¶1(dissenting).
¶2[¶21.] I respectfully dissent. A person certainly has a lesser expectation of privacy in their automobile than in their home, but Fourth Amendment protections are not forfeited merely due to the fact that you are stopped in your vehicle. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985).
¶3[¶ 22.] In a case involving furtive gestures or movements, the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1989), as follows:
An investigative detention is justified if a police officer has a reasonable and articula-ble suspicion that the automobile’s occupants are “involved in criminal activity.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226, 105 S.Ct. 675, 679, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1087, 1090 (Utah 1986). Additionally, an officer may search a vehicle for weapons if he has a reasonable belief that the suspect is dangerous and “may gain immediate control of weapons.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3481, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). In such instances, “due weight must be given, not to [the officer’s] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
¶4The New Jersey Supreme Court, also in a case involving furtive movements or gestures, stated the following:
Finally, in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), the Court upheld the right of police to conduct a weapons search of the interior of a car when they have a reasonable belief that the motorist is potentially dangerous. In upholding the search, Justice O’Con-nor’s opinion for the Court explained that a search of the passenger compartment of an automobile is “permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.” Id. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. at 3480, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1220 (quoting Terry v. *510Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906).
We may summarize the essence of these protective principles again in the words of Chief Justice Hughes:
“Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck * ⅜ * leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” … ⅜
Accepting these rules as representing bedrock constitutional law, it remains to apply them to the factual base [of the ease]. [State ex rel. H.B., 75 N.J. 243, 248, 381 A.2d 759, 761 (1977) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909).]
¶5State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 573 A.2d 1376, 1379 (N.J.1990) (alteration in original).
¶6[¶ 23.] An objective review is required to discern whether or not an articulable suspicion existed to warrant such an intrusion. Furtive movements or gestures by themselves are not sufficient justification for a search. Lund, 573 A.2d at 1383; Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1137. See also Spence v. State, 525 So.2d 442 (FlaApp5 Dist 1988) (leaning down as if putting something on floorboard did not justify officer’s suspicion of criminal activity); People v. Mills, 115 Ill.App.3d 809, 71 Ill.Dec. 247, 450 N.E.2d 935 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1983) (defendant’s moving fast and leaning forward as officer approached did not create reasonable suspicion justifying a stop); People v. Superior Court of Yolo County, 3 Cal.3d 807, 91 Cal.Rptr. 729, 478 P.2d 449 (1970) (passenger’s action of putting her arm over the back seat, then facing forward, and bending down toward floor, then resuming normal position did not support probable cause to search).
¶7[¶ 24.] Turning to the record, it is apparent from Officer Fiechtner’s testimony the reason for the search:
Q: Why did you inform her that you were going to search that area for weapons.
A: Because of movement that I had seen. The trial court stated in its findings of fact:
The driver of the vehicle was identified as the Defendant Karen Ashbrook. She was asked about the “furtive movements” and stated that her passenger was reaching for her purse. Trooper Fiechtner did not know the Defendant, nor her two passengers and he reasonably believed, that based upon his experience and the “furtive movements” he had just observed, the occupants may well be armed with weapons and it was necessary for officer safety to search the front end of the vehicle.
Then the officer, when asked whether he conducted a Terrypat-down search, testified:
Q: Is there a reason that you did not do a pat-down search of her before asking her to stand in front of her van?
A: Yes.
Q: What is that reason?
A: I did not observe any type of a bulge on her person that would have conceivably been a weapon. And absent that, I’m very reluctant to pat down a female.
… ⅜ …
Q: Why did you not have the other two passengers in the vehicle step outside when you searched the vehicle for a concealed weapon?
A: My immediate area of concern was in that front seat area where I’d seen the furtive movement. The driver’s hands were on the steering wheel or in her lap. I could easily watch her. And the rear seat passenger was sitting still with her hands in her lap.
Q: Were they all female?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you normally pat down females without a female officer or matron present?
*511A: I very seldom pat down females. If there’s a matron present, she’ll do it. If I feel it’s necessary, I’ll generally have a second officer or do it right in front of the video camera.
¶8[¶ 25.] In this case, we have three females on their way to the Sturgis Rally. Officer Fiechtner claims he was in fear for his safety, however, his own testimony belies any such claim. We have previously said a suspicion or hunch is not a basis to circumvent the Constitution, “ ‘in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given not to his inchoate and unpartieularized suspicion or “hunch,” but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.’” State v. Shearer, 1996 SD 52, ¶ 20, 548 N.W.2d 792, 796 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909). A review of the record shows that if an officer employs the buzzword “furtive movement” and refers to a generalized notion of safety, Fourth Amendment rights fly right out the back of the van. An objective review of this record does not support the trial court’s conclusion there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion for a protective sweep. To hold otherwise establishes precedent that if one simply employs the proper terminology, the inquiry stops, and the Constitution is rendered effectively meaningless.
¶9[¶ 26.] I am authorized to state that Justice SABERS joins in this dissent.