Wolf v. Murrane’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 district · 26 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Generally, a court may not appoint a receiver without notice and a reasonable opportunity for interested parties to be heard prior to the appointment of a receiver. Rouse v. Rouse, (Iowa 1970), 174 N.W.2d 660, 665-666 ; 45 Am.Jur. Receivers § 90, page 81; 75 C.J.S. Receivers §§ 48, 49, pages 704 — 710. In emergencies where a showing is made that ex parte appointment of a receiver is necessary to prevent damage to or loss of property, the court may exercise its discretion in appointing without notice * * * In the instant case, no circumstances appear which would indicate there was no time for a hearing. * * * “Despite the disregard of the general rule requiring a prior hearing, we find nothing to indicate that either of the parties was prejudiced to the point of being denied a fair result and since our review' here is de novo (Rule 334, R.C.P.) reversal on this issue alone would serve no useful purpose. Therefore, without approving trial court’s actions and noting the irregularity of the appointment without notice, we shall not reverse solely on the failure of the trial court to hold a hearing pursuant to notice prior to the appointment of a receiver.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re the Marriage of Prybil

2. ““Upon dissolution, the partnership relationship ceases to exist except insofar as it is necessary to continue to wind up the affairs of the partnership. The effect of dissolution is stated in 60 Am.Jur.2d, Partnership, § 198, p. 111: ‘ * * * Both under the Uniform Act (referring to Uniform Partnership Act, adopted in Iowa, Chapter 251, Laws of the Sixty-fourth General Assembly, First Session, 1971, [now chapter 544, The Code, 1973] but not applicable to this case) and at common law it is recognized that after dissolution, the partnership continues only for the purpose of winding up the partnership affairs. Dissolution operates only with respect to future transactions; as to everything past, the partnership continues until all preexisting matters are terminated. Included in the winding up or liquidation of partnership affairs are the performance of existing contracts, the collection of debts or claims due the firm, and the payment of firm debts.’ See also 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 351, at pp. 859-860.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Engel v. Vernon