Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

1997 Ohio 159

Disciplinary Counsel v. Donnell

Ohio Supreme Court

Decided October 1, 1997

Ohio Supreme Court · decided 1997-10-01

Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Permanent disbarment—While filling dual role of guardian and attorney to the guardian, allowing ward's assets to dissipate and appropriating funds of the estate for business and personal use.

Relies on Miami County Bar Ass'n v. Hallows · Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Armon · Tonge v. Salisbury

Decided 1997-10-01

[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 
79 Ohio St.3d 496
.]




                  OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CLIFTON.
             [Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Clifton, 
1997-Ohio-159
.]
Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Permanent disbarment—While filling dual role of
        guardian and attorney to the guardian, allowing ward’s assets to dissipate
        and appropriating funds of the estate for business and personal use.
       (No. 96-2805—Submitted May 7, 1997—Decided October 1, 1997.)
    ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
                     Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 94-58.
                                 ___________________
        {¶ 1} On October 21, 1994, relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, filed an
amended complaint charging in two counts that respondent, William Deems Clifton
II of Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0038076,
 violated eight
Disciplinary Rules while acting as the guardian of an estate, and in another count,
that respondent violated an additional Disciplinary Rule and a Rule for the
Government of the Bar by failing to pay attorney registration fees on a timely basis
during the 1989/1991, 1991/1993 and 1993/1995 biennia. After respondent filed
an answer, the matter was heard by a panel of the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”).
        {¶ 2} The panel found that on February 3, 1984, the Hamilton County
Probate Court appointed respondent guardian of the person and estate of Ollie R.
Cawein, an incompetent, after the death of her brother, who was the prior guardian.
At the time of respondent’s appointment, Cawein’s assets totaled over $500,000,
mostly consisting of stocks, bonds and cash, in addition to two residences in
Cincinnati and two lots in Florida. Between February 1984 and December 1992,
when respondent resigned as guardian, respondent placed estate funds totaling
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




$296,236.72, either into his private business or personal accounts and used them
for business and personal expenses.
       {¶ 3} Between April 1986 and September 1990, respondent not only
retained for his own use dividends and interest belonging to the estate, but also
borrowed $172,407 from Cawein’s estate without authority. He retained proceeds
of sales of the estate’s stocks, proceeds from the sales of stocks received in stock
splits, and proceeds from distributions of the estates of Cawein’s relatives and
executed six personal five-year promissory notes for the borrowed amounts. He
did not timely pay these notes because he determined at the time the notes were due
that Cawein’s estate did not need the money and that it was not convenient for him
to make the payments. Respondent transferred the funds represented by the notes
to Jamaica Trading Shares, Inc., a Delaware corporation that he formed and owned.
The funds in Jamaica Trading were used to meet respondent’s professional and
personal obligations, such as the purchase of an automobile for himself.
Respondent did not report the receipt of stock from stock splits in his annual
guardianship reports. Not only did the estate fail to receive the funds represented
by the notes, but it also failed to realize interest had the funds been received and
invested.
       {¶ 4} Cawein was an incompetent as a result of a stroke incurred in 1976.
She resided in a nursing home and had little prospect of occupying either of the two
residences she owned in Cincinnati. Yet respondent failed to sell either property,
and during his guardianship realized only $13,205.62 in rental income from one of
the properties. During respondent’s tenure as guardian, operating expenses of these
two properties exceeded the rental income by $15,287.99. In addition, while he
was guardian respondent spent an additional $64,442.34 in repairs on these
properties. Respondent did not maintain insurance on either property, and because
he did not file tax returns for the estate for several years, tax liens were placed on




