Volume 198 — United States Reports

This was an appeal from an order dismissing a writ of habeas corpus, and remanding appellant to the custody of the marshal to await the action of the District Judge. . On December 31, 1903, an indictment was found by the grand jury of the District of Columbia, charging appellant with a violation of Rev. Stat. sec. 5451, in bribing an officer, of the United States to do an act in violation of-his official duty.

Held: that it did not discriminate, and dismissed the suit.

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court holding that a New York State statute that prescribed maximum working hours for bakers violated the bakers' right to freedom of contract under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The decision has since been effectively overturned. The case began in 1899 when Joseph Lochner, a German immigrant who owned a bakery in Utica, New York, was charged with violating New York's Bakeshop Act of 1895. The Bakeshop Act had made it a crime for New York bakeries to employ bakers for more than 10 hours per day or 60 hours per week. He was convicted and ultimately appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

' APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. These cases were submitted .together. No. 354 is an appeal from an order and judgment of the District Court of the Eastern District of New York, in habeas corpus, remanding to the custody of appellee. No. 355 is an appeal from an order of the United States Circuit Court for the same district, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus arising out of the same proceedings as No. 354.

Held: that such a taking is undu the circumstances of this case good according to the law of Massachusetts as construed by its Supreme Judicial Court. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. William H. Brown for plaintiff in error. Mr. Charles T. Taiman for defendant in error. *92

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OP NEW YORK.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: void and in conflict with § 5219, Rev. Stat., as to those portions which are retroactive as imposing a burden on the bank not borne by other moneyed corporations of the State, and valid and not in conflict with § 5219 as to taxes imposed thereafter.

Held: that the judgment was final and the writ of error must be dismissed. The jiirisdiction of the Circuit Court rested solely on diverse citizenship, the assertion of title under patent from the.

This was a bill exhibited, in September, 1898, by Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, a corporation of New York, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Vermont, against the Howe Scale Company of 1886, a corporation of Vermont, alleging that complainant had been for many years engaged in the manufacture and sale of typewriting machines known in the markets and to the trade and public, and referred to, identified, offered for sale and sold as the “Remington…

The bill filed in the Circuit Court by .the plaintiff, McQuesten, alleged her to be “a citizen of the United States and of the State of Massachusetts, and residing at Turners Falls in said State,” while'the defendants Steigleder and wife were alleged to be “ citizens of the State of Washington, and residing at the city of Seattle'in said State.” The object of the suit was to obtain a decree adjudging defendants to be trustees for the plaintiff in respect of certain .real…

Held: that as an individual can derive no personal right under those-sections to enforce repudiation of his- notes, even though they might be illegal and void as against public policy, the defense did not amount to the setting up by, and decision against, the maker, of the notes of a right, privilege or immunity under a statute of the United States, within the meaning of § 709, Rev. Stat., and the writ of error was…

Held: and a well-known member of the principal political party in the district in which the court is held opposing that to which the clerk may belong, the clerk and said commissioner each to place one name in said box alternately, without reference to party affiliations, until the whole number required shall be placed therein, . . . and all juries to serve in courts after the passage of this act shall be drawn in…

