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Scott et al., Appellants, v. Yates, Appellee.
[Cite as Scott v. Yates (1994), Ohio St.3d .]
Evidence -- Trial court abuses its discretion in permitting
investigating police officer to testify as to which party
was at fault in automobile accident, when --
Qualifications of expert witness.
(No. 93-1643 -- Submitted October 26, 1994 -- Decided
December 20, 1994.)
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Ross County, No.
92CA001917.
Appellant Phyllis G. Scott and appellee Rebecca L. Yates
were involved in a head-on automobile collision in Pickaway
County on January 30, 1991. Both parties assert that
immediately prior to the impact, the other party drove left of
the roadway's center line.1
Appellant filed suit on behalf of herself and as the
administrator of the estate of her husband, Harold Scott, who
died as a result of injuries he received in the crash.
Appellant alleged that appellee's negligence caused the
accident.
Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion in limine
designed to exclude the testimony of the investigating officer,
Deputy Alan E. Hawkins, as to the point of impact, and
specifically as to who caused the collision. After conducting
a voir dire examination of Hawkins, the trial court ruled that
Hawkins qualified as an expert witness and could give an
opinion on causation. At trial, Hawkins opined that appellant
had caused the collision.
The jury found in favor of the appellee and judgment was
entered upon the verdict. The appellate court affirmed.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the
allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Clark, Perdue, Roberts & Scott Co., L.P.A., and Dale K.
Perdue, for appellants.
William J. Christensen, for appellee.
Francis E. Sweeney, Sr., J. In this case, we are asked
to draw a clear distinction between accident investigation,
which involves the collection and recording of information, and
accident reconstruction, which involves use of scientific
methodology to draw inferences from the investigative data. We
decline the invitation to offer hard and fast rules pertaining
to this issue. Instead, we confine our discussion to the
particular facts at hand. In so doing, we simply find that the
police officer testifying here went beyond his scope of
expertise. Thus, we determine the trial court abused its
discretion in permitting Deputy Hawkins to testify as to which
party was at fault. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a
new trial.
The rule governing the admission of expert testimony is
former Evid.R. 702. This rule provided:
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
(Emphasis added.)
While this rule permits expert testimony, a threshold
determination must first be made under Evid.R. 104(A)
concerning the qualifications of the witness to testify.
To qualify as an expert, the witness need not be the best
witness on the subject. Alexander v. Mt. Carmel Med. Ctr.
(1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 155, 159,
10 O.O.3d 332, 334,
383 N.E.2d
564, 566. The expert must demonstrate some knowledge on the
particular subject superior to that possessed by an ordinary
juror. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp. (1973),
36
Ohio St.2d 151, 160,
65 O.O.2d 374, 379,
304 N.E.2d 891, 897.
A ruling concerning the admission of expert testimony is within
the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
Alexander, supra, at
157,
10 O.O.3d at 333,
383 N.E.2d at 565.
Appellant has no dispute with Hawkins' qualifications to
collect data at the accident scene or his ability to testify as
to his observations. What appellant urges as error, however,
is the admission of Hawkins' opinion as to how the accident
occurred. Upon the particular facts in this case, we agree
that Hawkins was not qualified to give an opinion on causation.
Here, Deputy Hawkins testified that his highest level of
formal education was the twelfth grade. Some time after high
school, he attended the police academy for vocational
training. There, he spent approximately two weeks on accident
investigation.
Hawkins testified he was unfamiliar with the theory of
conservation of momentum and consequently did not know how it
might affect the post-impact course of motor vehicles involved
in a crash. Nor did he know the formula for calculating the
speed of motor vehicles, either before or after impact, or what
effect speed would have upon the post-impact course of vehicles.
Hawkins testified that there is a difference between
investigating an accident, and reconstructing one. He frankly
admitted that he was not an accident reconstructionist; that he
never had the opportunity to work with an accident
reconstructionist; and further, that he had never conducted an
accident reconstruction.
Thus, based upon these facts, we conclude the trial court
abused its discretion. Because Deputy Hawkins did not possess
the necessary knowledge or expertise, his opinion that
appellant caused the collision was inadmissible. Accordingly,
we reverse the judgment of the appellate court, and remand the
cause for a new trial.
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
Douglas, Resnick and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.
Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney and Wright, JJ., dissent.
Footnote:
1 Appellee's counterclaim was subsequently dismissed.
Wright, J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent. In my
view, there is no way to find an abuse of discretion here, as
the officer involved was a veteran accident investigator who
testified to nothing more than the point of impact of
plaintiff's automobile with that of the defendant.
Under former Evid. R. 702, a witness may qualify as an
expert and, therefore, testify as to his opinion if the witness
has the requisite "knowlege, skill, experience, training, or
education." (Emphasis added.) The majority opinion in this
case relies on Hawkins' lack of formal education and simply
ignores his specialized training and experience with regard to
locating points of impact.
In this case, Deputy Hawkins' experience and training in
locating the point of impact between colliding cars gave him
"some superior knowledge not possessed by ordinary jurors."
State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp. (1973), 36 Ohio
St.2d 151, 160,
65 O.O.2d 374, 379,
304 N.E.2d 891, 897. While
in the police academy, Hawkins' two-week training involving
accident investigation consisted of determining who was at
fault in an accident, what caused the accident, and which
driver to cite for the accident. At the time of the accident,
Hawkins had been a police officer and had investigated
accidents for twelve years. At the trial, Hawkins testified
that he had investigated at least one hundred fifteen accidents
per year while working for the Pickaway County Sheriff's
Department. More specifically, Hawkins testified that, while
with the sheriff's department, he had received specialized
training from two supervisors on "point of impact tracking" and
the causes of accidents. Hawkins explained that he had been
trained to determine the point of impact from such evidence as
a car's ultimate resting point after an accident, skid marks,
marks through grass, location of debris from the cars, vehicle
separation, and other physical evidence such as gouges in the
road. In response to a question by the trial judge, Deputy
Hawkins expressly stated that his job required him to draw
conclusions from accident investigative data concerning "points
of impact" about every day.
A trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its
decision is "unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable."
Steiner v. Custer (1940), 137 Ohio St. 448,
19 O.O. 148,
31
N.E.2d 855, paragraph two of syllabus; Calderon v. Sharkey
(1982),
70 Ohio St.2d 218,
24 O.O.3d 322,
436 N.E.2d 1008;
Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983),
5 Ohio St.3d 217, 5 OBR 481,
450
N.E.2d 1140; In re Jane Doe 1 (1991),
57 Ohio St.3d 135,
566
N.E.2d 1181; Rock v. Cabral (1993),
67 Ohio St.3d 108, 112,
616
N.E.2d 218, 222. How can anyone seriously suggest that the
trial court acted in an arbitrary, unconscionable, or
unreasonable fashion in the fact situation posed to it in this
case?
Deputy Hawkins testified as to what he observed at the
scene. The jury disbelieved the plaintiff and the plaintiff's
expert witness and found that plaintiff had crossed the
centerline prior to impact and was the architect of her
husband's death and her own injuries. We should respect the
call made by the trial judge and affirm the well-reasoned
opinion of the court of appeals.
Moyer, C.J., and A.W. Sweeney, J., concur in the foreging
dissenting opinion.
