[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at
79 Ohio St.3d 259.]
IN RE RIDDLE, ALLEGED NEGLECTED/DEPENDENT CHILD.
[Cite as In re Riddle, 1997-Ohio-391.]
Juvenile court—Determining whether a child is neglected under former R.C.
2151.03(A)(2)—Child who is receiving proper care pursuant to an
arrangement initiated by the parent with a caregiver is not a dependent
child under R.C. 2151.04(A)—Trial court’s finding of neglect not against
the manifest weight of the evidence, when.
(No. 96-1304—Submitted April 15, 1997—Decided July 23, 1997.)
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Guernsey County, No. 96CA03.
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{¶ 1} Travis Riddle, Sr. and appellant, Angela Hannon, were divorced in
May 1994. Pursuant to the divorce, custody of the couple’s son, Travis Riddle, Jr.
(born August 18, 1993), was assigned to Travis Riddle, Sr.
{¶ 2} On July 12, 1995, appellee, Guernsey County Children Services
Board (“GCCSB”), received a complaint that Travis, Jr. was not receiving proper
care due to his parents’ transient lifestyles. This complaint alleged that Travis, Jr.
was staying with different people in different locations, and that stability in Travis,
Jr.’s care was lacking. At about the time appellee became involved, Travis, Sr.,
who had recently lost his job, acknowledged that he was not providing proper care
for Travis, Jr.
{¶ 3} Travis, Jr.’s paternal grandparents, Jeff and Christy Riddle, were
among the various caregivers the child had stayed with prior to appellee’s
involvement. Jeff and Christy Riddle expressed concerns about the well-being of
their grandson, and about the ability of either parent to provide regular, stable care.
In response to the situation, a GCCSB caseworker mediated an agreement to
address Travis, Jr.’s care. Signatories to this agreement or “contract” were
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appellant, Travis Riddle, Sr., Jeff Riddle, Christy Riddle, and the caseworker. The
contract was signed on July 26 and 27, 1995.
{¶ 4} The contract outlined two aspects of the parents’ problems regarding
Travis, Jr.: that neither parent had permanent appropriate housing and that the
custodial parent, Travis, Sr., had been unable to provide a stable environment. As
a desired solution, the contract specified that the goal was to provide Travis, Jr.
with a permanent stable environment. The contract recognized that the paternal
grandparents’ home provided a stable environment on a temporary basis without
court intervention.
{¶ 5} The contract set out “conditions” to be complied with to achieve the
goal of providing Travis, Jr. with a permanent stable environment. The first
condition was that Travis, Jr. would reside with his paternal grandparents until
Travis, Sr. found suitable housing and achieved a source of income that would
provide for his son’s basic needs. Other conditions addressed Aid to Dependent
Children benefits for Travis, Jr., the child’s medical care, and parental visitation.
The final condition specified that “Travis Riddle [Sr.] will accomplish his goals on
or before September 10, 1995. If he is unable, Guernsey County Children Services
Board will assist the paternal grandparents in receiving temporary legal custody of
their grandchild to ensure his ongoing stability.”1
{¶ 6} As the contract was structured, Travis, Sr., as the custodial parent, was
challenged to modify his situation with a goal of establishing a more stable
environment for the child’s welfare. Travis, Sr. was given approximately forty-five
days to display his commitment to the contract’s goals. The contract placed no
similar responsibilities upon appellant to improve her situation.
1. A copy of the contract can be found in the appendix to appellee’s brief, along with a copy of the
complaint filed in juvenile court. The contract is not found in the record, although the complaint,
found in the record, references the contract as an attachment. Also, the copy of the contract in the
appendix is clearly stamped “FILED” at the top and is dated the same as the complaint. Moreover,
the caseworker’s testimony about the contract corroborates its terms.
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{¶ 7} Upon the expiration of the contract period, the caseworker determined
that very little, if any, progress had been made by Travis, Sr. to meet the contract’s
goals. On September 20, 1995, the caseworker filed a complaint in Guernsey
County Juvenile Court, alleging that Travis, Jr. appeared to be a
neglected/dependent child pursuant to R.C. 2151.03(A)(2) and 2151.04(A), and
requested that the court inquire into the status of the child. The complaint explained
that the conditions of the contract had not been met, and asked for assignment of
temporary legal custody to the paternal grandparents.
{¶ 8} On September 26, 1995, the court appointed attorneys to represent
each of the parents, appointed a guardian ad litem for the child, found probable
cause to believe that Travis, Jr. was a neglected/dependent child, and awarded
interim custody to the paternal grandparents, with protective supervision by
appellee.
{¶ 9} On November 20, 1995, the court approved appellee’s case plan for
Travis, Jr.’s care, which specified that the child’s parents would each obtain
appropriate housing and income, that the paternal grandparents would meet the
child’s daily needs, and that appellant and Travis, Sr. would each visit weekly with
their son.
