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1996 Ohio 91

State v. Williams

Ohio Supreme Court

Decided February 21, 1996

Ohio Supreme Court · decided 1996-02-21

Criminal law—Aggravated murder—Death penalty upheld, when.

Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · State v. Jenks · State v. Long

Decided 1996-02-21

[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 
74 Ohio St.3d 569
.]




    THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, v. WILLIAMS,
                         APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE.
                      [Cite as State v. Williams, 
1996-Ohio-91
.]
Criminal law—Aggravated murder—Death penalty upheld, when.
1. Neither the felony-murder statute nor Ohio case law requires the intent to
        commit felony to precede the murder in order to find a defendant guilty of
        a felony-murder specification.
2. Whether a person has a “significant history of prior criminal convictions” under
        R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) is a question for the jury and is specifically outside the
        province of expert testimony.
   (No. 94-846-Submitted—December 12, 1995—Decided February 21, 1996.)
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County, No.
                                        89-T-4210.
                                  __________________
        {¶ 1} On the evening of August 15, 1988, defendant-appellant Andre R.
Williams and Christopher Daniel assaulted and robbed George and Katherine
Melnick after forcibly entering their home on Wick Street in Warren, Ohio.
Williams beat Mr. and Mrs. Melnick, killing him and leaving her for dead. He also
attempted to rape Mrs. Melnick.
        {¶ 2} Between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. on August 15, 1988, a neighbor of
the Melnicks heard glass breaking and shortly thereafter heard Mrs. Melnick
screaming “Oh, dear God,” “Help me,” “Please stop,” and “No more.” The
screaming lasted for approximately one hour. No one called the police at that time.
Two days later, another neighbor, concerned that she had not seen the Melnicks for
two days, contacted the police. The investigating officers entered the Melnick
home and found Mrs. Melnick lying under the kitchen table in a pool of her own
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




blood. Though she had been severely beaten, she was alive. The police found Mr.
Melnick in a bedroom. He was dead, and according to the police report, had been
for some time.
       {¶ 3} Mrs. Melnick suffered from blunt force injuries including facial
fractures. As a result of these injuries, surgeons removed her right eye. Her injuries
also caused blindness in her remaining eye and diminished hearing. She has no
memory of the attack. Her underpants, which she had been wearing before the
attack, were found beside her on the floor. A test for the presence of semen was
performed; the results were negative.
       {¶ 4} An autopsy revealed that Mr. Melnick had been struck at least ten
times and that he died as a result of multiple skull fractures and other “multiple and
extensive blunt force injuries.” Investigators found several items in the house that
are believed to have been used in the attack on the Melnicks, including a lamp, a
brick, an ax handle, and a piece of concrete block. The investigation revealed that
several items were missing from the Melnick home, including a Magnavox VCR
and Mrs. Melnick’s purse, which had contained approximately $2,000 in $50 bills.
       {¶ 5} The ensuing police investigation focused on Williams and Daniel.
Henry Daniel, Jr., Daniel’s brother, and Lisa Tobe, Henry, Jr.’s girlfriend, testified
that they saw Williams and Daniel on the night of the murder at the house of Henry
Daniel, Sr., Chris Daniel’s father. Both appeared “hyper” and spent five to fifteen
minutes together in the bathroom. Shortly thereafter, Henry, Jr. saw blood on the
bathroom wall and on Williams’s hand and Lisa noticed a rust-colored spot on
Daniel’s shirt. Williams and Daniel had in their possession a brown gym bag, a
VCR, and a “nice amount” of money.
       {¶ 6} The day after the murder, Williams bought a used car. He paid with
nine $50 bills. Williams paid to have the car repainted with four $50 bills. The
manager of the auto painting shop, who accepted payment from Williams,
described him as so nervous that he needed help counting the money.




