Keator v. Gale’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “There are far different policy concerns presented when an actively negligent tortfeasor seeks to escape liability by a plaintiffs release of a vicariously liable master. The result in Horejsi is premised to a great degree upon the active/passive distinction between the liability of the servant and the master. A master’s vicarious liability is based entirely upon the underlying wrongful conduct of the servant, not upon any active wrongdoing by the master. Thus, release of the servant “remove[s] any foundation upon which to impute negligence to the employer.” Horejsi at 319 (quoting Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc., 27 Utah 2d 109 , 493 P.2d 625, 628 (1972)). [[Image here]] The result in Horejsi was effectively pre-ordained by the nature of a Pier-ringer release and the vicariously liable master’s right to indemnity against the servant. The plaintiffs agreement to indemnify the settling defendant for any subsequent claims for indemnity or contribution is an “indispensable characteristic” of a Pierringer release. Kellen [v. Mathias, 519 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Minn.Ct.App.1994) ]. A vicariously li able party is entitled to indemnity from the party who directly caused the injury. Horejsi at 318-319 . We thus noted in Horejsi that a circle of indemnity would be created if the release of the servant did not release the vicarious liability of the master: If the plaintiff recovered at trial from the non-settling master, the master would have a right of indemnity against the released se”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Nelson v. Johnson

2. “No policy reason exists to release an agent where the principal is released, absent an intent to release both parties.”); McFadden v. Turner, 159 N.J.Super. 360 , 388 A.2d 244, 247 (1978) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27); Keator v. Gale, 561 N.W.2d 286, 289 (N.D.1997); Losito v. Kruse, 136 Ohio St. 183 , 24 N.E.2d 705, 707 (1940); Biles v. Harris, 521 P.2d 884 (Ok.App.1974); Vanderpool v. Grange Ins. Ass’n, 110 Wash.2d 483 , 756 P.2d 111, 114 (1988). But see Int'l Halliwell Mines, Ltd. v. Cont'l Copper & Steel Indus., Inc., 544 F.2d 105 , 109-10 (2d Cir.1976) (”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jamerson v. Quintero