Held: error; that in an action of ejectment plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of defendant’s, and that the rule is not affected in this case by the fact that the defendants, by cross-petition, had asked for equitable relief.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA.</p> <p>The case is thus stated by the Supreme Court of Iowa, to which it had been carried by appeal from the District Court of Palo Alto county:</p> <p>“This is an action in equity to quiet title to a tract of some two hundred and ninety acres of land in the south half of section 30, township'97, range 34, in Palo Alto county. Plaintiff is the admitted owner of lots two and three, forming a part of. said tract, and cOfitaining about 99 acres. According to the original Government survey, made in 1857, this land was adjacent to a lake, which was meandered, and the meander lines were run along the north side of the said two lots. The remainder of the land claimed lies between this meander line and the alleged shore of the lake, and is the-subject of the controversy. The half section in question — that is,' such part of it as lies beyond the original meander line — was resurveyed by the Government in the year 1898, and platted into five lots, of which lots 11, 14, and 16 are claimed by defendant Hemp-hill, and lots 12 and 13 -by defendant Ryan. These claims are founded upon conveyances from Palo Alto county, under a patent issued to the State, under the swamp land grant of 1850, and which is based upon the resurvey of 1898. Schlosser insists that the meander line is not his boundary, it not marking the edge of the lake, but that he is entitled to claim up to the east and west half section line of said section. There was a decree for plaintiff,- and defendants appeal.” 118 Iowa, 452.</p> <p>The- Supreme Court ruled that “where a body of water is meandered, such-lines are not boundary lines, and the ádjacent owner will usually take title to the actual shore, but where there is no adjacent body of water proper to be meandered, such line becomes á boundary, and a purchaser from the Government cannot claim title beyond it;” and held upon the facts that there was no body of water in se'ction thirty necessary to. be meandered, and that plaintiff could not claim title béyond.the meandered line. The court said in concluding: “In our opinion, the plaintiff has no right to any other than the land patented to his grantor, and the decree of the trial court must therefore be reversed.” And-entered judgment as.follows:'</p> <p>“In this.cause, the court being fully advised in the premises, file their written opinion reversing the judgment of the. District Court.</p> <p>“It is therefore considered by the court that the judgment of the court, below be and it is hereby reversed and set aside, and the. cause is remanded for further proceedings in harmony with the opinion of this court, and that a writ of procedendo issue accordingly.</p> <p>“It is further considered by the court that the appellee pay the costs of this appeal, taxed' at $227.70, and that execution issue therefor.”</p> <p>This writ of error was thereupon brought.</p>

Held: error: That the denial of defendant was sufficient under the practice of North Carolina to put the question of plaintiff’s corporate capacity to sue in issue. ' That for purposes óf suing and being sued jn the courts of the United States the members of a corporation are to be deemed citizens of the State by whose laws it was created.

.. On February 7, 1866, an act passed the Alabama legislature incorporating five persons named, their associates and successors, ah “The Alabama and Georgia Manufacturing Compány.” On March 21> 1866, the Georgia legislature incorporated the same mdividuals under, the same name, “The Alabama and Georgia Manufacturing Company.” ;The purposes of the two'corporations were identical. .

Separate proceedings in bankruptcy were begun in the District Court of the United States for the District of Washington, Northern Division, against Daniel N. Holden and Lizzie Holden, his wife. They were consolidated. . Both the parties were adjudicated to be bankrupt, and J. A. Stratton became the trustee of both estates.

Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), was a United States Supreme Court case that exemplified the idiosyncratic types of jurisdiction state courts (and therefore plaintiffs) could assert through quasi in rem actions before International Shoe's (1945) "minimum contacts" test replaced Pennoyer's (1878) principles of "power and notice". This case involved three parties: Harris, Balk, and Epstein. Harris owed Balk money and Balk owed Epstein money. Thus, there was no debt relationship between Harris and Epstein. Harris and Balk lived in North Carolina while Epstein lived in Maryland. Harris traveled to Maryland. While he was there, Epstein attached the debt Harris owed Balk in order for Epstein to obtain jurisdiction over Balk.

Appellant sued in the Court of Claims to recover the sum of $102,000, for the use, during the six years preceding the commencement of the suit, of a device invented by thé appellant for registering impressions in connection with printing presses. The Court of Claims dismissed the pétition. The findings of the Court of Claims are as follows: “II.

Chicago Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which upheld sales of American grain for future delivery provided for by the rules of the Chicago Board of Trade of the state of Illinois. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. delivered the majority opinion of the court, in which he wrote: People will endeavor to forecast the future and to make agreements according to their prophecy.

United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Supreme Court conceded its right to judicial review over immigration matters. The case held that "a citizen of Chinese parentage seeking admission to the United States" could be excluded by the administrative immigration authorities, even when being denied a hearing before a judicial body on the question whether they were indeed a citizen. The Court determined that refusing entry at a port does not deny due process and held that findings by immigration officials are conclusive and not subject to judicial review unless there is evidence of bias or negligence.

Held: that: As the proceeding was one in bankruptcy there was no appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals and its jurisdiction was confined, under clause of § 24, to revision in matter of law on notice and petition.