                                          2
                                January Term, 1996




       {¶ 7} Numerous acquaintances (Jennifer Gunther, Lance Owens, Henry
Daniel, Jr., Ruben Gunther, and Mario Daniel, Chris Daniel’s brother) testified that
Williams admitted to and bragged about his involvement in an assault and robbery
on an elderly couple on Wick Street. According to the testimony of these witnesses,
Williams and Chris Daniel waited outside the couple’s home until the woman
finished a telephone call, and then broke in. Once inside, Chris hit the woman in
the head with a brick while Williams attacked the man with a stick and a lamp.
Williams said they got $1,800 (mostly in $50 bills) and a VCR from the robbery.
Another witness, Estill Peterman, testified that he overheard an argument between
Chris Daniel and Williams about which of them had used the lamp and ax handle
to kill the man.
       {¶ 8} With respect to the attempted rape of Mrs. Melnick, Williams told
Lance Owens that just before he left the Melnick house, he was “on top of her” and
was “trying to get some.” Williams told Henry Daniel, Jr., “I raped the lady” and
“I got some butt from the old lady.” Ruben Gunther testified that Williams said he
“got the butt from her.” Mario Daniel heard Williams say he “tried to get some
from the lady.”
       {¶ 9} During their investigation, the police found the Melnicks’ VCR (it
was identified by serial number) in a wooded area less than three-tenths of a mile
from Henry Daniel, Sr.’s house. The police also found a brown nylon gym bag
containing Mrs. Melnick’s purse at the side of a road near Henry Daniel, Sr.’s
house. Several hairs found in the purse were tested and compared to hair samples
taken from Williams and Chris Daniel. The state’s expert testified that one of the
hairs was microscopically consistent with Daniel’s hair and that another hair was
similar to Williams’s hair. The defense expert testified that he could not exclude
the possibility that some of the hair taken from the purse was from Williams.
       {¶ 10} When initially interviewed by police, Williams denied involvement
in the incident and furnished an alibi. In the course of the interview, Williams asked




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                            SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




detectives, “Do you talk with judges?” When a detective asked what he meant,
Williams then said, “Would it go easier on me if you talked to one?”
       {¶ 11} The grand jury indicted Williams on three counts of aggravated
felony-murder; each count was based on the separate underlying felonies of
aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and rape. Each aggravated murder count
alleged three R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) felony-murder death penalty specifications and
one R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), “course of conduct” death penalty specification. The
grand jury also indicted Williams for attempted aggravated murder (Count Four),
aggravated burglary (Count Five), aggravated robbery (Count Six), and rape (Count
Seven).
       {¶ 12} The jury found Williams guilty on each aggravated murder count
and guilty on all four death penalty specifications for each count. They also found
him guilty of attempted aggravated murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated
robbery and attempted rape. The jury found Williams not guilty of rape.
       {¶ 13} During the penalty phase, the prosecution moved to dismiss the
aggravated murder charges in Counts Two and Three. Thus, only Count One,
aggravated murder based on the underlying felony of aggravated burglary, with
four capital specifications, was considered during the penalty phase.
       {¶ 14} During the sentencing phase, Williams presented witnesses who
described his history and background. Frank C. Goodman, Director of Student
Services in Special Education for Warren City Schools, testified that Williams was
born on May 1, 1967, that he was placed in a developmentally handicapped
program in the fourth grade, and that he had IQ scores of seventy-six in 1973,
seventy-eight in 1978, and sixty-seven in 1983. Goodman also testified that
Williams did poorly in school, repeated three grades, and stopped attending school
when he was eighteen. According to an assistant principal from the high school
Williams attended, Williams was suspended during ninth grade for being in a fight
but otherwise had only minor disciplinary infractions.




                                         4
                                January Term, 1996




       {¶ 15} Emma Eggleston, whose son had grown up with Williams, testified
that Williams had “always been a nice, little, young man.” Williams’s cousin
described him as a “kind-hearted, helpful person,” with a reputation as “a nice
person.” Madeline Vail, Williams’s grandmother, who raised Williams, also
testified. She stated that he was a “good and respectable” child, that he was an only
child who never had the aid or assistance of a father, that he never gave her any
particular problems with respect to discipline, respect, or control and that he was
not violent.
       {¶ 16} The parties stipulated that Williams had three misdemeanor
convictions in his record: assault in February 1987, assault in December 1987, and
shoplifting in February 1988.
       {¶ 17} In an unsworn statement, Williams proclaimed his innocence. He
stated that while he had done nothing to Mr. and Mrs. Melnick, he was sorry about
what had happened to them. He questioned the propriety of the jury’s determining
whether he (or any other person) should be put to death, stating, “there’s only one
person that should judge somebody’s life and that’s God, the man upstairs.”
       {¶ 18} The jury recommended the death penalty, and the trial court
sentenced Williams to the death penalty and prison terms. On appeal, the court of
appeals ruled that “the evidence was insufficient to warrant a finding of guilty as to
the aggravated murder count which was predicated on the underlying felony of
rape/attempted rape,” because the state had not proven that Williams intended to
rape Mrs. Melnick at the time that he killed Mr. Melnick. The court of appeals also
found that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow an attorney to express an
opinion, as an expert, on whether Williams’s prior criminal record constituted a
“significant history of prior criminal convictions” under R.C. 2929.04(B)(5). The
court of appeals affirmed the other convictions and the sentence of death with
respect to the other three death-penalty specifications.




