[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at
75 Ohio St.3d 418.]
THE STATE EX REL. SMITH, APPELLEE, v. SMITH, JUDGE, ET AL., APPELLANTS.
[Cite as State ex rel. Smith v. Smith, 1996-Ohio-215.]
Prohibition preventing juvenile court judge from proceeding with a parentage
action denied, when.
(No. 95-1215—Submitted February 20, 1996—Decided April 10, 1996.)
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 67806.
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{¶ 1} Appellee, Paula Ann Smith, was born in Zimbabwe to parents who
were citizens of South Africa. Appellee subsequently became a Canadian citizen.
Appellee met appellant Timothy Johnson while they were students attending
Bowling Green State University in Ohio. At the time, appellee and her parents
resided in Ohio.
{¶ 2} After appellee became pregnant as a result of sexual intercourse
occurring in Ohio, she left for South Africa in September 1993. On December 25,
1993, appellee gave birth to a son in Pretoria, South Africa. Appellee placed her
child for adoption in South Africa in accordance with the law of that country, which
requires the consent only of the mother of an illegitimate child to effectuate an
adoption. The adoption was finalized in January 1994.
{¶ 3} In February 1994, Johnson filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to establish a parent and child
relationship between himself and appellee’s child. As of the date Johnson filed his
parentage action, appellee had returned to Ohio. Appellee moved to dismiss the
parentage action because the juvenile court lacked in personam jurisdiction over
her child and the adoption had been finalized in South Africa. Appellant Judge
Burke E. Smith overruled appellee’s motion. Judge Smith noted that the parties had
acknowledged that Johnson had no knowledge that appellee gave birth to the child
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until February 1994, when he promptly filed the parentage action. Judge Smith
further determined that the South African adoption decree did not bar the parentage
action and was not res judicata. He set the matter for evidentiary hearing.
{¶ 4} Appellee then filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga
County requesting a writ of prohibition preventing Judge Smith from proceeding
with the parentage action. The court of appeals permitted Johnson to intervene.
Following the submission of evidence and briefs, the court of appeals granted the
writ of prohibition.
{¶ 5} The cause is now before the court upon appeals as of right.
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Mary Ann S. Johanek, for appellee.
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Gregory
B. Rowinski and Jeffrey I. Sherwin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant
Judge Burke E. Smith.
Kohrman, Jackson & Krantz and Barbara K. Roman, for appellant Johnson.
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Per Curiam.
{¶ 6} Appellants assert that the court of appeals erred in granting the writ
of prohibition. In order to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, appellee had to
establish that Judge Smith was about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial authority,
that the exercise of that power was unauthorized by law, and that denying the writ
would have resulted in injury for which no other adequate remedy existed in the
ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Sellers v. Gerken (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 115,
116,
647 N.E.2d 807, 809. It is uncontroverted that Judge Smith was about to
exercise judicial authority in proceeding with the parentage action.
{¶ 7} As to the remaining requirements for a writ for prohibition, absent a
patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter
jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging the court’s
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jurisdiction has an adequate remedy at law by appeal. State ex rel. Enyart v. O’Neill
(1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 656,
646 N.E.2d 1110, 1112. The court of appeals
determined that the availability of appeal was immaterial because Judge Smith
patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed.
{¶ 8} Juvenile courts have original jurisdiction over parentage actions. R.C.
3111.06(A). A putative father is a proper party to bring an action to determine the
existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship. R.C. 3111.07(A).
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, Judge Smith possessed basic authority to
proceed in the parentage action. See State ex rel. Fenwick v. Finkbeiner (1995), 72
Ohio St.3d 457, 460,
650 N.E.2d 896, 898.
{¶ 9} Nevertheless, the court of appeals concluded that despite Judge
Smith’s basic statutory jurisdiction, the South African adoption decree divested him
of jurisdiction under R.C. 3107.15 and 3107.18. R.C. 3107.15(A) provides that a
final decree of adoption issued by an Ohio court has the effect of terminating all
parental rights of biological parents and creating parental rights in adoptive parents.
{¶ 10} R.C. 3107.18 provides:
“Except when giving effect to such a decree would violate the public policy
of this state, a court decree terminating the relationship of parent and child, or
establishing the relationship by adoption, issued pursuant to due process of law by
a court of any jurisdiction outside this state, whether within or outside the United
States, shall be recognized in this state, and the rights and obligations of the parties
as to all matters within the jurisdiction of this state, including without limitation,
those matters specified in section 3107.15 of the Revised Code, shall be determined
as though the decree were issued by a court of this state.”
