¶1MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
¶2JACOBS, JUDGE: Respondent determined deficiencies in petitioner's Federal income taxes and additions to tax as follows:
¶4Year Deficiency Sec. 6651(f)
¶5_____________________________________________________________________
¶61990 5,850 3,304
¶71991 6,197 4,300
¶81992 6,640 3,551
¶9The issues for decision are:
¶10(1) Whether petitioner had unreported income for each of the years under consideration (namely, 1990, 1991, and 1992), as determined by respondent. In respondent's posttrial brief, respondent concedes a portion of the taxable income determined in the notice of deficiency. We hold that petitioner had unreported income for each year under consideration in the amount determined by respondent after concession, discussed infra.
¶11(2) Whether petitioner's failure to file Federal income tax returns for each of the years under consideration was due to fraud. We hold that it was.
¶12(3) Whether petitioner should be required to pay a penalty to the United States under section 6673(a)(1). We hold that he should, in the amount of 5,000.
¶13All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the*335 years under consideration. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. All dollar amounts are rounded.
¶14FINDINGS OF FACT
¶15Petitioner resided in Boise, Idaho, at the time he filed his petition. He did not file a Federal income tax return for any of the years under consideration.
¶16Petitioner had been employed by the city of Boise (the City) since 1977. During the years under consideration, he was a subdivision review analyst in the City's Public Works Department, receiving wages from the City as follows:
¶171990 28,515
¶181991 28,481
¶191992 30,382
¶20During the years under consideration, petitioner was married to Betty A. Simmons (Mrs. Simmons). Mrs. Simmons was employed by CPC Intermountain Hospital (the hospital) throughout 1990, 1991, and 1992, and received wages from the hospital as follows:
¶211990 9,330
¶221991 13,081
¶231992 13,911
¶24Prior to 1990, petitioner and Mrs. Simmons had filed joint income tax returns. By 1990, *336 petitioner had become a tax protester and adopted tactics designed to evade the payment of tax and harass those whom he thought were interfering with his scheme. The first thing petitioner did was to drop out of the commercial banking system, and thereafter he dealt primarily in cash. Then he attempted to stop withholding on his paychecks by filing false Forms W-4. Specifically, on April 16, 1991, he filed a Form W-4 with the City claiming 30 allowances; prior thereto, he had claimed 5 allowances that resulted in withholding close to his actual tax liability. Upon receipt of this Form W-4, the City notified the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in accordance with a regulatory requirement. The IRS responded to the City's notification directing the City to withhold at single taxpayer rates with no allowances until a new Form W-4 was filed with a reasonable number of allowances claimed. The City complied with the IRS' instructions.
¶25On March 16, 1992, petitioner filed a Form W-4 with the City claiming 31 allowances. After the City did not honor this new Form W-4, petitioner filed bogus liens against various city employees (including the City payroll clerk) and IRS employees. He also*337 filed a lawsuit against the City and the payroll clerk. The City defended the lawsuit; the liens were expunged, and a judgment was entered against petitioner.
¶26In December 1992, petitioner and Mrs. Simmons executed a declaration of trust purporting to convey their personal residence to themselves as trustees for the benefit of their children.
¶27This case previously had been calendared for trial at the session in Boise beginning on May 22, 1995. On May 19, 1995, petitioner and Mrs. Simmons filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy under chapter 13, thus halting the proceedings in this case. Petitioner and Mrs. Simmons did nothing to prosecute the bankruptcy case, and that case was dismissed for failure to file a plan and failure to file tax returns.
¶28On March 6, 1995, respondent filed a motion for an award of a penalty under section 6673. On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed a document entitled "Administration Law Demand for Dismissal of Notice of Deficiency by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue". In response, the Court issued an Order, dated March 30, 1995, in which we characterized petitioner's arguments as frivolous and admonished petitioner that if he continued*338 to advance such frivolous legal arguments, we would consider imposing a penalty under section 6673. At the trial of this case, on June 10, 1996, petitioner continued the same tax protester arguments he had been warned to abandon.
¶29In the notice of deficiency, respondent determined that petitioner was liable for tax on all the wage income he received from the City and on 50 percent of the wage income Mrs. Simmons received from the hospital. Respondent also determined additions to tax under section 6651(f) for the years in issue. In respondent's posttrial brief, respondent conceded that petitioner's and Mrs. Simmons' wages were community income, and thus petitioner was liable for tax on only 50 percent of the income he received from the City, and 50 percent of the income Mrs. Simmons received from the hospital.
¶30OPINION
¶31ISSUE 1. UNREPORTED INCOME
¶32The uncontroverted evidence in this case establishes that petitioner and Mrs. Simmons had unreported wage income during each of the years under consideration as follows:
¶33Petitioner Mrs. Simmons
¶34______________________________________________________________________
¶361991 28,481 13,081
¶371992 30,382 13,911
¶38Idaho is a community property State. Absent circumstances not shown here, petitioner is liable for tax on 50 percent of the wage income received from the City and 50 percent of the wage income Mrs. Simmons received from the hospital. See United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971).