<p>Where the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is invoked on the' ground of diverse citizenship, it will not be held to rest also on the ground that the suit arose under the Constitution of the United States, unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy as to the effect or construction of the Constitution upon the determination of which the resuit depends, and which appears on the record by a statement in legal and logical form such as good pleading requires and where the case is not brought within this rule the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is final.</p> <p>Where the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court has been invoked on the ground of diverse citizenship and plaintiff 'asserts two causes of action, only one of which involves'a-right under the Constitution, and the Circuit Court . of Appeals decides against him on that cause of action and in his favor on- the other, the judgment of that Court is final and defendant cannot make- the alleged constitutional question on which he has succeeded the basis of jurisdiction for an appeal to this court.</p>

<p>The general rule that tangible personal property is subject to taxation by the State in which it is, no matter where the domicil of the owner may be, is not affected by the fact that the property is employed in interstate transportation on either land or water.</p> <p>Vessels registered or enrolled are not exempt from ordinary rules respecting taxation of personal property. The artificial sjtius created as the home port of a vessel, under § 4141, Rev. Stat., only controls the place of taxation in. the absence of an actual situs elsewhere.</p> <p>Vessels, though engaged in interstate commerce, employed in such commerce wholly within the limits of a State, are subject to taxation in that State although they may have been registered or enrolled at a port outside its limits.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion.. This statute violates Art. I, § 9, cl. 6, U. S. Const., which provides that no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another. This clause applies both to Federal and state legislation. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 414; The Lizzie Henderson, Fed. Cas.

Held: owned and stored at points in States other than Pennsylvania is hereby reserved, and it is agreed that it shall be submitted for the determination of the court. If the court shall be of the opinion that upon the facts stated in the aforesaid depositions of Fred.

This action was brought by the defendant in error .Nash, to condemn a right of way, so called, by enlarging a ditch for the conveying of water across the land of plaintiff^ in error, for the purpose of bringing water from Fort Canyon Creek, in the county and State of Utah, which is a stream of water flowing from the mountains near to the land of the defendant in error, and thus to irrigate his land.

United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), was a U.S. Supreme Court case that held that the Treaty with the Yakima of 1855, negotiated and signed at the Walla Walla Council of 1855, as well as treaties similar to it, protected the Indians' rights to fishing, hunting and other privileges.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OP CLAIMS.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: under the facts of this case, not to be such a classification as to make the tax void under the Fourteenth Amendment because it denies the street railway' the equal protection of the law, or deprives it of its property without due process of law.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.</p> <p>This action was begun in the Circuit Court of the United. States for the District of New Jersey for the purpose of enjoining the- alleged infringement of certain letters patent of the United States, issued to John W. Sutton, and bearing date of May 22, 1888, number 383,258, for a certain new and useful invention or improvement upon machines for plucking furs.</p> <p>In the Circuit Court a decree was rendered granting an injunction, 120 Fed. Rep. 672; upon appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit this judgment was reversed, and the cause was remanded to the Circuit Court with directions to dismiss the bill. 123 Fed. Rep. 869.</p> <p>The case was brought here upon writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Circuit Court of .Appeals.</p>

This was an action of ejectment brought, in 1896, by the Vicksburg, Shreveport and Pacific Railroad Company in the First Judicial District Court, Caddo Parish, Louisiana, against certain possessors, for whom Smith, Leonard and others were substituted as defendants, to recover 178.80 acres of land in that parish less 35.18 acres theretofore recovered by Smith and others in another action.

Held: under the circumstances of this case, and in view of the statutes of Illinois as to service on foreign corporations, to be carrying on business in Illinois, and that service on such persons of process in a •suit against it in the Circuit Court of the United States for Illinois was sufficient.

Held: the bar of the statute of limitations was operative. But this amounted to saying that even although the plaintiff was entitled to adverse the Uhlig claims, he could not be heard to rebut the evidence for the defendants *451 as to the possession under the Uhlig locations, by evidence as to the possession taken and had under the Levi P. location. Plainly we think the ruling denied to the grantee of the Yes You.

Held: as death was essential to confer jurisdiction on a probate court to administer an estate as such, the fact, of life at the time the administration was initiated conclusively rebutted the presumption and caused the court to be wholly without jurisdiction to administer the estate of a person who was alive.