                                          5
                                SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶ 19} The cause is now before this court pursuant to an appeal as of right
and the state’s cross-appeal.
                                 __________________
       Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, and Patrick F.
McCarthy, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee and cross-appellant.
        Thomas E. Zena and Gary L. Van Brocklin, for appellant and cross-appellee.
                                 __________________
       WRIGHT, J.
       {¶ 20} We are required by R.C. 2929.05(A) to undertake a three-prong
analysis in all death penalty cases.     First, we must review each of the nine
propositions of law raised by appellant. Second, we must independently review the
record to determine whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
factors. Finally, we must independently determine whether the sentence of death
is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. For the
reasons set forth below, we reverse the court of appeals in part, and affirm the
convictions and sentence of death.
       {¶ 21} In Proposition of Law II, appellant contends that the jury verdict was
improper because it did not indicate that the jury unanimously found either that he
was the principal offender in the murder or that he acted with prior calculation and
design. We first note that appellant did not timely object to the verdict forms and
thus waived all but plain error. Moreover, each of the verdict forms which the jury
used and signed contained language, conforming to the statute, stating either that
Williams was the principal offender, or that Williams had committed the murder
with prior calculation and design. See R.C. 2929.04(A)(7); see State v. Penix
(1987), 
32 Ohio St.3d 369
, 
513 N.E.2d 744
.
       {¶ 22} Appellant also contends as part of Proposition of Law II that the trial
court should have instructed the jury on the law of aiding and abetting. This




                                          6
                                       January Term, 1996




argument is without merit. As the person who performed every act constituting the
aggravated murder, Williams was the principal offender. State v. Sneed (1992), 
63 Ohio St.3d 3, 12
, 
584 N.E.2d 1160, 1168
. It was therefore unnecessary for the court
to instruct the jury on aiding and abetting.1 We find that Proposition of Law II lacks
merit.
         {¶ 23} In Proposition of Law IX, appellant contends that the trial court erred
because it did not instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of involuntary
manslaughter. Involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense to aggravated
murder. State v. Thomas (1988), 
40 Ohio St.3d 213
, 
533 N.E.2d 286
, paragraph
one of the syllabus. We find that the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct
the jury on involuntary manslaughter because a charge on a “lesser included offense
is required only where the evidence presented at trial would reasonably support
both an acquittal on the crime charged and a conviction upon the lesser included
offense.” 
Id.
 at paragraph two of the syllabus.
         {¶ 24} Here, under any reasonable view of the evidence, Williams was the
principal actor in the purposeful killing of Mr. Melnick. If the defense had argued
that Williams was a bystander or that the killing was not purposeful, an instruction
on involuntary manslaughter would have been necessary. As it was, the defense
contended that Williams was not present at the crime. Thus, on the evidence
presented, the jury could not have found Williams not guilty of aggravated murder
and guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Accordingly, the trial court’s failure to
instruct on involuntary manslaughter was not error.


1. Defense counsel failed to object at trial to either the instructions given by the judge or the verdict
forms, thereby waiving all but plain error. To prove plain error, the defense must establish that, but
for the asserted deficiency, “the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise.” State v.
Underwood (1983), 
3 Ohio St.3d 12
, 3 OBR 360, 
444 N.E.2d 1332
, syllabus; Crim.R. 30(A); State
v. Long (1978), 
53 Ohio St.2d 91
, 
7 O.O.3d 178
, 
372 N.E.2d 804
, paragraph two of the syllabus.
Even assuming the instructions on this issue were defective, there was no plain error because the
appellant has not established an outcome-determinative error with respect to Proposition of Law II.




