¶1 The evidence does no more than raise a suspicion, somewhat strong perhaps, of the defendant’s guilt. It would require a repudiation of Tucker’s testimony and a guess to bridge the hiatus in the State’s case. Hence, under the principle announced in S. v. Battle, 198 *431 N. C., 379, 151 S. E., 927; S. v. Swinson, 196 N. C., 100, 144 S. E., 555; S. v. Montague, 195 N. C., 20, 141 S. E., 285; S. v. Prince, 182 N. C., 788, 108 S. E., 330; S. v. Rhodes, 111 N. C., 647, 15 S. E., 1038; S. v. Goodson, 107 N. C., 798, 12 S. E., 329; S. v. Brackville, 106 N. C., 701, 11 S. E., 284; S. v. Massey, 86 N. C., 660, and S. v. Vinson, 63 N. C., 335, tbe motion for nonsuit will be allowed.
¶2 It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between evidence sufficient to carry a case to the jury, and a mere scintilla, which only raises a suspicion or possibility of the fact in issue. S. v. Bridgers, 172 N. C., 879, 89 S. E., 804; S. v. White, 89 N. C., 462. The general rule is that, if there be any evidence tending to prove the fact in issue, or which reasonably conduces to its conclusion as a fairly logical and legitimate deduction, and not merely such as raises a suspicion or conjecture in regard to it, the ease should be submitted to the jury. But as was said in the case where a darky was being prosecuted for the larceny of a pig, there must be more than the argument of the solicitor: “Gentlemen of the jury, there was a hog. Here is a negro. Take the case.” Wilson v. Lumber Co., 194 N. C., 374, 139 S. E., 760; Moore v. R. R., 173 N. C., 311, 92 S. E., 1.
¶3 Reversed.