Held: insufficient under the circumstances of this case. This suit was brought against the defendant, appellee, for the purpose of obtaining a discovery of all the matters referred to in the bill of complaint, and to have a receiver appointed of the assets of the company within the State of New York, and for an accounting by the directors of the defendant, and for other relief.

refusing to permit the plaintiff to use the wharf of defendant at Pensacola for the transportation of plaintiff’s property, as stated in the declaration. The action was brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Florida.

Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that, to prove abuse of discretion in the enforcement of criminal law that violates the Equal Protection Clause, it is necessary to show that there were people of other races who committed the same crime without being prosecuted. This case involved anti-Chinese sentiment at the turn of the 20th century. Justice Rufus W. Peckham dissented without writing an opinion.

Held: that: The general rule is that all matters respecting the remedy and the admissibility of evidence depend upon the law of the State where the suit is brought. Under the circumstances of this case the contract was a New York contract and not an Illinois contract. As §§ 834, 836, of the N. Y. Code of Civil Procedure, were enacted prior to the execution of the contract involved, they could not impair its obligation.

Held: not error and that: General Words in a release are to be limited and restrained to the particular words in the recital; and the release in this case, not being for all injuries but only for the particular ones specified, was not a bar to a recovery for damages resulting from the non-enumerated injuries and that the application of this rule is not affected by the words “avoid all controversy in regard to the matter”…

Held: that; A bailee asserting a lien for charges has the technical possession of the goods. The transfer of a warehouse receipt is not a symbolical delivery, but a real delivery to the same extent as if the goods had been transported to another warehouse named by the pledgee.

