[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at
81 Ohio St.3d 524.]
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. PATTERSON, APPELLEE.
[Cite as State v. Patterson, 1998-Ohio-611.]
Criminal law—Sentencing—Sentence of actual incarceration mandated by former
R.C. 2925.03 may run consecutively to or concurrently with a definite term
of incarceration pursuant to former R.C. 2929.11—Combined sentences
may not exceed maximum term of incarceration provided by former R.C.
2929.11.
A sentence of actual incarceration mandated by former R.C. 2925.03 may run
consecutively to or concurrently with a definite term of incarceration
pursuant to former R.C. 2929.11. However, the combined sentences may
not exceed the maximum term of incarceration provided by former R.C.
2929.11.
(No. 97-64—Submitted January 14, 1998—Decided April 29, 1998.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, Nos. 69551, 69552 and
69553.
__________________
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellee Tramel Patterson was charged in three
indictments by a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury. Appellee pled guilty to one count
of drug trafficking in violation of former R.C. 2925.03(A)(4) in each of his three
cases.i In exchange for his guilty pleas, each of the other counts in appellee’s three
indictments was dismissed. The trial court sentenced appellee to a one-year term
1. All statutory references in this opinion refer to former R.C. 2929.11, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 258, 143
Ohio Laws, Part I, 1308, 1383, and former R.C. 2925.03, Sub.H.B. No. 391, 145 Ohio Laws, Part
III, 5768, 5771, which apply to crimes committed before July 1, 1996. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146
Ohio Laws, Part IV, Section 5, 7810. Provisions analogous to former R.C. 2929.11 are now codified
at R.C. 2929.13. R.C. 2925.03 was substantially revised by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws,
Part IV, 7377.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
of incarceration pursuant to former R.C. 2929.11, the general felony sentencing
statute. R.C. 2929.11(D)(1) provides for a definite term of one, one and one-half,
or two years for the commission of a third degree felony.
{¶ 2} In addition to the one-year definite sentence, the trial court sentenced
appellee to a consecutive term of eighteen months of actual incarceration on each
count, pursuant to R.C. 2925.03. R.C. 2925.03(C)(4) imposes a term of eighteen
months of actual incarceration for aggravated drug trafficking in violation of R.C.
2925.03(A)(4). Two of the sentences were to run consecutively, and the third
sentence was to run concurrently with the first two.
{¶ 3} On appeal, appellee argued that imposing an eighteen-month term of
actual incarceration as required by R.C. 2925.03(C)(4) consecutively to a one-year
definite term of incarceration pursuant to R.C. 2929.11(D)(1) was impermissible
because such a sentence exceeds the two-year maximum sentence allowed by R.C.
2929.11(D)(1) for sentencing of a third degree felony. The court of appeals agreed,
vacated appellee’s sentences, and remanded the matter to the trial court for
resentencing.
{¶ 4} The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a
discretionary appeal.
__________________
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mark
Mahoney, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
James A. Draper, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Donald Green,
Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
__________________
MOYER, C.J.
{¶ 5} This case involves the interplay between former R.C. 2925.03 and
former R.C. 2929.11. Appellant argues that a term of actual incarceration pursuant
to R.C. 2925.03(C)(4) may be ordered to run consecutively to a definite term of
2
January Term, 1998
incarceration imposed under R.C. 2929.11(D)(1) even when such a sentence
exceeds the maximum penalty set forth in R.C. 2929.11(D)(1). For the reasons that
follow, we disagree.
{¶ 6} A term of actual incarceration mandated by R.C. 2925.03 may run
consecutively to or concurrently with a definite term of incarceration pursuant to
R.C. 2929.11. However, the combined sentences may not exceed the maximum
term of incarceration allowed by R.C. 2929.11. Accordingly, we affirm the
decision of the court of appeals.
{¶ 7} Appellee pled guilty to drug trafficking, specifically to knowingly
possessing cocaine in an amount exceeding the bulk amount but less than three
times the bulk amount, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(4). Pursuant to R.C.
2925.03(C)(4), such a violation is a felony of the third degree, and “the court shall
impose a sentence of actual incarceration of eighteen months.”
{¶ 8} R.C. 2929.11, the general felony sentencing statute, lists the penalties
to be imposed for each class of felony. Under R.C. 2929.11(D)(1), the term of
imprisonment for a felony of the third degree shall be a definite term of one, one
and one-half, or two years.
