1998 OHIO 461 - State ex rel. Thomas v. Ghee

[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at

81 Ohio St.3d 191

.]




      [THE STATE EX REL.] THOMAS, APPELLANT, v. GHEE, CHAIR, ET AL.,
                                       APPELLEES.
              [Cite as State ex rel. Thomas v. Ghee,

1998-Ohio-461

.]
Mandamus to compel Ohio Adult Parole Authority to remove detainer from
        relator’s record—Writ denied, when.
      (No. 97-1992—Submitted January 13, 1998—Decided March 4, 1998.)
   APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 97APD04-531.
                                  __________________
        {¶ 1} Appellant, Charles Thomas, an inmate at Mansfield Correctional
Institution, filed a “motion” for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for
Franklin County. According to Thomas, while he was on parole for a previous
conviction, he was arrested and a detainer was filed.               Thomas’s parole was
subsequently revoked following a hearing. Thomas requested a writ of mandamus
to compel appellees, Margarette T. Ghee, Chair of the Ohio Parole Board, and the
Adult Parole Authority, to “Cancel, Terminate, Expunge, and Remove” the detainer
from their records.
        {¶ 2} In May 1997, after appellees filed an answer and a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the court of appeals ordered the parties to file
evidentiary statements and briefs. Before appellees’ deadline to file passed, they
moved to stay the court of appeals’ May 1997 order until the court resolved their
pending motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeals granted
appellees’ motion to stay. Thomas filed a motion for a default judgment based on
appellees’ alleged failure to comply with the court of appeals’ May 1997 order.
        {¶ 3} In August 1997, the court of appeals granted appellees’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings, denied Thomas’s motion for default judgment, and
denied the writ. The court of appeals determined that a detainer could properly
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




issue against Thomas based on hearsay, and that expunging Thomas’s record of the
detainer would be futile because his parole had already been revoked following a
hearing. Thomas later filed a motion to amend his “pleading,” and the court of
appeals overruled the motion.
       {¶ 4} The cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right.
                                __________________
       Charles Thomas, pro se.
       Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and J. Eric Holloway, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellees.
                                __________________
       Per Curiam.
       {¶ 5} Thomas asserts in his propositions of law that the court of appeals
erred in granting appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and denying his
motions for default judgment and to amend his pleading. For the following reasons,
we hold that Thomas’s propositions are meritless and affirm the judgment of the
court of appeals.
       {¶ 6} First, as the court of appeals properly determined, Thomas was not
entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel appellees to remove the detainer from his
record. Because his parole was ultimately revoked, removing the detainer would
be futile. See State ex rel. Strothers v. Turner (1997),

79 Ohio St.3d 272, 274

680 N.E.2d 1238, 1239

 (“[M]andamus will not issue to compel a vain act.”). In
addition, the pertinent administrative rule does not prohibit the issuance of detainers
based on hearsay.       Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-1-31(A) (“The department of
rehabilitation and correction shall have the authority to file a detainer against an
offender or otherwise cause the arrest of an offender by the issuance of a detainer
whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that such offender has violated or is
about to violate any of the terms or conditions of his supervision or sanction and




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                                January Term, 1998




commits an overt act toward such violation.”); cf. Crim.R. 4(A)(1), which permits
hearsay to support a finding of probable cause for an arrest warrant.
       {¶ 7} Second, the court of appeals did not, as Thomas asserts, erroneously
rely on the in forma pauperis filing requirements for inmates filing civil actions set
forth in R.C. 2969.21 to 2969.27. Although appellees raised this argument, the
court of appeals did not base its judgment on these provisions. Therefore, we need
not determine the applicability of R.C. 2969.21 et seq.
       {¶ 8} Third, Thomas was not entitled to a default judgment under Civ.R.
55. Appellees did not fail to plead or otherwise defend as provided by the Rules of
Civil Procedure. Civ.R. 55(A); State ex rel. Shimola v. Cleveland (1994),

70 Ohio St.3d 110

637 N.E.2d 325

. They timely filed an answer and a motion for judgment
on the pleadings. Contrary to Thomas’s contention, appellees also did not violate
the court of appeals’ May 1997 evidence and briefing order because they obtained
a stay of that order pending resolution of their motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
       {¶ 9} Fourth, the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying
Thomas’s postjudgment motion for leave to amend his pleading. See Civ.R. 15(A);
see, e.g., Rahn v. Whitehall (1989),

62 Ohio App.3d 62

574 N.E.2d 567

.
       {¶ 10} Finally, Thomas should have filed a complaint or petition for a writ
of mandamus instead of a “motion.” See Myles v. Wyatt (1991),

62 Ohio St.3d 191

580 N.E.2d 1080

.
       {¶ 11} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly denied the writ.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
                                                                 Judgment affirmed.
       MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
                               __________________




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