                                                   7
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶ 25} Furthermore, the injuries that Mr. Melnick suffered do not
reasonably permit a finding that he was not killed purposefully. In Thomas, this
court stated, “It is axiomatic that ‘a person is presumed to intend the natural,
reasonable and probable consequences of his voluntary acts.’” 
Id.,
40 Ohio St.3d at
217
, 
533 N.E.2d at 290
, quoting State v. Johnson (1978), 
56 Ohio St.2d 35, 39
, 
10 O.O.3d 78, 80
, 
381 N.E.2d 637, 640
. Further, Williams told several people that he
had beaten and robbed an elderly couple on Wick Street, giving details of the
assault, and was overheard saying that he had killed the man. When speaking to
Jennifer Gunther and Lance Owens, Williams actually demonstrated what he had
done during the killing. Thus, in this case, “no reasonable jury could have both
rejected a finding of guilty on the charged crime and returned a verdict of guilty on
the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter.” State v. Shane (1992),
63 Ohio St.3d 630, 633
, 
590 N.E.2d 272, 275
. See State v. Campbell (1994), 
69 Ohio St.3d 38, 47-48
, 
630 N.E.2d 339, 349
. We find that Proposition of Law IX
lacks merit.
       {¶ 26} In Proposition of Law V, appellant claims that a crime scene video
and gruesome, inflammatory, and duplicative photographs prejudiced his right to a
fair trial. The defense timely objected to the photographs. However, the defense
did not timely object to the final edited version of the video and thus waived all but
plain error with respect to that issue. State v. Williams (1977), 
51 Ohio St.2d 112
,
5 O.O.3d 98
, 
364 N.E.2d 1364
.
       {¶ 27} Under Evid.R. 403 and 611(A), the admission of photographs is
within the trial court’s sound discretion. State v. Landrum (1990), 
53 Ohio St.3d 107, 121
, 
559 N.E.2d 710, 726
; State v. Maurer (1984), 
15 Ohio St.3d 239, 264
, 15
OBR 379, 401, 
473 N.E.2d 768, 791
. Nonrepetitive photographs are admissible in
capital cases, even if they are gruesome, when the probative value of each
photograph outweighs the danger of material prejudice to the accused. 
Id.
 at
paragraph seven of the syllabus; State v. Morales (1987), 
32 Ohio St.3d 252, 258
,




                                          8
                                January Term, 1996




513 N.E.2d 267, 273-274
. In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the objected-to photographs because none of them was repetitive and
each photograph’s probative value outweighed its prejudicial impact.
       {¶ 28} Six of the objected-to photographs depicted separate injuries to Mr.
Melnick’s head. One of the other photographs depicted defensive-type wounds on
Mr. Melnick’s arm, and another showed leg wounds. Collectively, the photographs
illustrated and corroborated the testimony of the coroner and the police officers.
The photographs also depicted the nature and severity of the wounds and were thus
probative of the killer’s intent to kill. The trial court closely examined every
proffered photograph and in fact excluded several.         There was no abuse of
discretion with respect to these photographs.
       {¶ 29} As to the final edited version of the videotape, the defense failed to
object at trial and thus waived all but plain error. Since nothing in the record
suggests that the verdict would have clearly been otherwise if the videotape had not
been admitted, there was no plain error. See State v. Underwood (1983), 
3 Ohio St.3d 12
, 3 OBR 360, 
444 N.E.2d 1332
, syllabus.
       {¶ 30} In Proposition of Law VIII, appellant makes three arguments with
respect to the jury’s finding that Williams was guilty of attempted rape. Appellant
argues that the prosecutor asked an expert witness improper and prejudicial
questions, that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s Crim.R. 29 motion
for acquittal, and that the trial court improperly charged the jury on the lesser
included offense of attempted rape. We address each of these arguments separately.
       {¶ 31} The prosecutor asked criminalist Dale L. Laux, “[I]n your
experience, training and analysis, have you had an occasion to analyze rape kits in
alledged [sic] rapes where there was no presence of semen or seminal fluid?”
Though the question is arguably inartful, we find that the prosecutor’s question in
no way prejudiced Williams. In his answer, Laux expressed no opinion on the
ultimate issue of whether a rape occurred. He merely observed that the absence of