¶39ISSUE 2. SECTION 6651(f) ADDITIONS TO TAX
¶40Section 6651 imposes an addition to tax for failure to file a tax return. Where the failure to file is fraudulent, the addition to tax is 15 percent of the amount required to be shown on the return for each month beyond the return's due date, up to a maximum of 75 percent. (If the failure to file is not fraudulent and is not due to reasonable cause, the addition to tax is 5 percent of the amount required to be shown on the return for each month that the return is not filed, up to a maximum of 25 percent.) Respondent bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the failure to file was fraudulent. Sec. 7454(a); Rule 142(b); Clayton v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 632, 652-653 (1994).*340Respondent's burden is met if it is shown that petitioner intended to evade taxes known to be due and owing by conduct intended to conceal, mislead, or otherwise prevent the collection of taxes, and that there is an underpayment of tax. Stoltzfus v. United States, 398 F.2d 1002, 1004 (3d Cir. 1968); Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1123 (1983); Acker v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 107, 112 (1956).
¶41The existence of fraud is a question of fact to be resolved upon consideration of the entire record. DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 874 (1991), affd. 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992). Fraud is never presumed but, rather, must be established by affirmative evidence. Edelson v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 828, 832-833 (9th Cir. 1987), affg. T.C. Memo. 1986-223. Direct evidence of the requisite fraudulent intent is seldom available, but fraud may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943); Rowlee v. Commissioner, supra at 1123.*341The taxpayer's entire course of conduct may establish the requisite intent. Otsuki v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 96, 105-106 (1969).
¶42Over the years, courts have identified various factors from which fraudulent intent can be inferred. These include: Failure to file a return for several consecutive years; failure to report substantial income; dealing in cash to avoid financial scrutiny; filing a false Form W-4; and failure to cooperate with the taxing authorities. Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 307-308 (9th Cir. 1986), affg. T.C. Memo. 1984-601. These factors are present in this case.
¶43We observed petitioner at trial. He is an intelligent individual who was continuously employed in a responsible position. We are convinced that he was aware of his obligation to report his income and file income tax returns, but he deliberately chose not to do so. We recognize that failure to file a tax return itself does not establish fraud, but combined with affirmative acts, it will be sufficient to prove fraud. See Habersham-Bey v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 304 (1982). Here, the*342 evidence shows that petitioner engaged in affirmative acts to misrepresent, secrete, and attempt to deceive in order to evade taxes known by him to be due and owing to the Government. He intentionally filed false Forms W-4 to prevent the collection of taxes. He dealt primarily in cash to avoid financial scrutiny. And he tried to remove his assets from the reach of the IRS by executing a declaration of trust with his wife purporting to convey their personal residence to themselves as trustees for the benefit of their children.
¶44Respondent has proven by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner's failure to file returns for each of the years under consideration was fraudulent. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is liable for the section 6651(f) additions to tax for 1990, 1991, and 1992.
¶45ISSUE 3. SECTION 6673(a)(1) PENALTY
¶46In relevant part, section 6673(a)(1) provides:
¶47SEC. 6673(a). Tax Court Proceedings. --
¶48(1) Procedures Instituted Primarily For Delay, Etc. --
¶49Whenever it appears to the Tax Court that --
¶50(A) proceedings before it have been instituted or
¶51maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay,
¶52*343 (B) the taxpayer's position in such proceeding is
¶53frivolous or groundless, or
¶54…
¶55the Tax Court, in its decision, may require the taxpayer to pay
¶56to the United States a penalty not in excess of 25,000.
¶57Petitioner presented frivolous and groundless arguments throughout these proceedings. We admonished petitioner that if he continued to advance such arguments, we would consider imposing a penalty under section 6673(a)(1). He did not heed our warning.
¶58We find that petitioner, in addition to maintaining a frivolous and groundless position, instituted and maintained this proceeding primarily for delay. He had ample opportunity to address the merits of respondent's determination, but he chose not to do so. See Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989) (defining legal frivolousness). Petitioner's insistence on pursuing his fruitless argument has consumed time and effort of this Court (and of respondent) that could have otherwise been devoted to resolving bona fide claims of other taxpayers. *344 See Cook v. Spillman, 806 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, we shall grant respondent's motion for an award of a penalty under section 6673 and require petitioner to pay a penalty to the United States in the amount of 5,000.
¶59We have considered all arguments made by petitioner in this proceeding. We perceive no need to refute petitioner's protester arguments with somber reasoning; to do so might suggest they have colorable merit. See Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417 (5th Cir. 1984). Suffice it to say, all of them are without merit.
¶60To reflect the foregoing and respondent's concession,
¶61An appropriate order will be issued, and a decision will be entered under Rule 155.