.]
BROCWELL, APPELLEE, v. KING ET AL.; PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY, APPELLANT.
[Cite as Brocwell v. King,
1996-Ohio-446
.]
Motion for discretionary appeal denied.
(No. 95-2496—Submitted March 19, 1996—Decided June 19, 1996.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Richland County, No. 95-25.
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Owens & Martin Co., L.P.A., James J. Martin and Timothy L. Cardwell, for
appellee.
Roetzel & Andress, Ronald B. Lee and Laura M. Faust, for appellant.
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{¶ 1} This cause is before the court on a motion for discretionary
appeal/claimed appeal as of right. The motion is denied.
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and STRATTON, JJ.,
concur.
DOUGLAS, J., dissents.
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DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.
{¶ 2} I respectfully dissent from the ruling by the majority not to accept this
case for review. I would accept the case to review and decide the issues presented
by appellant (Progressive Casualty Insurance Company) in Propositions of Law
Nos. 1 and 4.
I
{¶ 3} The issue presented by appellant’s Proposition of Law No. 1 is
whether Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 204, should be applied
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
retroactively. The issues arise out of the much discussed case of Savoie v. Grange
Mut. Ins. Co. (1993),
.
{¶ 4} In seeking our review of this question, appellant makes two
arguments. First, appellant says that there are “[q]uestions of public and great
general interest relating to the extent and nature of available
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, subsequent to the overruling of Savoie
v. Grange Mutual Insurance Company … by Am.S.B. No. 20 ….” Thus,
contends appellant, the General Assembly has “overruled” a decision of this
court—the Supreme Court of Ohio.
{¶ 5} Second, appellant says that “… questions of great public and
general interest are raised with respect to the issue of whether the General
Assembly’s expression of prior statutory intent regarding R.C.§ 3937.18, as set
forth in Am.S.B. 20[,] has in effect nullified the Savoie decision and the extent of
the reverberations of that nullification.” Accordingly, it is appellant’s contention
that the 120th General Assembly, which passed Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, was declaring
what the “intent” of the 114th General Assembly was when that General Assembly
passed a predecessor statute to the current version of R.C. 3937.18.
{¶ 6} Either or both of appellant’s arguments may, or may not, have
validity. Those decisions are left for another day because the threshold issue is
whether the legislation can be applied retroactively. That is all that is presented to
us in appellant’s Proposition of Law No. 1.
II
{¶ 7} Appellant’s fourth proposition of law raises the issue of whether an
insured is entitled to both liability policy coverage limits and underinsured motorist
benefits of the same policy. This issue raises the important question of setoff. I
believe we should decide the question in this context as well as the other contexts
of setoff we are currently considering.
2
January Term, 1996
III
{¶ 8} Accordingly, I would grant appellant’s application seeking us to
accept jurisdiction. These are important issues that need to be decided. Because
the majority does not do so, I respectfully dissent.
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3
