[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at
70 Ohio St.3d 471.]
IN RE HAYS: OHIO DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, APPELLANT, v.
CLERMONT COUNTY ALCOHOL, DRUG ADDICTION AND MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES BOARD, APPELLEE.
[Cite as In re Hays, 1995-Ohio-46.]
Probate Court possesses jurisdiction to issue an order of involuntary commitment
for mental health treatment—Jurisdiction to order state to assume cost of
mental health treatment which is integral to commitment determination—
Mental health services which are the financial responsibility of the state.
1. A county probate court possesses jurisdiction to issue an order of involuntary
commitment for mental health treatment pursuant to R.C. 2101.24 and
5122.15. (In re Hamil [1982], 69 Ohio St.2d 97, 23 O.O. 3d 151,
431
N.E.2d 317, distinguished.)
2. Where a county has developed a mental health plan pursuant to R.C.
340.03(A)(1) and the plan has been approved by the Director of Mental
Health pursuant to R.C. 5119.61(L), the county, pursuant to R.C. 340.011,
is not financially obligated to fund services beyond those encompassed in
the plan. Consequently, any mental health services required by law to be
provided to those persons needing such services which are not encompassed
within the plan are the financial responsibility of the state of Ohio.
3. A probate court does not exceed its jurisdiction when it orders that the state
assume the cost of mental health treatment which is integral to the
commitment determination but for which no provision has been made in the
mental health plan developed by the county and approved by the state.
(No. 93-1689—Submitted May 11, 1994—Decided October 5, 1994.)
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-920118.
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 1} Respondent, Vickie R. Hays, is a woman thirty-nine years of age who
has been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. On August 15, 1991, she arrived
at the home of her sister in a disheveled condition after a disappearance of six
weeks. She apparently was under the impression that she was a mouse. On that
date, her sister, Wilma Hays, submitted an affidavit to the Clermont County Probate
Court requesting that the respondent be involuntarily confined in a mental health
facility. In response to the request, the Clermont County Probate Court issued an
order of detention pursuant to R.C.5122.11. On August 15, 1991, the Clermont
County Probate Court transferred jurisdiction to the Hamilton County Probate
Court. On August 16, 1991, the Hamilton County Probate Court issued a temporary
order of detention which directed that respondent be detained at the Pauline
Warfield Lewis Center ("Lewis Center") -- a mental health facility operated by
appellant, Ohio Department of Mental Health in Cincinnati, Ohio. The order was
executed by the Hamilton County Sheriff on August 19, 1991. On August 21, 1991,
a hearing was conducted by the Hamilton County Probate Court. Following the
hearing, the court referee ordered respondent to be placed in the care of appellee,
the Clermont County Alcohol, Drug Addiction and Mental Health Services
("ADAMHS") Board for treatment at Lewis Center.
{¶ 2} On September 12, 1991, Charles Feuss, M.D., Director of the Lewis
Center, requested an order of continued commitment with respect to respondent.
On October 30, 1991, a hearing was held before a referee of the Hamilton County
Probate Court, wherein evidence was adduced supporting the placement of
respondent at Buckeye House, a group home in Butler County, as the least
restrictive environment for treatment of her. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
referee placed respondent in the care of appellee. On October 31, 1991, another
hearing was held, wherein appellant was represented by an assistant attorney
general. On November 15, 1991, the referee issued an order concluding that
respondent was in need of twenty-four-hour supervised placement short of
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January Term, 1995
hospitalization. The referee further concluded that Clermont County lacked such a
facility, and that a placement conforming to the above criteria was the Buckeye
House in Butler County, while treatment was to be provided on an outpatient basis
at the Clermont County Counseling Center. Inasmuch as Clermont County lacked
the funds to provide for such placement, the referee ordered appellant to provide
the funds necessary to carry it out. Thereafter, appellant filed objections to the
report of the referee. On December 4, 1991, following a full hearing, the referee
confirmed his previous order of October 31, 1991. On January 21, 1992, the
Hamilton County Probate Court overruled the objections to the report of the referee
and approved it. On July 21, 1993, the First District Court of Appeals affirmed.
Finding its decision to be in conflict with the decision of the Twelfth District Court
of Appeals in In re Berger (Feb. 16, 1993) Clermont App. No. CA92-06-065,
unreported, the appellate court certified the record of the case to this court for
review and final determination.
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Lee I. Fisher, Attorney General and David J. Kovach, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellant.
Donald W. White, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and James A.
Shriver, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Winnifred Weeks and Joseph H. Brockwell, urging affirmance in part for
amicus curiae, Ohio Legal Rights Service.
Hugh F. Daly, Genevieve Gomez and Frank Wassermann, Legal Aid
Society of Cincinnati, urging affirmance for amici curiae, Drop Inn Center
Shelterhouse, Free Store/Food Bank and the Greater Cincinnati Coalition for the
Homeless.
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
WILLIAM SWEENEY, J.
I
{¶ 3} The present controversy concerns the authority of a probate court to
issue an order of involuntary commitment for mental health treatment and to require
the Ohio Department of Mental Health to assume the cost of such treatment. The
jurisdiction of probate courts to conduct commitment hearings is set forth in R.C.
