majority"> Stacy, O. J.,

after stating the ease: Are the references in the Lawson-Linville-Key deed of trust to the prior, but subsequently registered, Lawson-Folger-Hemmings deed of trust sufficient to make the lien of the latter superior to that of the former? We think not.

The references in question do not show that the parties intended to recognize the prior instruments as superior liens, unless duly registered, and it is well-nigh axiomatic that “no notice, however full and formal, will supply the place of registration.” Piano Co. v. Spruill, 150 N. C., 168, 63 S. E., 723.

The facts of the instant case bring it within the principles announced in Story v. Slade, ante, 596; Hardy v. Abdallah, 192 N. C., 45, 133 S. E., 195; Blacknall v. Hancock, 182 N. C., 369, 109 S. E., 72, and Piano Co. v. Spruill, supra, rather than those applied in Hardy v. Fryer, 194 N. C., 420, 139 S. E., 833; Bank v. Smith, 186 N. C., 635, 120 S. E., 215; Bank v. Voss, 130 N. C., 590, 41 S. E., 791; Brasfield v. Powell, 117 N. C., 140, 23 S. E., 106, and Hinton Leigh, 102 N. C., 28, 8 S. E., 890.

For the lien of a subsequently registered instrument to take precedence over one previously registered, it must appear that the latter was executed in subordination to the former. Hardy v. Fryer, supra.

Affirmed.

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