such a criminal act into two or more separate offenses, and to inflict separate punishments upon the various steps in the act or transaction, such as one for breaking, or for the attempt to break with the criminal intent, and another for a larceny with the same intent, or such as one for the attempt to break, a second for the breaking, a third for the entering, a fourth for the taking of stamps, a fifth for the taking of other property, a sixth for the conversion of the property, and a seventh for carrying it away, all with the same single criminal intent. And there is evidently no limit to the number of offenses into which a single criminal transaction inspired by a single criminal intent may be divided, if this rule of divison and punishment is once firmly established.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““We think that it is manifest that Congress in the enactment of these sections [190-192—section 190 being practically the same as section 47 involved in the present ease] intended to describe separate and distinct offenses, for in section 190 [47] it is made an offense to steal any mail bag or other property belonging to the Post Office Department, irrespective of whether it was necessary, in order to reach the property, to forcibly break and enter into a post office building. The offense denounced by that section is complete when the property is stolen, if it belonged to the Post Office Department, however the larceny be attempted. Section 192 makes it an offense to forcibly break into or attempt to break into a post office, with intent to commit in such post office a larceny or other depredation. This offense is complete when the post office is forcibly broken into, with intent to steal or commit other depredation. It describes an offense distinct and apart from the larceny or embezzlement which is defined and made punishable under section 190 [47]. If the forcible entry into the post office has been accomplished with the intent to commit the offenses as described, or any one of them, the crime is complete, although the intent to steal or commit depredation in the post office building may have been frustrated or abandoned without accomplishment. And so, under section 190 [47], if the property is in fact stolen, it is immaterial how the post office was entered, whether by fo”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The highest judicial tribunals of Massachusetts, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Georgia have decided that burglary with intent to commit larceny and larceny at the same time and as a part of the same transaction may not be lawfully punished as separate offenses, because they are parts of a single continuous act inspired by a single criminal intent. * * *”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.