{¶ 10} The trial court held an adjudicatory hearing on December 18, 1995.
Several individuals testified at the hearing that Travis, Jr. had not been receiving
proper care prior to the time his paternal grandparents assumed responsibility for
his care. Appellant apparently was unable to care for Travis, Jr. on a consistent
basis, and therefore was unable to seek custody of the child. Further unrefuted
testimony established that Travis, Jr. was well cared for after the paternal
grandparents assumed their responsibilities for him.
{¶ 11} After the presentation of testimony, the trial court determined that
Travis, Jr. was a neglected child, and the case proceeded to the dispositional
hearing. After the dispositional hearing, the trial court journalized its decision
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finding Travis, Jr. to be a neglected child, assigned temporary custody to the
paternal grandparents, and established a parental visitation schedule.
{¶ 12} Appellant appealed from the trial court determination that Travis, Jr.
was a neglected child. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court,
and certified its judgment as in conflict with the decisions of the Court of Appeals
for Franklin County in In re Reese (1982), 4 Ohio App.3d 59, 4 OBR 109,
446
N.E.2d 482, In re Crisp (Feb. 5, 1981), Franklin App. No. 80AP-678, unreported,
1981 WL 2983, and In re Darst (1963),
117 Ohio App. 374,
24 O.O.2d 144,
192
N.E.2d 287. The certified question is, “Can a trial court make a finding of neglect
under R.C. 2151.03(A) if the child is being properly cared for by a relative who has
not been declared legal guardian or custodian as those terms are defined in R.C.
2151.011[B](18) and R.C. 2151.011[B](26), respectively?”
{¶ 13} The cause is now before this court upon our determination that a
conflict exists.
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Charles E. McKnight, for appellant.
Josephine E. Hayes, Guernsey County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for
appellee.
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ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.
{¶ 14} The court of appeals’ certification order invites this court to consider
whether a juvenile court, as a matter of law, is foreclosed from entering a finding
of neglect when it is uncontroverted that the allegedly neglected child is receiving
proper care from a relative both at the time of the filing of the complaint and at the
time of the adjudicatory hearing.2 For the reasons which follow, we distinguish the
2. Appellate courts appear to be divided over whether neglect or dependency must exist only at the
time of the filing of the complaint or also at the time of the adjudicatory hearing in order for juvenile
court jurisdiction to attach. See Kurtz & Giannelli, Ohio Juvenile Law (1996-1997 Ed.) 39, Section
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January Term, 1997
factual scenario of this case from that in the cases certified as conflicting with the
court of appeals’ decision. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, while
at the same time generally approving of the rationales behind the decisions reached
in the certified conflict cases.
{¶ 15} We do not approach this case by expressly focusing on the certified
question, but instead examine the circumstances leading to the trial court’s finding
of neglect to inquire whether the trial court’s decision was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. To determine that Travis, Jr. was a neglected child under
former R.C. 2151.03(A)(2), the trial court was required to find that the essential
statutory elements were proven by clear and convincing evidence. See R.C.
2151.35(A) and Juv.R. 29(E)(4).
{¶ 16} Our inquiry is guided by R.C. 2151.01, which sets out the purposes
of R.C. Chapter 2151 relevant here:
“(A) To provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical
development of children subject to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code;
“…
“(C) To achieve the foregoing purposes, whenever possible, in a family
environment, separating the child from its parents only when necessary for his
welfare or in the interests of public safety[.]”
{¶ 17} Travis, Jr. was adjudged to be a neglected child pursuant to former
R.C. 2151.03(A)(2), which defined a “neglected child” as any child “[w]ho lacks
proper parental care because of the faults or habits of [the child’s] parents, guardian,
or custodian[.]”3 In the complaint filed in juvenile court, he was also alleged (but
was not found) to be a dependent child pursuant to former R.C. 2151.04(A), which
2.05; 2 Anderson’s Ohio Family Law (2 Ed.1989) 297-299, Section 19.19. The issue does not arise
in this case due to the circumstances here. Testimony at the adjudicatory hearing established that
Travis, Jr.’s situation was unchanged between the date of the filing of the complaint and the date of
the hearing.
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defined a “dependent child” as any child “[w]ho is homeless or destitute or without
proper care or support, through no fault of [the child’s] parents, guardian, or
custodian[.]”3
{¶ 18} For our purposes here, it is useful to recognize a distinction between
an allegation under R.C. 2151.03(A)(2) that a child is neglected and an allegation
under R.C. 2151.04(A) that a child is dependent. R.C. 2151.03(A)(2) requires some
showing that parents, a guardian, or a custodian is at fault before a finding of a lack
of proper (or adequate) care can be made. R.C. 2151.04(A), on the other hand,
requires no showing of fault, but focuses exclusively on the child’s situation to
determine whether the child is without proper (or adequate) care or support. See In
re East (C.P.1972), 32 Ohio Misc. 65,
61 O.O.2d 38,
288 N.E.2d 343.
{¶ 19} Crisp and Darst, two of the certified conflict decisions, were
dependency cases involving allegations of a lack of proper care pursuant to R.C.
