Great Western Mining Manufacturing Company v. Charles a Harris D B’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

78 federal appellate · 47 district · 51 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 239 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Nor do we think the .-jurisdiction is established.” says Mr. Justice Day, speaking Cor the court in Great Western Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Harris, 198 U. S. 561 , 25 Sup. Ct. 770 , 49 L. Ed. 1163 , “because the action is authorized to be instituted by the receiver in the name of the corporation. ,Such actions subjecting local assets to a foreign jurisdiction and to a foreign receivership would come within .the reasoning of Booth v. Clark [ 17 How. 322 , 15 L. Ed. 164 ]. If a recovery be had, although in the name of the corporation, the property would be turned over to the receiver, to be by him administered under the order of the court appointing him.””

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Fairview Fluor Spar & Lead Co. v. Ulrich · The Wabash

2. “every jurisdiction, in which it is sought by means of a receiver to subject property to the control of the court, has the right and power to determine for itself who the receiver shall be and to make such distribution of the funds realized within its own jurisdiction as will protect the rights of local parties interested therein, and not permit a foreign court to prejudice the rights of local creditors by removing assets from the local jurisdiction without an order of the court or its approval as to the officer who shall act in the holding and distribution of the property recovered.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. McCandless v. Furlaud · Fowler v. Osgood

3. ““But apart from the absence of any such case, we think that a receiver could not be admitted to the comity extended to judgment creditors, without an entire departure from chancery proceedings, as to the manner of his appointment, the securities which are taken.from him for the performance of his duties, and the direction which the court has over him in the collection of the estate of the debtor, and the application and distribution of them. If he seeks to be recognized in .another jurisdiction, it is to take the fund there out of it, without such court having any control of his subsequent action in respect to it, and without his having even official power to give security to the court, the aid of which he seeks, for his faithful conduct and official accountability. All that could be done upon such an application from a receiver, according to chancery practice, would be to transfer him from the locality of his appointment to that where he asks to be recognized for the execution of his trust in the last, under the coercive ability of that court, and that it would be difficult to do, where it may be asked to be done, without the court exercising its province to determine whether the suitor, or another person within its jurisdiction, was the proper person to act as receiver.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Fowler v. Osgood · The Wabash