Larry Weyant, Charles Weyant v. George S. Okst, Irvin Richard Weber, Joseph Peter Auberger, Lawrence Mueller’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 federal appellate · 14 district · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 69 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A judgment is said to be final if it conclusively determines the rights of the parties to the litigation and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the order ... or resolve collateral issues .... However, certain types of post-judgment motions interrupt the judgment’s finality because judicial efficiency is improved by postponing appellate review of the judgment “until the District Court has had an opportunity to dispose of all motions that seek to amend or alter what otherwise might appear to be a final judgment,” Ostemeck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174 [, 109 S.Ct. 987 , 103 L.Ed.2d 146 (1989)].... The timely filing of a postjudgment motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), 52(b), or 59 automatically “affect[s] the finality of the judgment,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 Advisory Committee Note (1995), because such a motion seeks to alter the judgment or reverse decisions embodied in it. See, e.g., Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 267 , 98 S.Ct. 556 , 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (“A timely petition for rehearing tolls the running of the [appeal] period because it operates to suspend the finality of the ... court’s judgment, pending the court’s further determination whether the judgment should be modified so as to alter its adjudication of the rights of the parties.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 12 Moore’s Federal Practice § 59.12[1], at 59-38 (3d ed.1999) (a “timely motion under Rule 59 destroys the finality of the judgment”). A judgment’s fina”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In Re Reading Broadcasting, Inc. · Linda Jones v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America

2. “The Second Circuit concluded that: Because the 14-day period established by Rule 54(d)(2)(B) for the filing of a motion for attorneys’ fees was introduced in large part to avoid piecemeal appeals of merits and fees questions, that 14-day period begins to run with the entry of a final judgment. And because the finality of a judgment is negated by the timely filing of a motion under Rule 50(b), 52(b), or 59, we conclude that a Rule 54(d)(2)(B) motion is timely if filed no later than 14 days after the resolution of such a Rule 50(b), 52(b), or 59 motion.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Miltimore Sales, Inc. v. International Rectifier, Inc.

3. “[C]ertain types of post-judgment motions interrupt the judgment's finality because judicial efficiency is improved by postponing appellate review of the judgment until the District Court has had an opportunity to dispose of all motions that seek to amend or alter what otherwise might appear to be a final judgment, ... [but] finality is restored upon the resolution of the last of any post-judgment motions that operated to suspend finality.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. BARBARA ANN HOLLIER TRUST VS. SHACK C/W 63308