2151.04. In both cases, the Tenth Appellate District found that, if a child is
receiving proper care from relatives to whom the parent had entrusted the child’s
care, then the child is not a dependent child under R.C. 2151.04. See Crisp,
Franklin App. No. 80AP-678, unreported, at 4-5; Darst, 117 Ohio App. at 379,
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O.O.2d at 146,
192 N.E.2d at 290-291. We approve of the rationale behind Crisp
and Darst, at least insofar as R.C. 2151.04(A) is concerned. Given that fault
(parental or otherwise) is not an issue in an R.C. 2151.04(A) dependency inquiry,
so that the focus is exclusively on the child’s situation, a child who is receiving
proper care pursuant to an arrangement initiated by the parent with a caregiver is
not a dependent child under R.C. 2151.04(A).4
3. R.C. 2151.03(A)(2) was amended, effective August 8, 1996, to substitute the word “adequate”
for “proper,” and to make the statute gender neutral. See Sub. H.B. No. 274.
4. R.C. 2151.04(A) was amended, effective August 8, 1996, to define “dependent child” as any
child “[w]ho is homeless or destitute or without adequate parental care, through no fault of the
child’s parents, guardian, or custodian[.]” Sub. H.B. No. 274.
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{¶ 20} Although a dependency case focuses on the condition or
environment of the child, and not on fault, a neglect case, particularly one under
R.C. 2151.03(A)(2), does require an inquiry into the “faults or habits” of the
caregiver. The ultimate finding required under R.C. 2151.03(A)(2) is that the child
lacks proper (or adequate) parental care due to those faults or habits. In Reese, the
Tenth Appellate District considered whether a child is neglected when a parent
temporarily, through an informal agreement, places the child with a relative. The
Reese court cited Crisp and Darst, and determined that its reasoning in those
dependency cases also applied to a neglect case. The court in Reese held that, if
the relative was providing proper care pursuant to the informal agreement, the child
could not be found to be lacking “proper parental care” under R.C. 2151.05, so that
the child was not a neglected child. 4 Ohio App.3d at 62, 4 OBR at 112,
446 N.E.2d
at 485. As we read Reese, the parent’s voluntary act of temporarily placing the
child with a responsible relative is an indicator of proper parental care, and does
not support a finding that the parent is at fault. Therefore, the care furnished by the
relative can be imputed to the parent. “In such situations, the state has no interest
in assuming guardianship since the obligations of care, custody, and support are
being met.” Kurtz & Giannelli, Ohio Juvenile Law (1996-1997 Ed.) 42, Section
2.06(D). Just as we generally accept the reasoning behind Darst and Crisp, we also
generally accept the reasoning underlying Reese.
{¶ 21} Nevertheless, we find that a significant factual distinction exists
between the situation in the Reese, Crisp, and Darst cases and the situation in this
case. In Reese, as in Crisp and Darst, the parent voluntarily arranged for the child
to be placed with a relative. One of the underlying concerns in cases of this type,
as set out in R.C. 2151.01(C), is that the state should intervene only when necessary
because the parent-child relationship may be fundamentally altered by the state’s
intervention. In this case, however, the GCCSB caseworker was already involved
prior to the filing of the neglect/dependency complaint in juvenile court, and it was
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through the caseworker’s initiative that Travis, Jr. was placed with relatives to
provide stability in the child’s care. It was the caseworker who mediated the
“contract” which set out the terms of the initial placement with Jeff and Christy
Riddle. No credit can be imputed to Travis, Sr., the custodial parent, for the paternal
grandparents’ provision of proper care in this situation.
{¶ 22} The court of appeals below in its opinion stated, “Just because a child
is safe, whether it be in a foster home or the grandparents’ home, does not negate a
finding the child is neglected because of the acts or omissions of the parents.”
Given the facts of this case, we do not disagree with the appropriateness of this
observation. Similarly, we endorse the approach of In re Poth (June 30, 1982),
Huron App. No. H-81-31, unreported, 1982 WL 9371, in which the Sixth Appellate
District, in a situation where the county assumed care of a child because the parents
were not providing care, rejected an argument that the child could not be adjudged
dependent as a matter of law when the child was receiving excellent foster care.
