¶1concurring and dissenting.
¶2[¶ 16] I agree the trial court’s finding of no changed circumstances was clearly erroneous. However, having made that determination, the majority then goes on to find as a matter of fact, upon an equivocal record, that the changed circumstances require a change of custody.
¶3[¶ 17] Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P., contemplates that trial courts, not appellate courts, find facts. See Park View Manor v. Housing Authority, Etc., 287 N.W.2d 83, 86 (N.D.1979).
“‘The entire responsibility for deciding doubtful fact questions in a nonjury case should be, and we think it is, that of the district court. The existence of any doubt as to whether the trial court or this Court is the ultimate trier of fact issues in nonju-ry cases is, we think, detrimental to the orderly administration of justice, impairs the confidence of litigants and the public in the decisions of the district courts, and multiplies the number of appeals in such cases.’ ” Matter of Estate of Koch, 259 N.W.2d 655, 665 (N.D.1977) (Pederson, J., concurring specially) (citing Pendergrass v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir.1950)).
¶4[¶ 18] Although I do not disagree with the result reached by the majority, in order to preserve the proper roles of trial and appellate courts, I would reverse on the clear error of finding no changed circumstances, and remand for the trial court to consider whether the changed circumstances require a change of custody.
¶5[¶ 19] William A. Neumann