                                          9
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




semen does not prove that a rape did not occur. Further, Laux stated that he found
“no physical evidence of a rape” on Mrs. Melnick. We reject the argument that the
trial court erred by not excluding this question.
        {¶ 32} The admission of expert testimony is within a trial court’s discretion.
State v. Williams (1983), 
4 Ohio St.3d 53
, 4 OBR 53, 
446 N.E.2d 444
, syllabus.
An expert opinion is admissible when it “dispels a misconception common among
lay persons.” Evid.R. 702(A). Thus, because jurors might mistakenly ascribe
greater significance to the absence of semen than warranted, the trial court
exercised sound discretion in allowing Laux to answer.
        {¶ 33} With respect to appellant’s argument that the trial court improperly
rejected the Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, the “relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks (1991), 
61 Ohio St.3d 259
, 
574 N.E.2d 492
,
paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 
443 U.S. 307
,
99 S.Ct. 2781
, 
61 L.Ed.2d 560
. We believe there was sufficient evidence of forcible
sexual conduct in the record to allow a rational fact finder to find Williams guilty
of attempted rape.
        {¶ 34} Mrs. Melnick had been beaten and was found lying in a pool of her
own blood, with her underwear on the floor beside her. She remembered nothing
about the attack other than that she had been wearing underwear immediately
before the attack. Lance Owens, Henry Daniel, Jr., Ruben Gunther and Mario
Daniel, all testified that Williams had told them about raping Mrs. Melnick. Given
this evidence and testimony, it is certainly possible that a “rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Jenks, 
61 Ohio St.3d 259
, 
574 N.E.2d 492
, paragraph two of the syllabus. Thus, a
jury could reasonably find that Williams attempted to rape Mrs. Melnick. See State
v. Scudder (1994), 
71 Ohio St.3d 263, 274-275
, 
643 N.E.2d 524, 533
; State v. Durr




                                           10
                                January Term, 1996




(1991), 
58 Ohio St.3d 86, 92-93
, 
568 N.E.2d 674, 681-682
. It should also be noted
that Williams was acquitted of rape, rendering the Crim.R. 29 motion on that
charge moot. We reject the argument that the trial judge improperly overruled the
Crim.R. 29 motion.
       {¶ 35} The court of appeals reversed appellant’s conviction under Count
Three, finding that “there was no evidence to suggest that Appellant formed his
intent to rape Katherine Melnick prior to the time that he inflicted his fatal assault
on George Melnick.” In Proposition of Law I of its cross-appeal, the state contends
that the court of appeals’ finding resulted from an erroneous interpretation of State
v. Rojas (1992), 
64 Ohio St.3d 131
, 
592 N.E.2d 1376
. The court of appeals stated:
       “[Rojas] established that for purposes of R.C. 2903.01(B) and R.C.
2929.04(A)(7), it is necessary that evidence be presented from which a fact finder
could reasonably conclude that the defendant formed his intent to commit the
underlying felony prior to or during the commission of the acts which resulted in
the murder victim’s death.”
       {¶ 36} The state contends that the evidence “need not establish that an
offender formed an intent to commit an attempted rape at or prior to the time” he
committed the murder. Rather, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) requires that the murder occur
“while the offender was” committing a felony, attempting to commit a felony, or
fleeing from the scene of a felony. The trial court correctly instructed the jury that
the term “while” “means that the death must occur as part of acts leading up to, or
occurring during, or immediately subsequent to the [relevant felony].”
       {¶ 37} The Rojas decision itself supports the state’s argument on this issue.
Rojas did not rob his victim until hours after he had stabbed her and the case reflects
that he did not stab her in order to rob her. State v. Rojas, 
64 Ohio St.3d at 131
-
132, 
592 N.E.2d at 1379
. In this case, each of the crimes of which Williams was
convicted occurred during one continuous incident. Accordingly, Williams should
not be able to escape the felony-murder rule by claiming the rape was merely an