2101.24(A). This section provides in relevant part:
"(2) In addition to the exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon the probate
court by division (A)(1) of this section, the probate court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over a particular subject matter if both of the following apply:
"(a) Another section of the Revised Code expressly confers jurisdiction over
that subject matter upon the probate court.
"(b) No section of the Revised Code expressly confers jurisdiction over that
subject matter upon any other court or agency.
"…
"(C) The probate court has plenary power at law and in equity to dispose
fully of any matter that is properly before the court, unless the power is expressly
otherwise limited or denied by a section of the Revised Code." (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 4} One of the sections of the Revised Code to which R.C.
2101.24(A)(2)(a) refers is R.C. 5122.15(A), which governs involuntary
confinement proceedings. This subsection provides:
"(A) Full hearings shall be conducted in a manner consistent with this
chapter and with due process of law. The hearings shall be conducted pursuant to
section 2945.40 of the Revised Code in all cases in which the respondent is a person
found not guilty by reason of insanity, and in all other cases, by a judge of the
probate court or a referee designated by a judge of the probate court, and may be
conducted in or out of the county in which the respondent is held. Any referee
designated under this division shall be an attorney."(Emphasis added.)
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January Term, 1995
{¶ 5} R.C. 5122.15 also addresses the criteria governing the authority of the
probate court to render a placement decision. In this regard, R.C. 5122.15(C) and
(E) provide:
"(C) If, upon completion of the hearing, the court finds clear and
convincing evidence that the respondent is a mentally ill person subject to
hospitalization by court order, the court shall order the respondent, for a period
not to exceed ninety days to:
"(1) A hospital operated by the department of mental health if the
respondent is committed pursuant to division (D) of section 2945.38 or section
2945.40, 5120.17, or 5139.08 of the Revised Code;
"(2) A nonpublic hospital;
"(3) The veterans' administration or other agency of the United States
government;
"(4) A board of alcohol, drug addiction, and mental health services or
agency the board designates;
"(5) Receive private psychiatric or psychological care and treatment; or
"(6) Any other suitable facility or person consistent with the diagnosis,
prognosis, and treatment needs of the respondent.
"…
"(E) In determining the place to which, or the person with whom, the
respondent is to be committed, the court shall consider the diagnosis, prognosis,
preferences of the respondent, and projected treatment plan for the respondent and
order the implementation of the least restrictive alternative available and consistent
with treatment goals and, in the case of a person found not guilty by reason of
insanity, with public safety. If the court determines that the least restrictive
alternative available that is consistent with treatment goals is inpatient
hospitalization, the court's order shall so state." (Emphasis added.)
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 6} The probate court therefore possesses the statutory authority and duty
to place a mentally ill individual in the least restrictive treatment alternative
available. In support of its view that no such authority exists, appellant relies upon
In re Hamil (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 97,
23 O.O.3d 151,
431 N.E.2d 317. Hamil
concerned the authority of juvenile courts to order such commitment. However,
such courts do not possess the jurisdiction conferred by R.C. 2101.24 and
5122.15(A). The distinction between the jurisdiction of juvenile and probate courts
was expressly recognized in Hamil, wherein it was stated:
"From this section [R.C. 2151.23(A)(4)] Jeffrey's parents conclude a
Juvenile Court which has jurisdiction over a mentally-ill juvenile subject to
hospitalization by court order, is invested with all powers inherent in the Probate
Court, including the grant of plenary power found in R.C. 2101.24. Jeffrey's
parents contend that this grant of plenary power enables the court to fully dispose
of any matter properly before it, including resolving any financial aspects necessary
to implement their disposition. In order to reach this conclusion one must ignore
the language of R.C. 2151.23(A)(4), which only grants the Juvenile Court those
powers found in R.C. Chapters 5122 and 5123, and does not bestow upon it those
powers found in R.C. Chapter 2101. Consequently, unless another statute exists
which affirmatively grants the Juvenile Court authority to order ODMH to pay for
Jeffrey's care in a private psychiatric facility, the courts below were acting beyond
the scope of their jurisdiction when they made such orders. Jeffrey's parents
contend R.C. 5122.15 authorizes the action taken by the lower courts. We
disagree." (Emphasis added.) 69 Ohio St.2d at 100-101,
23 O.O.3d at 153,
431
N.E.2d at 319.
{¶ 7} We therefore conclude that a county probate court possesses
jurisdiction to issue an order of involuntary commitment for mental health
treatment pursuant to R.C. 2101.24 and 5122.15.
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January Term, 1995
II
{¶ 8} Notwithstanding the authority of the probate court to order such
placement, appellant further contends that the probate court lacks the jurisdiction
to order the Ohio Department of Health to pay for treatment. In support of this
view, appellant cites the following language in Hamil:
"We agree a civil committee, such as Jeffrey, has a statutory right to be
placed in the least restrictive environment available; however, appellees' argument
completely misinterprets the word 'available.' Adhering to the construction
proposed by appellees, any time a less restrictive alternative or environment exists,
regardless of cost, a civil committee must be transferred to that locale or released
from custody. Surely when the General Assembly adopted R.C. 5122.15(E) and
(F) it did not intend the state of Ohio to assume the cost of sending mentally ill
individuals to expensive, private, non-public facilities, simply because those
facilities might offer less restrictive treatment alternatives. The cost of fostering
such a policy might prove to be astronomical.
