OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
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The State of Ohio, Appellant, v. Elam, Appellee.
[Cite as State v. Elam (1994), Ohio St.3d .]
Criminal procedure -- Penalties and sentencing -- Multiple
sentences -- Fifteen-year limit on an aggregate minimum
term of incarceration set by R.C. 2929.41(E)(2) does not
apply to multiple terms imposed consecutively to sentence
for aggravated murder.
The fifteen-year limit on an aggregate minimum term of
incarceration set by R.C. 2929.41(E)(2) does not apply to
multiple terms imposed consecutively to a sentence for
aggravated murder.
(No. 93-194 -- Submitted November 17, 1993 -- Decided
March 30, 1994.)
Certified by the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No.
C-920216.
On August 8, 1991, the Hamilton County Grand Jury returned
a nine-count indictment against defendant-appellee, Rex Elam.
Count one was for aggravated murder and contained three death
penalty specifications. Counts two, six and eight were for
aggravated burglary, counts three, seven and nine were for
aggravated robbery, and counts four and five were for rape.
These alleged offenses were against three victims and occurred
on three separate occasions.
Pursuant to a plea bargain, Elam pled guilty to all
counts. In exchange for the plea, the state dropped the death
penalty specifications to count one. The trial court sentenced
Elam to a term of life imprisonment on count one, ten to
twenty-five years on each of counts two through five, each to
run consecutively to the prior count, and ten to twenty-five
years on each of counts six through nine, all to run
concurrently with count four. Elam thus received a total term
of incarceration of life plus forty to one hundred years.
The trial court overruled Elam's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. He then appealed, asserting, inter alia, that
R.C. 2929.41(E)(2) limited his aggregate minimum term for the
felonies other than aggravated murder to fifteen years. The
court of appeals held that R.C. 2929.41(E)(2) does, in fact,
limit the aggregate minimum sentences for the four
non-aggravated murder felonies to fifteen years, even when
imposed consecutively to an aggravated murder count. Holding
also that R.C. 2929.41(E)(2) is self-executing, however, the
court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Finding its judgment to be in conflict with that of the
Court of Appeals for Summit County in State v. Owens (1975), 51
Ohio App.2d 132,
5 O.O.3d 290,
366 N.E.2d 1367, the court of
appeals certified the record of the case to this court for
review and final determination.
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney,
and L. Susan Laker, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for
appellant.
Peter Rosenwald, for appellee.
Moyer, C.J. The question certified for our review is
whether, under R.C. 2929.41(E), there exists an aggregate
minimum term of incarceration for consecutive multiple
sentences for offenses that have been imposed consecutively to
a life sentence for aggravated murder.
R.C. 2929.41(B) allows the imposition of consecutive terms
of incarceration in several situations, including "[w]hen the
trial court specifies" that they are to be served
consecutively. R.C. 2929.41(B)(1). R.C. 2929.41(E) limits the
trial court's discretion to impose consecutive sentences, and
provides in relevant part:
"Consecutive terms of imprisonment imposed shall not
exceed:
"(1) An aggregate minimum term of twenty years, when the
consecutive terms imposed include a term of imprisonment for
murder and do not include a term of imprisonment for aggravated
murder;
"(2) An aggregate minimum term of fifteen years, … when
the consecutive terms imposed are for felonies other than
aggravated murder or murder;
"(3) An aggregate term of eighteen months, when the
consecutive terms imposed are for misdemeanors."
Because Elam's consecutive sentences include a term for
aggravated murder, subsection (E)(1) plainly does not apply.
Because each of the terms is for a felony, neither does
subsection (E)(3) apply.
The court of appeals in the instant case held that
subsection (E)(2) does apply, following the reasoning of State
v. Slider (1980), 70 Ohio App.2d 283,
24 O.O.3d 387,
437 N.E.2d
5. In Slider, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth District
reasoned that subsection (E)(2) is different in terms of its
application from (E)(1), which "applies to the whole
consecutive term when one of the consecutive terms is for
murder."
Id. at 288,
24 O.O.3d at 390,
437 N.E.2d at 9. In
contrast, (E)(2) "limit[s] the minimum aggregate term for all
consecutive sentences, except those imposed for aggravated
murder or murder." (Emphasis sic.)
Id. at 288,
24 O.O.3d at
390,
437 N.E.2d at 10.
Following this logic, Elam argues that had there been no
aggravated murder conviction in this case, R.C. 2929.41(E)(2)
would have automatically limited his total sentence to fifteen
to one hundred years. This assertion is correct, but it begs
the question. The real issue is what happens when there is a
term imposed for aggravated murder.
The polestar of statutory interpretation is legislative
intent, which a court best gleans from the words the General
Assembly used and the purpose it sought to accomplish. Where
the wording of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this court's
only task is to give effect to the words used. State v. Davis
(1985), 16 Ohio St.3d 34, 35, 16 OBR 449, 450,
476 N.E.2d 655,
656. By its very terms, this statute applies only "when the
consecutive terms imposed are for felonies other than
aggravated murder[.]" R.C. 2929.41(E)(2). The most natural
reading of this clause compels the conclusion that a court
should look at all of the consecutive terms imposed, and apply
R.C. 2929.41(E)(2) only when none of them is for aggravated
murder.
The consecutive terms imposed in this case were for five
crimes: aggravated murder and four other felonies. The
interpretation that Elam urges, and that the Slider court
reached, requires a conceptual severance of the aggravated
murder term from the terms for other felonies imposed
consecutively to it. The words of subsection (E)(2) do not
support a conclusion that the General Assembly intended such a
result. Rather, the wording of both subsections (E)(1) and
(E)(2) reveals a common legislative intent that aggravated
murderers receive no benefit from the statute.
Thus, we hold that the fifteen-year limit on the aggregate
minimum term of incarceration set by R.C. 2929.41(E)(2) does
not apply to multiple terms imposed consecutively to a sentence
for aggravated murder. If the consecutive terms imposed
include a term for aggravated murder, as do Elam's terms,
subsection (E)(2) does not apply. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the court of appeals as modified and reinstate the
sentence of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed
as modified.
A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Wright, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney and
Pfeifer, JJ., concur.