Edward B. Whitney, as trustee in bankruptcy of Daniel LeRoy Dresser and Charles E. Riess, members of the firm of Dresser & Company, filed a bill in equity against Charles H. Wenman, Stuyvesant Fish, George C. Boldt, the Security Warehousing Company and others, in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Upon demurrer to the bill, the court dismissed the same for want of jurisdiction.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The plaintiff, who was the owner of a claim against the defendant, the People’s National Bank of Lebanon, Pennsylvania, commenced an action in the State of New York by levying an attachment upon the funds of the defendant in that State, upon the ground that it was a foreign corporation. The defendant, appearing specially, for that purpose, moved to have the attachment vacated upon the ground that it was prohibited by the Revised Statutes of the United States. - At special term the motion was denied; the Appellate Division reversed the judgment of the special term and vacated the attachment. The Court of Appeals answered two questions certified' to it by the Appellate Division and affirmed the judgment of that coiirt. The two questions propounded are as follows, 173 Ñ. Y. 314:</p> <p>“1. Is the defendant exempt from attachment before judgment under section 5242, U. S. Revised.Statutes?</p> <p>“2. Are ;the rights claimed by plaintiff, to attachment agaihét. the defendant before judgmént, and fe the jurisdiction thereby acquired, preserved and given by section 4 of the act of Congress'of July 12, 1882?”</p> <p>The Court of Appeals, in affirming the'judgment of the court below, answered the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative. The case was then brought to this court upon writ of error.</p> <p>What is said in the opinion of this court in Pacific National Bank v. Mixter, 124 U. S. 721, that all attachments before judgment against national banks Solvent or insolvent are void under § 5242, is not only obiter but contradicts the judgment of the court in the Mixter case itself, which upheld the jurisdiction of the court below, acquired against the non-resident national bank by reason of the attachments and sustained the judgments entered below in virtue of this jurisdiction, but restrained what was practically execution, viz., proceedings on the bond to dissolve the attachment the bank being itself insolvent.</p> <p>The Mixter case has been questioned by this court. Earle v. Pennsylvania, 178 U. S. 449; Earle v. Conway, 178 U. S. 456. Robinson v. Bank, 81 N. Y. 385; Raynor v. Bank, 93 N. Y. 37.</p> <p>All doubts must be resolved against the jurisdiction of the United States courts. Petri v. National Bank, 142 U. S. 649; Joy v. St. Louis, 122 Fed. Rep. 525; United States v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 159 U. S. 548.</p> <p>Cases on defendant’s brief, Ex parte Jones, 164 U. S. 693; Garner v. National Bank, 66 Fed. Rep. 371, make no reference to the acts of July 12, 1882, and August 13, 1888. And see Hower v. Weiss, 55 Fed. Rep. 356; National Bank v. Buford, 191 U. S. 119; Norris v. National Bank, 30 Ill. App. 54; Kentucky v. Greer, 13 Illinois, 432; Holmes v. National Bank, 18 S. Car. 37.</p> <p>The act of July 12, 1882, introduces a new and unanswerable authority for the proposition that whatever may have been the former law, attachments against national banks, before judgment, when constituting the basis of jurisdiction, are now to be sustained. Had the defendant in the case at-bar, been a foreign state bank, with funds here, the New York courts would clearly have had jurisdiction through attachment, to impound the funds. Hence under the act of 1882, the same jurisdiction exists over the funds of a foreign national bank.</p> <p>If the prohibition of § 5242 be construed to include solvent banks, then the act of July 12, 1882, conflicts, and being the later statute, must prevail.</p> <p>The trend of legislation is distinctly toward removing from national banks any class privilege, or legal advantage of any description whatever. Petri v. National Bank, 142 U. S. 644. For definition of word jurisdiction as used in this statute see 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 1041, and cases cited. What was said in the Mixter case is now clearly obiter.</p> <p>A national bank is exempt from attachment before final judgment under § 5242, Rev. Stat.; §§ 52, 57, Currency Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 115, 116; act of March 3, 1873, 17 Stat. 603; Robinson v. National Bank, 81 N. Y. 385; Raynor v. Pacific Nat. Bank, 93 N. Y. 371; National Bank v. Mixter, 124 U. S. 721. The New York courts followed the Mixter case in Bank of Montreal v. National Bank, 112 N. Y. 667.</p> <p>In Massachusetts an injunction against a solvent national bank was denied, on the authority of the Mixter case. Freeman Mfg. Co. v. Nat. Bank of Republic, 160 Massachusetts, 398.</p> <p>In Vermont it is held that national banks were not subject to attachment or injunction before final judgment. Safford v. Nat. Bank, 61 Vermont, 373; Hazen v. Lyndonville Nat. Bank, 70 Vermont, 543.</p> <p>. In Minnesota, it has been held that an attachment against -a national bank in another State was void. First Nat. Bank v. La Due, 39 Minnesota, 415. So in Tennessee. Rosenheim Co. v. Southern Nat. Bank, 46 S. W. Rep. 1026. See also Planters’ Loan &c. Bank v. Berry, 91 Georgia, 264; Dennis v. First Nat. Bank of Seattle, 127 California, 453; Garner v. Second Nat. Bank, 66 Fed. Rep. 369.</p> <p>The decision in the Mixter case was not questioned, even indirectly, in Earle v. Pennsylvania, 178 U. S. 449; Earle v. Conway, 178 U. S. 456. The point was clearly not involved in those cases.</p> <p>The act of July 12, 1882, § 4, did not repeal these provisions of § 5242, Rev. Stat., or give any new or different rights to creditors of national banks in regard to provisional remedies. 22 Stat. 162. See cases cited supra and Petri v. Bank, 142 U. S. 644; National Bank v. Buford, 191 U. S. 119, 123. As held by the Court of Appeals Congress did not intend to regulate the method of commencing an action so as to enable a state court to acquire jurisdiction over the property of a national bank without acquiring jurisdiction of the bank itself. Raynor v. Nat. Bank, 93 N. Y. 371; Manufacturing Co. v National Bank, 160 Massachusetts, 398; Pacific Nat. Bank v. Mixter, 124 U. S. 721.</p>

This case was begun by bill in equity 'filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Vermont in the name of the Great Western Mining and Manufacturing Company, a Kentucky corporation, by L.- C. Black, its receiver, against B. D. Harris, a citizen of the State of Vermont. It is averred that the corporation was duly organized under the laws of the State of Kentucky.

<p>In error to the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Texas.</p>

<p>On a certificate from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Civil Appeals of the First Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for. the District of Porto Rico. •</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.</p>