                                          2
                                 January Term, 1997




the properties. Eventually, the liens were removed after respondent paid the taxes
and penalties.
        {¶ 5} Respondent also neglected to maintain the two real estate lots in
Florida appraised at $11,000 and owned by the estate. His failure to pay property
taxes on the Florida real estate resulted in the lots’ being sold at a sheriff’s sale.
        {¶ 6} Because respondent failed to account for the use of Social Security
income from November 1989 through March 1993, the Department of Health and
Human Services suspended Cawein’s Social Security payments totaling $27,429.
Although the suspended amounts were ultimately recovered, the estate lost $5,800
in interest that could have been realized had the funds been received and invested.
        {¶ 7} Without court approval, respondent paid himself an aggregate of
$66,985 in attorney fees and guardianship fees during the period he served as both
attorney and guardian.      However, respondent did not retain records of time
expended or work performed to support the fees charged.
        {¶ 8} The panel also found that during his guardianship respondent visited
Cawein infrequently. His testimony indicated that during the six years of his
guardianship, he purchased only $800-$1,200 in clothes for her, and the employees
of the nursing home testified that Cawein was dressed with clothes left at the
nursing home when other occupants departed or died. Respondent also claimed
that he did repair Cawein’s broken television at one time, and that if it was
subsequently not working, he did not know about it. Respondent would not
authorize speech therapy for Cawein, nor would he authorize the purchase for
Cawein of a recommended “lap board” and a “communication board” (an item with
icons to which she could point to indicate her needs). The estate, however,
maintained a subscription to The Wall Street Journal.
        {¶ 9} On May 31, 1991, the nursing home contacted the Hamilton County
Probate Court indicating serious concerns about the Cawein guardianship. The
nursing home cited not only respondent’s failure to visit his ward and his disregard




                                            3
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




for her everyday needs, but also the fact that the estate owed the nursing home over
$18,000 for care and maintenance of Cawein. After an investigation by the court,
respondent resigned as guardian in December 1992.
         {¶ 10} On January 8, 1993, the court appointed Dolores Schuessler as
successor guardian. When Schuessler visited the nursing home three days after her
appointment, she found Cawein dressed in very worn clothing and living in a
crowded, shabby room, with no curtains on the windows. Schuessler purchased
clothing for Cawein, as well as a television set and a recliner chair to replace her
wheelchair.    Schuessler requested an immediate dental exam of Cawein and
arranged to have fresh flowers sent to Cawein every week. Schuessler rescinded
the order of respondent “do not hospitalize” and told the nursing home Cawein was
to have every care possible. During the approximately seventy days she was
guardian until Cawein died on March 17, 1993, Schuessler visited Cawein eight
times.
         {¶ 11} As a result of the audit requested by Schuessler, the Hamilton
County Probate Court found in September 1994 that during the term of his
guardianship, respondent had violated his fiduciary duty to the Cawein estate; the
court ordered him to make restitution in the amount of $400,282.88 for funds he
had mismanaged, commingled, or lost. The restitution amount consisted of the
following: $22,869.95 for losing or forfeiting assets; $79,094.91 for unpaid interest
on the six promissory notes; $41,194.07 for interest lost on funds not received by
the estate and not accounted for by the promissory notes; $74,187.33 for losses
incurred in the management of the estate’s real property; $66,985 for attorney and
guardianship fees received by the respondent; $47,369.58 for statutory interest on
the above amounts from January 1, 1993 through September 1, 1994; and
$68,582.04 for the expenses incurred by the successor guardian to trace assets of
the estate and satisfy liens. The order of restitution was affirmed on appeal. In re