{¶ 9} When construing a general provision together with a special or local
provision, R.C. 1.51 directs us to interpret them so that, if possible, effect is given
to both. This court has consistently held that “all statutes which relate to the same
general subject matter must be read in pari materia. … And, in reading such
statutes in pari materia, and construing them together, this court must give such a
reasonable construction as to give proper force and effect to each and all such
statutes.” (Citations omitted.) Johnson’s Markets, Inc. v. New Carlisle Dept. of
Health (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 28, 35,
567 N.E.2d 1018, 1025, citing Maxfield v.
Brooks (1924),
110 Ohio St. 566,
144 N.E. 725; see, also, United Tel. Co. of Ohio
v. Limbach (1994),
71 Ohio St.3d 369, 372,
643 N.E.2d 1129, 1131. Furthermore,
“[t]his court in the interpretation of related and co-existing statutes must harmonize
3
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
and give full application to all such statutes unless they are irreconcilable and in
hopeless conflict.” Johnson’s, supra, 58 Ohio St.3d at 35,
567 N.E.2d at 1025,
citing Couts v. Rose (1950),
152 Ohio St. 458,
40 O.O. 482,
90 N.E.2d 139.
{¶ 10} We held in State v. Arnold (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 175,
573 N.E.2d
1079, that R.C. 2925.03 and R.C. 2929.11 do not conflict. Therefore, a sentencing
judge is required to construe the statutes together and give proper force and effect
to both when imposing a sentence.
{¶ 11} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.11(D)(1), a term of one year, eighteen
months, or two years may be imposed for a felony of the third degree. There is no
requirement in R.C. 2929.11 that this sentence include actual incarceration.
However, this provision must be read in conjunction with R.C. 2925.03(C)(4),
which imposes actual incarceration of eighteen months for the crime of aggravated
drug trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(4). Harmonizing the two statutes
effectively eliminates the option of imposing the minimum one-year sentence for a
defendant convicted of a third degree felony of aggravated drug trafficking under
R.C. 2925.03(A)(4). However, a judge maintains the option of sentencing a
defendant to a maximum term of two years for the commission of a third degree
felony. Therefore, reading the two sentencing statutes in pari materia, a person
convicted of the third degree felony of aggravated drug trafficking in violation of
R.C. 2925.03(A)(4) shall receive a mandatory term of eighteen months of actual
incarceration and may receive an additional six months (not necessarily of actual
incarceration) without violating the maximum sentencing provisions of R.C.
2929.11(D)(1).
{¶ 12} As appellee was sentenced to a definite term of one year for the
underlying offense in each count, plus an additional eighteen months of actual
incarceration to be served consecutively, his sentence exceeded the maximum term
allowed by law, and the court of appeals correctly vacated his sentence.
4
January Term, 1998
{¶ 13} Appellant contends that our holding in Arnold stands for the
proposition that the underlying felony sentences contained in R.C. 2925.03 and the
sentences imposed by R.C. 2929.11 are separate and distinct penalties, both of
which must be taken into account by a sentencing court. The defendant-appellant
in Arnold argued that the actual term of incarceration for aggravated drug
trafficking required by R.C. 2925.03 was the only penalty that could be imposed
and superseded any sentence that could be imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.11. We
held that “where a defendant has been convicted of trafficking in drugs in violation
of R.C. 2925.03(A), the indefinite term of imprisonment prescribed by R.C.
2929.11(B) is imposed in addition to a period of actual incarceration as prescribed
by R.C. 2925.03(C).” Arnold, supra,61 Ohio St.3d at 179,
573 N.E.2d at 1082.
Our holding should not be misconstrued as authorizing a sentencing court to exceed
the maximum sentence allowed by R.C. 2929.11.
{¶ 14} In Arnold, the appellant’s total sentence did not exceed the
maximum term found in R.C. 2929.11. In the case at bar, appellee’s combined
sentence of two and one-half years exceeded the statutory maximum term by six
months on each count.
{¶ 15} We hold that a sentence of actual incarceration mandated by former
R.C. 2925.03 may run consecutively to or concurrently with a definite term of
incarceration pursuant to former R.C. 2929.11. However, the combined sentences
may not exceed the maximum term of incarceration provided by former R.C.
2929.11.
{¶ 16} Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG
STRATTON, JJ., concur.
__________________
5