"…
"Unfortunately, economic considerations are also prevalent in determining
the 'availability' of a facility within the meaning of R.C. 5122.15(E) and (F). If the
supervisor of an institution designated within one of the alternatives listed in R.C.
5122.15(C)(2) through (6) refuses to accept a committee because he or his family
cannot guarantee payment for the cost of care, then the least restrictive alternative
which can be said to be 'available' is a state hospital. Applying this interpretation
to the instant case, if Jeffrey Hamil's parents were unable to guarantee payment of
the cost of care at Bellefaire, then Bellefaire was not an 'available' alternative. The
Juvenile Court then had the option of continuing Jeffrey's commitment at Sagamore
Hills or transferring Jeffrey to another state hospital, since a state hospital would
be the only alternative 'available.'" (Emphasis added in part.) 69 Ohio St.2d at 103-
104,
23 O.O.3d at 154-155,
431 N.E.2d at 320-321.
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 9} The contention of appellant regarding the economic implications of
unrestricted placements is not inconsequential. However, in the present context, it
is not persuasive. As an initial matter, appellant has failed to demonstrate that
placement of respondent in Buckeye House and the provision of outpatient
treatment at Clermont County Counseling Center were more expensive than
hospitalization at the Lewis Center. Second, amici Drop Inn Center Shelterhouse
et al. correctly observe that the economic analysis of Hamil has been superseded by
the decision of this court in In re Burton (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 147, 11 OBR 465,
464 N.E.2d 530.
Burton, supra, described the Ohio statutory scheme for the
treatment of the mentally ill as follows:
"Although all states provide for the commitment of mentally ill persons, the
statutory provisions for treatment are quite divergent. A small number of
jurisdictions either do not specifically provide for treatment or refer vaguely to the
manner of treatment. Other statutes indicate that treatment shall be provided to the
extent that funds and facilities are available. Still other jurisdictions place an
affirmative obligation on the state to treat patients committed to its institutions and
provide the patient with an unqualified right to treatment. Ohio falls within this
latter type of provision. (Emphasis added.) 11 Ohio St.3d at 152, 11 OBR at 469,
464 N.E.2d at 536.
{¶ 10} Despite this statutory obligation to provide treatment and the
authority of probate courts, after a hearing, to order the appropriate treatment, there
nevertheless arises the question of the allocation of payment for such treatments
between the counties and the state. Of obvious concern is the risk that counties
would plead poverty when treatment of their mentally ill citizens is at issue and
insist that the state assume the cost of such treatment. However, the Revised Code
appears to provide a mechanism for determining the proper allocation in a particular
case.
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January Term, 1995
{¶ 11} As observed by amici, R.C. 340.03(A)(1)(c) requires a county
mental health board to develop a plan for delivery of mental health services and
submit it to the state. The mental health plan for Clermont County was in fact
approved by the state. Once a plan is approved, a county is not obligated to provide
funding for services which are not included therein. In this regard, R.C. 340.011(B)
provides:
"Nothing in Chapter 340., 3793., 5119., or 5122. of the Revised Code shall
be construed as requiring a board of county commissioners to provide resources
beyond the total amount set forth in a community mental health plan, as developed
and submitted under section 340.03 of the Revised Code, to provide the services
listed in section 340.09 of the Revised Code, and nothing in those chapters shall be
construed as requiring a board of county commissioners to provide resources
beyond the total amount set forth in a plan for alcohol and drug addiction services,
prepared and submitted in accordance with sections 340.033 and 3793.05 of the
Revised Code, to provide alcohol and drug addiction services."
{¶ 12} Given the affirmative obligation of the state to provide treatment, the
authority of the probate court to determine the appropriate treatment in a particular
case, and the lack of a duty of the county mental health board to provide services
beyond those funded in its mental health plan, it falls to the state to fund those
treatment options allocated to it by statute and ordered by a probate court.
{¶ 13} The authority of a probate court to issue an order to the state to
provide funding is expressly conferred by R.C. 2101.24(C), inasmuch as payment
for the treatment is in aid of its jurisdiction to adjudicate a matter properly before
it (i.e., the determination of the least restrictive environment for commitment of a
mentally ill individual).
{¶ 14} It is our further determination, therefore, that where a county has
developed a mental health plan pursuant to R.C.340.03(A)(1) and the plan has been
approved by the Director of Mental Health pursuant to R.C. 5119.61(L), the county,
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
pursuant to R.C. 340.011, is not financially obligated to fund services beyond those
encompassed in the plan. Consequently, any mental health services required by
law to be provided to those persons needing such services which are not
encompassed within the plan are the financial responsibility of the state of Ohio. A
probate court does not exceed its jurisdiction when it orders that the state assume
the cost of mental health treatment which is integral to the commitment
determination but for which no provision has been made in the mental health plan
developed by the county and approved by the state.
{¶ 15} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ.,
concur.
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