{¶ 11} In support of the court of appeals’ holding, appellee contends that an
adoption decree bars subsequent parentage actions because of considerations of res
judicata and standing. See, e.g., Gilbraith v. Hixson (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 127,
512 N.E.2d 956, syllabus (“The doctrine of res judicata can be invoked to give
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conclusive effect to a determination of parentage contained in a dissolution decree
or a legitimation order, thereby barring a subsequent paternity action brought
pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3111.”); Farley v. Farley (1992), 85 Ohio App.3d 113,
116,
619 N.E.2d 427, 429 (R.C. 3107.15 denies standing to relatives of parents
whose parental rights were terminated by adoption).
{¶ 12} However, assuming its applicability to the South African adoption
decree, R.C. 3107.15 does not divest juvenile courts of jurisdiction to proceed in
parentage actions. Issues of res judicata and standing do not attack a court’s
jurisdiction and can be adequately raised by postjudgment appeal. State ex rel. LTV
Steel Co. v. Gwin (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 245, 251,
594 N.E.2d 616, 621; State ex
rel. Lipinski v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div.(1995),
74
Ohio St.3d 19, 21,
655 N.E.2d 1303, 1305-1306.
{¶ 13} Further, it is not patent and unambiguous that the South African
adoption decree is entitled to comity and the effects specified in R.C. 3107.15(A).
Under R.C. 3107.18, a foreign adoption decree will not be accorded the status of
an Ohio adoption decree if public policy of this state would be violated or the
foreign adoption decree was not issued pursuant to due process of law. Therefore,
the recognition and effectiveness of a foreign adoption decree are subject to the
condition that the decree not be repugnant to the laws of Ohio. See, generally, 3
Spike, Ohio Family Law and Practice (1994) 686, Section 46.39.
{¶ 14} The court of appeals determined that giving effect to the South
African adoption decree would not violate the public policy of the state because
“R.C. 3107.15(A)(1) sets forth a clear public policy of terminating the relationship
between the biological parents and the adopted child.” The court of appeals further
stated that the South African decree was effective because “due process does not
require actual notice to the biological father of adoption proceedings in all
circumstances.”
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January Term, 1996
{¶ 15} We have previously noted that R.C. 3107.15 reflects the General
Assembly’s intent to find families for children. In re Adoption of Ridenour (1991),
61 Ohio St.3d 319, 328,
574 N.E.2d 1055, 1063. However, R.C. 3107.06 and
3107.07 reflect a countervailing policy that biological parents’ consent to adoption
is required except under limited circumstances. The requirement of consent to
adoption by a natural parent, except under the specific statutorily enumerated
conditions, “protects the statutory adoption scheme from attack on the ground that
the adoption proceedings operate to deprive such a parent of the rights of custody
and control without due process of law.” Spike, supra, at 644, Section 46.08.
{¶ 16} “Because of the finality and serious impact of adoption, the law
accords protections to a natural parent when the adoption of a child is proposed.
Among those protections are the right to adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard before any parental rights which may exist are terminated.” In re Adoption
of Greer (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 293, 298,
638 N.E.2d 999, 1003, citing Lehr v.
Robertson (1983),
463 U.S. 248,
103 S.Ct. 2985,
77 L.Ed.2d 614. Parents have a
fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and management of their children.
In re Murray (1990),
52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157,
556 N.E.2d 1169, 1171.
{¶ 17} In the case at bar, South African law did not require any notice to the
biological father of an illegitimate child to effectuate the adoption decree. Unlike
the putative father in Lehr, supra,463 U.S. at 261-262,
103 S.Ct. at 2993-2994,
77
L.Ed.2d at 626-627, there was no evidence that Johnson forfeited his opportunity
to demonstrate a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood so as to
waive the requirement of notice of the adoption proceeding. Therefore, it is
arguable that the South African adoption decree was not entered in accordance with
due process of law and that giving effect to such decree would violate the public
policy of this state.
{¶ 18} Judge Smith did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to
proceed in Johnson’s parentage action, and appellee failed to establish the
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inadequacy of a postjudgment appeal to raise her claims concerning R.C. 3107.15,
3107.18, res judicata, and standing. Accordingly, appellee is not entitled to
extraordinary relief in prohibition. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
court of appeals is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ.,
concur.
WRIGHT, J., not participating.
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