{¶ 23} The certification-of-conflict order in this case invites us to consider
whether the terms “guardian” and “custodian” in R.C. 2151.03(A)(2) should be
limited to the definitions of those terms in R.C. 2151.011(B)(18) and
2151.011(B)(26), respectively.5 If we were to determine that “proper parental care”
can be provided only directly by a parent, or directly by a person who has officially
been designated as a “guardian” or a “custodian,” then obviously a non-parent who
does not fit the statutory definitions could never provide “proper parental care.” It
5. R.C. 2151.011(B)(18) provides:
“‘Guardian’ means a person, association, or corporation that is granted authority by a
probate court pursuant to Chapter 2111. of the Revised Code to exercise parental rights over a child
to the extent provided in the court’s order and subject to the residual parental rights of the child’s
parents.”
R.C. 2151.011(B)(26) provides:
“‘Custodian’ means a person who has legal custody of a child or a public children services
agency or private child placing agency that has permanent, temporary, or legal custody of a child.”
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follows from our general agreement with the Reese approach that we decline to
resort to such a rigid construction of R.C. 2151.03(A)(2).
{¶ 24} As one of her major arguments, appellant suggests that this case is
at heart a custody dispute, and that a neglect/dependency action should not be used
as a substitute for a custody proceeding. In Reese, 4 Ohio App.3d at 62, 4 OBR at
112,
446 N.E.2d at 485, the court cautioned that “[t]he statutory scheme … was
not intended by the General Assembly for use as a tool by persons seeking custody
of a child who has been temporarily entrusted to their care by a parent when the
parent then requests the return of the child. See In re Kronjaeger (1957),
166 Ohio
St. 172 [
1 O.O.2d 459,
140 N.E.2d 773] …. … [W]here the primary objective
of the complainant in filing a complaint under R.C. 2151.27 is to obtain custody,
there appears to be a tendency to confuse the issues which are determinative of
selecting a proper custodian — suitability of prospective custodians and the best
interests of the child — with the issues which are determinative of a finding that
the child is a neglected child.”
{¶ 25} The requirement that the trial court hold bifurcated hearings in cases
such as this helps to direct the focus of the initial inquiry into whether a child is
neglected or dependent (the allegations in this case) away from the custody issue.
See In re Baby Girl Baxter (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 229, 17 OBR 469,
479 N.E.2d
257, paragraph one of the syllabus (construing and applying R.C. 2151.35 and
Juv.R. 29 and 34). At the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court considers whether
the child is a neglected or dependent child. As mentioned above, the fault of the
parent, guardian, or custodian is relevant to a neglect adjudication under R.C.
2151.03(A)(2). However, the overall issue to be decided at such an adjudicatory
hearing is whether the child is a neglected child. A dispositional hearing is held
only if the trial court first determines that the child is a neglected child.
{¶ 26} We share the Reese court’s concern that a neglect/dependency
complaint should not be filed as a substitute for a custody action. However, given
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the facts of this case, we do not view it as essentially a custody dispute. This
situation differs from that in Reese, in which the relative entrusted by the parent to
care for the child attempted to use a neglect complaint as the vehicle to gain
custody. Here, we view the portion of the complaint requesting that temporary
custody of Travis, Jr. be assigned to the paternal grandparents as incidental to the
neglect/dependency action. See R.C. 2151.27(C). We accept appellee’s stated
contention that the goal behind filing the neglect/dependency complaint was to
provide a stable environment for the child, and that it was not to wrest custody of
Travis, Jr. from the custodial parent.
{¶ 27} Appellant also suggests that the contract basically operated as an
acquiescence that Travis, Jr. was neglected or dependent if its conditions were not
met. Our review of the record convinces us that the trial court did not find Travis,
Jr. to be a neglected child as a fait accompli solely on the basis of Travis, Sr.’s
failure to meet the contractual conditions. The trial court did not approach this case
as some hybrid-type of breach of contract/neglect action. Although Travis, Sr.’s
failure to meet the contractual conditions was a factor in the trial court’s
consideration, the trial court had before it other relevant evidence as well, and the
adjudicatory hearing did not unduly dwell on the agreement. The hearing properly
focused on the situations of all concerned, and the resulting necessity for the
agreement and its conditions.
{¶ 28} In conclusion, because the paternal grandparents were caring for
Travis, Jr. pursuant to an agreement initiated by the caseworker, rather than
pursuant to a voluntary informal agreement initiated by the child’s parent, we
distinguish this case from Reese. In addition, we find that this case is
distinguishable from Crisp and Darst as well for the same reason. Although we
believe that the evidence may have supported an adjudication that Travis, Jr. was a
dependent child, we cannot say that the trial court decision that Travis, Jr. was a
neglected child was against the manifest weight of the evidence. If the trial court
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believed that Travis, Jr.’s lack of proper care was due to circumstances within
Travis, Sr.’s control, then a finding of fault would not be inappropriate. See In re
Tikyra A. (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 452,
659 N.E.2d 867.
{¶ 29} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG
STRATTON, JJ., concur.
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