                                          11
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




afterthought. See State v. Smith (1991), 
61 Ohio St.3d 284, 290
, 
574 N.E.2d 510, 516
.
       {¶ 38} This court has had occasion to explain the meaning of the word
“while” with respect to R.C. 2903.01(B), stating:
       “ ‘The term “while” does not indicate  that the killing must occur at the
same instant as the attempted rape, or that the killing must have been caused by the
attempt, but, rather, indicates that the killing must be directly associated with the
attempted rape as part of one continuous occurrence[.] ’ The evidence here
showed that the murders were associated with the kidnappings, robbery, and rapes
‘as part of one continuous occurrence .”  The evidence here showed that
the murders were associated with the kidnappings, robbery, and rapes ‘as part of
one continuous occurrence.’” State v. Cooey (1989), 
46 Ohio St.3d 20, 23
, 
544 N.E.2d 895, 903
, quoting State v. Cooper (1977), 
52 Ohio St.2d 163, 179-180
, 
6 O.O.3d 377, 386
, 
370 N.E.2d 725, 736
.
       {¶ 39} In this case, the murder of Mr. Melnick was “associated” with the
attempted rape of Mrs. Melnick “as part of one continuous occurrence.” As such,
this case satisfies the Cooey test. The facts are even stronger than those in Rojas
and Smith, in which death sentences were affirmed, because there is no evidence
which suggests a substantial passage of time between the assault on Mr. Melnick
and the attempted rape of Mrs. Melnick. Thus, we find that neither the felony-murder statute nor Ohio case law requires the intent to commit a felony to precede
the murder in order to find a defendant guilty of a felony-murder specification. In
doing so, we reject the court of appeals’ interpretation of R.C. 2903.01(B) and
2929.04(A)(7).
       {¶ 40} Appellant’s final argument within Proposition of Law VIII is that the
trial court improperly instructed the jury on attempted rape.        We reject this
contention because the crime of attempted rape, which is a lesser included offense
of rape, was raised by the evidence. See State v. Thomas, 
40 Ohio St.3d 213
, 533




                                         12
                               January Term, 
1996 N.E.2d 286
, paragraph two of the syllabus. Moreover, the defense requested an
instruction on attempted rape, and cannot now complain of any error so induced.
See Crim.R. 30(A); State v. Seiber (1990), 
56 Ohio St.3d 4, 17
, 
564 N.E.2d 408, 422
.
       {¶ 41} In Proposition of Law I, appellant argues that the court of appeals
lacked the authority to affirm his death sentence by reweighing the evidence
because the court of appeals found that some mitigating evidence had been
improperly excluded by the trial court. We reject this argument.
       {¶ 42} Independent appellate reweighing has been upheld in varied
situations and “does not contravene the role of the jury in the penalty proceeding.”
State v. Holloway (1988), 
38 Ohio St.3d 239
, 
527 N.E.2d 831
, paragraph two of the
syllabus; see State v. Combs (1991), 
62 Ohio St.3d 278, 286
, 
581 N.E.2d 1071, 1079
; State v. Landrum, 
53 Ohio St.3d at 115
, 
559 N.E.2d at 721
. Rather, in a death
penalty case, the true purpose of independent appellate review is to provide “a
procedural safeguard against the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.”
Holloway, 
38 Ohio St.3d 239
, 
527 N.E.2d 831
, paragraph two of the syllabus.
Appellate reweighing requires the court to consider proffered evidence that the jury
was erroneously not allowed to consider. Thus, any deficiency in the lower court’s
decision can be cured by the reviewing court’s independent sentence assessment.
State v. Simko (1994), 
71 Ohio St.3d 483, 493
, 
644 N.E.2d 345
, 354; State v. Green
(1993), 
66 Ohio St.3d 141, 149
, 
609 N.E.2d 1253, 1260
. Accordingly we reject
Proposition of Law I.
       {¶ 43} The testimony that the trial court excluded was that of attorney R.
Scott Krichbaum. The defense wanted him to testify, as an expert, regarding
whether Williams lacked a “significant history of prior criminal convictions”
pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(B)(5). (The parties had stipulated to Williams’s criminal
record.) The court of appeals held that excluding the proffered testimony was error.
We reverse that holding.




