Daniel Holden v. J a Stratton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

88 federal appellate · 95 district · 50 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 351 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““As we have said, § 6 of the act adopts, for the purposes of the bankruptcy proceedings, the exemptions allowed by the laws of the several states. * * * “It is beyond controversy that, if the section just quoted stood alone, the policies in question would be exempt under the bankrupt act. The contention that they are not arises from what is assumed to be a limitation imposed upon the terms of § 6 by a proviso found in § 70a of the act [11 USCA §§ 24, 110(a)]. * * * “Considering the matter originally, it is, we think, apparent that § 6 is couched in unlimited terms, and is accompanied with no qualification whatever. Even a superficial analysis of § i70a demonstrates that that section deals not with exemptions, but solely with the nature and character of property, the title to which passes to the trustee in bankruptcy. The opening clause of the section declares that the trustee, after his appointment, shall be vested ‘by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, * * * except in so far as it is to property which is exempt/ and this is followed by an enumeration, under ’six headings, of the various classes of property which pass to the trustee. 'Clearly, the words ‘except in so far as it is to property which is exempt/ make manifest that it was the intention to exclude from the enumeration property exempt by the act. This qualification necessarily controls all the enumerations, and, therefore, excludes exempt property from all the provisions contained in the respective enu”

   11 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Orear · In re Carlon

2. ““As section 70a deals only with properly which, not being exempt, passes to the trustee, the mission of the proviso was, in the interest of the perpetuation of policies of life insurance, to provide a rule by which, where such policies passed to the trustee because they were not exempt, if they had a surrender value, their future operation could be preserved by vesting the bankrupt with the privilege of paying such surrender value, whereby the policy would be withdrawn out of the category of an asset of the estate ; that is to say, the purpose of the proviso was to confer a benefit upon the insured bankrupt .by limiting the character of the interest in a nonexempt life insurance policy which should pass to the trustee, and not to cause such a policy when exempt to become an asset of the estate.””

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Gannon · In re Brinson

3. ““There has been some contrariety of opinion expressed by the lower federal courts as to the exact meaning of the words ‘cash surrender value’ as employed in the proviso, some courts holding that it means a surrender value expressly stipulated by the contract of insurance to be paid, and other courts holding that the words embrace policies, even though a stipulation in respect to surrender value is not contained therein, where the policy possesses a cash value which would be recognized and paid by the insurer on the surrender of the policy. It is to be observed that this latter construction harmonizes with the practice under the bankrupt act of 1867 [In re Newland, 6 Ben. 342 , Fed. Cas. No. 10,170; In re McKinney (D. C.) 15 Fed. 535 ], and tends to elucidate and carry out the purpose contemplated by the proviso as we have construed it. However, whatever influence that construction may have, as the question is not necessarily here involved, we do not expressly decide it.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Mertens · Hiscock v. Mertens