198 Md. App. 655 - Moore v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

32 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Two crimes created by legislative enactment may not be punished separately if the legislature intended the offenses to be punished by one sentence. It is when we are uncertain whether the legislature intended one or more than one sentence that we make use of an aid to statutory interpretation known as the ‘rule of lenity.’ Under that rule, if we are unsure of the legislative intent in punishing offenses as a single merged crime or as distinct offenses, we, in effect, give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and hold that the crimes do merge.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Montgomery v. State · 218 Md. App. 196 - Kyler v. State

2. “The Double Jeopardy Clause protects a criminal defendant against ... multiple punishment for the same offense. Multiple punishment challenges generally arise in one of two broad contexts: “(a) A statute or a portion thereof proscribes designated conduct, and the question is whether the defendant’s conduct constitutes more than one violation of this proscription. Thus, murdering two people simultaneously might well warrant two punishments but stealing two one-dollar bills might not. (b) Two statutes or two portions of a single statute proscribe certain conduct, and the question is whether the defendant can be punished twice because his conduct violates both proscriptions. Thus, selling liquor on a Sunday might warrant two punishments for violating a prohibition law and a blue law, but feloniously entering a bank and robbing a bank, though violative of two statutes, might warrant but a single punishment.” Whether a particular course of conduct constitutes one or more violations of a single statutory offense affects an accused in three distinct, albeit related, ways: multiplicity in the indictment or information, multiple convictions for the same offense, and multiple sentences for the same offense. All three turn on the unit of prosecution of the offense and this is ordinarily determined by reference to legislative intent.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Montgomery v. State

3. “[The defendant] also appears to argue that the criminal information was defective for improperly charging her with multiple violations of one criminal offense, to -wit, possessing counterfeit currency, issuing counterfeit currency, and theft. The State responds that, because [the defendant] did not file a mandatory pre-trial motion in accordance with Maryland Rule 4-252(a)(2)[ 28 ] and (b), she waived her challenge to any alleged improper charging document. We agree with the State and hold that [the defendant’s multiplicity argument regarding the charging document has not been preserved for appellate review. When the State charges multiple counts for a single offense, the charging document is multiplicitous.... Because [the defendant] in the instant case did not file a mandatory motion in accordance with [Maryland] Rule 4-252, her multiplicity argument in reference to the charging document is deemed waived. [The defendant], however, may challenge her convictions on multiplicity grounds.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Montgomery v. State