                                         4
                                January Term, 1997




Guardianship of Cawein (Nov. 1, 1995), Hamilton App. No. C-940885, unreported,
1995 WL 653853
.
       {¶ 12} The panel found that the $172,704 which respondent had borrowed
from the estate had been repaid and that respondent’s bonding company had settled
the $400,282.88 judgment.
       {¶ 13} The panel concluded that respondent had clearly and convincingly
violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude),
1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects
upon the fitness to practice law), 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting an entrusted legal matter),
7-101 (A)(3) (intentionally prejudicing or damaging a client during the course of
the professional relationship), and 9-102(A) and (B) (failing to preserve the identity
of the funds and property of the client). As to the charge that respondent had failed
to pay attorney registration fees on a timely basis, the panel found violations of
Gov.Bar R. VI(1)(A) and DR 1-102(A)(6). Inasmuch as respondent’s activities
took place over a six-year period and were designed to conceal the defalcations, the
panel found no mitigating circumstances. The panel recommended that respondent
be disbarred.
       {¶ 14} The board adopted the findings, conclusions, and recommendation
of the panel.
                               __________________
       J. Warren Bettis, Interim Disciplinary Counsel, Lori J. Brown and Cynthia
L. Roehl, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
       Gary R. Lewis, for respondent.
                               __________________




                                          5
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       Per Curiam.
       {¶ 15} The respondent undertook the dual roles of guardian and attorney for
the guardianship of both the person and the estate of an incompetent woman who
it appears had no close relatives. As the record indicates, respondent failed
miserably in the performance of his duties in both roles. Over a six-year period
respondent wasted his ward’s considerable estate through both negligence and
design. Just as important, over those same six years, respondent failed to provide
adequately for the care and comfort of his ward.
       {¶ 16} A guardian of the estate is required by R.C. 2111.14(B) to manage
the estate for the best interest of the ward. The duty of management requires that
the guardian attend to the assets of the ward as a prudent person would attend to his
or her own assets. The record here indicates that respondent, filling the dual role of
guardian and attorney to the guardian, not only allowed assets of Cawein’s estate
to dissipate but also appropriated funds of the estate to his own use.
       {¶ 17} A guardian of the person is required by R.C. 2111.13(A) to protect
the person of the ward and to provide suitable maintenance as the amount of her
estate justifies. Thus, the guardian of an elderly woman has a duty to provide care
and maintenance according to her means and position in life. Tonge v. Salisbury
(1934), 
54 R.I. 170
, 
171 A. 372
. The successor guardian found Cawein poorly
dressed in a crowded, shabby room with no curtains, a broken television, and an
inadequate wheelchair. Under those circumstances, respondent failed to maintain
Cawein according to the means of a woman with an estate initially valued at over
$500,000. The successor trustee in this case took the kind of responsible action that
should have been taken by respondent.
       {¶ 18} A guardian of the person of an elderly incompetent must take steps
to see that the ward, however incapacitated, has the comfort and care that he or she
could afford were the ward personally able to order such care. Frankly, we find




                                          6
                                January Term, 1997




respondent’s actions as the guardian of the person and estate of Cawein to be
despicable and contemptuous.
       {¶ 19} As to respondent’s responsibility as attorney for the guardianship,
we said in Disciplinary Counsel v. Lucey (1984), 
14 Ohio St.3d 18, 21
, 14 OBR
322, 324, 
470 N.E.2d 888, 890
, “‘There are few ethical breaches which impact more
negatively on the integrity of the legal profession than the misuse of a client’s
funds.’” Recently we said, “Public trust in the legal profession is tested daily in the
service provided by each individual lawyer to his or her clients. When a lawyer,
who has taken responsibility for a client’s papers or property, commingles client
funds or dissipates that property, the lawyer not only ill serves the client but also
contributes to the erosion of public trust in the profession.” Miami Cty. Bar Assn.
v. Hallows (1997), 
78 Ohio St.3d 75, 77
, 
676 N.E.2d 517, 518
. In that case and in
Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Armon (1997), 
78 Ohio St.3d 497
, 
678 N.E.2d 1371
, we
noted that the appropriate sanction for the misuse of client funds is disbarment.
       {¶ 20} In this case, unlike Miami Cty. Bar Assn. v. Hallows, we find no
mitigating circumstances whatever. Respondent is permanently disbarred from the
practice of law in Ohio. Costs taxed to respondent.
                                                              Judgment accordingly.
       MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
                              ___________________




                                          7

/1997/ohio/159 · .json · Public domain