                                        13
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶ 44} Whether an accused’s criminal history is “significant” under R.C.
2929.04(B)(5) is a jury question. The weight to be given such a conclusion is also
a question for the jury. The trial court simply exercised its discretion “to refuse to
admit the testimony of an expert witness on an ultimate issue where such testimony
is not essential to the jury’s understanding of the issue and the jury is capable of
coming to a correct conclusion without it.” Bostic v. Connor (1988), 
37 Ohio St.3d 144
, 
524 N.E.2d 881
, paragraph three of the syllabus. As there is no legal standard
to determine the “lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions,” the
significance of Williams’s criminal history under R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) does not
involve professional matters “requiring special study, experience or observation not
within the common knowledge of laymen[.]” McKay Machine Co. v. Rodman
(1967), 
11 Ohio St.2d 77
, 
40 O.O.2d 87
, 
228 N.E.2d 304
, paragraph one of the
syllabus.
       {¶ 45} The jury knew of Williams’s criminal record and was properly
instructed with respect to mitigating factors by the trial judge. The jury thus had
all the information necessary to properly evaluate this asserted mitigating factor.
“Expert” testimony on such an issue would have been improper. We find that
whether a person has a “significant history of prior criminal convictions” under
R.C. 2929.04(B)(5) is a question for the jury and is specifically outside the province
of expert testimony.
       {¶ 46} In Proposition of Law III, appellant contends that the trial court erred
because it did not merge the four separate death penalty specifications charged
against Williams for sentencing purposes. As the defense failed to object at trial, it
waived all but plain error. Thus, the defense must, but did not, establish that “the
outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise” if the asserted error had
not occurred. State v. Long (1978), 
53 Ohio St.2d 91
, 
7 O.O.3d 178
, 
372 N.E.2d 804
, paragraph two of the syllabus. Moreover, Williams waived the issue by not




                                         14
                                January Term, 1996




raising it before the court of appeals. State v. Williams, 
51 Ohio St.2d 112
, 
5 O.O.3d 98
, 
364 N.E.2d 691
. Despite the waiver of this issue, we will address it briefly.
       {¶ 47} The defense’s argument is based primarily on this court’s decision
in State v. Jenkins (1984), 
15 Ohio St.3d 164
, 15 OBR 311, 
473 N.E.2d 264
,
paragraph five of the syllabus. In Jenkins, the defendant was charged with five
specifications, three of which alleged that he committed aggravated murder (1) to
escape apprehension for aggravated robbery; (2) while committing or fleeing after
committing aggravated robbery; and (3) while committing or fleeing after
committing kidnapping.      This court held that specification (1) unnecessarily
duplicated (2), and that specification (2) unnecessarily duplicated (3).         The
specifications were duplicative because they were part of an indivisible course of
conduct. Accordingly, the specifications were merged. 
Id. at 194-195
, 15 OBR at
337-340, 463 N.E.2d at 292-295.
       {¶ 48} In this case, the felony-murder and multiple murder specifications
represent distinct and separate aggravating circumstances and therefore are not
duplicative. See State v. Frazier (1991), 
61 Ohio St.3d 247, 256
, 
574 N.E.2d 483, 490-491
. Aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery are separate offenses and
constitute separate aggravating circumstances because they do not arise from the
same act. See State v. Slagle (1992), 
65 Ohio St.3d 597, 611
, 
605 N.E.2d 916, 929
;
State v. Barnes (1986), 
25 Ohio St.3d 203, 207
, 25 OBR 266, 269-270, 
495 N.E.2d 922, 925
. Under the facts of this case, attempted rape is also a separate offense and
aggravating circumstance because it involves separate offense elements and an
animus separate from the aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery.
Accordingly, even in the absence of waiver, we would reject Proposition of Law
III because the death penalty specifications were not duplicative.
       {¶ 49} In Proposition of Law IV, appellant argues that the prosecutor
improperly referred to Williams’s failure to testify at the sentencing hearing.
During his closing argument at the sentencing hearing the prosecutor said, “Finally




