¶1concurring in judgment.
¶2I agree with the Court’s opinion insofar as it finds that the issue presented is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and I join its holding that the trial court did err and the matter should therefore be reversed and remanded for trial. I do not, however, join the Court’s consideration of res ipsa loquitur and its decision that an instruction on res ipsa loquitur would be appropriate in the event this case should go to trial and certain evidence should be ad*321duced. First, because that issue is only speculative and the court’s answer is, of course, mere dicta. Second, because the answer is wrong.
¶3Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence. It is a traditional rule of justice and necessity which is applied in those few peculiar situations where the proof of the specific negligent act is within the defendant’s power to control and beyond the plaintiffs. The purpose is to aid plaintiff in making a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the defendant, without proof of specific acts of negligence, by allowing the trier of fact to infer negligence as legitimate deduction of fact from those fundamental facts which are established by direct evidence. Res ipsa lo-quitur and ordinary reliance on specific acts showing defendant’s failure to exercise due care are incompatible methods of proving negligence. Res ipsa loquitur supplies an inference of negligence when specific evidence of negligence is not available; it is not permissible in a case such as this one may be (if it goes to trial) where evidence of specific acts of negligence is available. Where there is evidence of specific acts or omissions of defendant to establish negligence, the doctrine does not apply. Flick v. Crouch, Okl, 555 P.2d 1274 (1976); E.S. Billington Lumber Co. v. Cheatham, 181 Okl. 402, 74 P.2d 120 (1937); Bewley v. Western Creameries, Inc., 177 Okl. 132, 57 P.2d 859 (1936). Res ipsa loquitur is not a “sub-issue” in this ease and the Court errs in treating it as one.