199 Md. App. 273 - Davis v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Neither the original Title III nor the original Maryland Wiretapping Act ... covered communications between cellular phones. Such expanded coverage would not, indeed, follow until 1986 on the federal side, or until 1988 on the Maryland side. In Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 524 , 121 S.Ct. 1753 , 149 L.Ed.2d 787 (2001), Justice Stevens described the time and the substance of the enhanced coverage: `As enacted in 1968, Title III did not apply to the monitoring of radio transmissions. In the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 1848 , however, Congress enlarged the coverage of Title III to prohibit the interruption of "electronic" as well as oral and wire communications. By reason of that amendment, as well as a 1994 amendment which applied to cordless telephone communications, 100 Stat. 4279 , Title III now applies to the interception of conversations over both cellular and cordless phones.' "Maryland followed the federal lead by enacting ch. 607 of the Acts of 1988. To the definitions in § 10-401, which already included "wire communication" and "oral communication," Maryland, again following Title III's example, added as § 10-401(11) a definition of "electronic communication": `(11)(i) `Electronic communication' means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical system.' "Whereas § 10-402(a), the operatio”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Davis v. State

2. “"the entitlement to intercept is indifferent to whether an inculpatory message is inbound from Macao or from Mt. Airy.... .... "... The critical situs at which an interception occurs may be at either or both of two places: 1) where the suspect phone which is the subject of the interception order is located, regardless of whether that phone is sending a message or receiving a message; and 2) where the police are located as they monitor and hear the intercepted message, to wit, the location of the `listening post.' The judge who issues the interception order must have jurisdictional authority over at least one of those two places as well as over the place where the crime has occurred and is to be prosecuted. The other end of the line, on the other hand, wherever it may be, has nothing to do with the issue of jurisdiction. If the appellant were right that the location of the other end of the line had jurisdictional significance, we would dread to contemplate the implications of intercepting a conference call."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Davis v. State

3. “"Under current law, an ex parte order (an order granted at the request and for the benefit of one party only without giving notice to the adverse party or providing the adverse party with an opportunity to contest the order) authorizing the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications may be issued only for communications within its territorial jurisdiction of the circuit court in which the application is filed. Therefore, to intercept communications on a mobile telephone, a separate order must be obtained from the circuit court in each jurisdiction in which the mobile telephone might be moved. "This bill removes the need for obtaining multiple ex parte orders by providing for multijurisdictional wiretap orders from mobile telephones."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Davis v. State