                                         15
                            SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




the last person presented in the penalty phase of this case was the Defendant. 
Every witness who’s testified as to what happened in this case took that witness
stand under oath and told you what happened. Every witness except one. The
Defendant.”   The setting of the comments and the context indicate that the
prosecutor’s comments were directed to the unsworn statement made by Williams
at the sentencing hearing. However poorly crafted the comments may have been,
they were not directed to Williams’s failure to testify at trial. Consequently, the
prosecutor’s comments were not improper and we reject Proposition of Law IV.
State v. DePew (1988), 
38 Ohio St.3d 275
, 
528 N.E.2d 542
, paragraph two of the
syllabus; State v. Lewis (1993), 
67 Ohio St.3d 200, 206-207
, 
616 N.E.2d 921, 926
;
State v. Coleman (1989), 
45 Ohio St.3d 298, 301
, 
544 N.E.2d 622, 627
.
       {¶ 50} In Proposition of Law VI, appellant argues that when the trial court
reviewed the jury’s recommendation for the death penalty it improperly considered
the facts and circumstances of the case itself, as what the appellant terms “a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance.” To the contrary, the trial court accurately
identified, and the jury found, four specified aggravating circumstances. When a
court so finds, there is a presumption that it relied only on those specified
aggravating circumstances and that it did not rely on nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances. State v. Rojas, 
64 Ohio St.3d at 142
, 
592 N.E.2d at 1386
; State v.
Wiles (1991), 
59 Ohio St.3d 71, 89
, 
571 N.E.2d 97, 120
. We find that the trial judge
did not improperly rely on nonstatutory aggravating factors and accordingly reject
Proposition of Law VI.
       {¶ 51} In Proposition of Law VII, appellant challenges the constitutionality
of Ohio’s death penalty statute. This challenge is summarily rejected. State v.
Poindexter (1988), 
36 Ohio St.3d 1
, 
520 N.E.2d 568
, syllabus; State v. Jenkins, 
15 Ohio St.3d 164
, 15 OBR 311, 
473 N.E.2d 264
.
       {¶ 52} We find that the evidence supports a finding of the aggravating
circumstances charged against Williams beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore




                                        16
                                January Term, 1996




agree with the jury that Williams killed Mr. Melnick while committing aggravated
burglary, aggravated robbery, and attempted rape, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), and as a
“course of conduct” with intent to kill two or more, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).
       {¶ 53} Some mitigating factors are present in this case. Williams has a low
IQ, which was recognized by authorities who attempted to provide help and
assistance. However, no evidence at trial established that Williams’s low IQ caused
him to lack the “substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct”
or “conform” to the law. Williams was raised by a grandmother who loved,
supported and nurtured him. He was twenty-one at the time of the offense.
       {¶ 54} We believe that Williams can also qualify for the R.C. 2929.04(B)(5)
mitigating factor, “lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions[.]” His
two 1987 assault convictions and his 1988 shoplifting conviction diminish the
significance of this mitigating factor. With regard to the R.C. 2929.04(B)(6)
mitigating factor, we find that since Williams personally killed Mr. Melnick, he
fails to qualify for the R.C. 2929.04(B)(6) mitigating factor. None of the mitigating
factors in R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) and (2) appear applicable, since no evidence suggests
that the victims induced the offense or that Williams acted under “duress, coercion,
or strong provocation.” No “other factors,” R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), are applicable.
While we recognize that some mitigating factors are relevant to this case, we find
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors.
       {¶ 55} The sentence of death is proportionate when compared with similar
felony-murder cases. See State v. Slagle, 
65 Ohio St.3d 597
, 
605 N.E.2d 916
; State
v. Murphy (1992), 
65 Ohio St.3d 554
, 
605 N.E.2d 884
; State v. Rojas, 
64 Ohio St.3d 131
, 
592 N.E.2d 1376
; State v. Smith, 
61 Ohio St.3d 284
, 
574 N.E.2d 510
; State v.
Lott (1990), 
51 Ohio St.3d 160
, 
555 N.E.2d 293
; State v. Holloway, 
38 Ohio St.3d 239
, 
527 N.E.2d 831
; State v. Barnes, 
25 Ohio St.3d 203
, 25 OBR 266, 
495 N.E.2d 922
. In addition, the death sentence in this case is proportionate when compared
with prior “course of conduct” murder cases. See State v. Dunlap (1995), 
73 Ohio 17
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




St.3d 308, 
652 N.E.2d 988
; State v. Loza (1994), 
71 Ohio St.3d 61
, 
641 N.E.2d 1082
; State v. Grant (1993), 
67 Ohio St.3d 465
, 
620 N.E.2d 50
; State v. Lorraine
(1993), 
66 Ohio St.3d 414
, 
613 N.E.2d 212
; State v. Hawkins (1993), 
66 Ohio St.3d 339
, 
612 N.E.2d 1227
; State v. Montgomery (1991), 
61 Ohio St.3d 410
, 
575 N.E.2d 167
; and State v. Combs, 
62 Ohio St.3d 278
, 
581 N.E.2d 1071
, including cases cited
at 294, 
581 N.E.2d at 1084
.
          {¶ 56} We affirm the convictions and death penalty sentence and reverse on
the cross-appeal.
                                                      Judgment affirmed in part
                                                      and reversed in part.
          MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ.,
concur.
                                __________________




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