State v. Cornwell

[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 

.]




           THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CORNWELL, APPELLANT.
                     [Cite as State v. Cornwell, 

.]
Criminal law—Aggravated murder—Death penalty upheld, when.
     (No. 97-1390—Submitted June 8, 1999—Decided September 22, 1999.)
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, No. 96-CR-525.
                                  __________________


        {¶ 1} During the early morning hours of June 11, 1996, defendantappellant, Sidney Cornwell, and some associates who belonged to a neighborhood
gang in Youngstown drove up to an apartment building on Oak Park Lane with the
intention of shooting a rival gang member. When the intended victim was not seen,
Cornwell opened fire on the occupants of an apartment, killing a three-year-old
child and wounding three adults.            Cornwell was subsequently convicted of
aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder, and sentenced to death.
        {¶ 2} On the afternoon of the previous day, Cornwell and other members or
associates of the “Crips” gang had been involved in a shootout with members of
the “Bloods” gang on Elm Street at New York Avenue in Youngstown. One of the
associates of the Crips, Edward McGaha, was grazed on the head by a bullet during
the gunfire exchange. McGaha saw Richard “Boom” Miles, a member of the
Bloods, and Michael Williams leave the scene, but did not see either of them
shooting. During the shootout, McGaha saw Cornwell using a black gun. Police
later recovered six 9-mm Luger shell casings from the shooting scene at the corner
of New York Avenue and Elm Street.
        {¶ 3} Later that afternoon, McGaha was released from the hospital and went
to his mother’s home on Elm Street. While he was standing outside in front of the
house with several people, including Cornwell, a carload of Bloods jumped out and
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opened fire on them. According to McGaha, Cornwell returned gunfire with the
same black semiautomatic weapon he had used at the earlier shootout.
       {¶ 4} Shortly thereafter, McGaha, Cornwell, and others gathered at a New
York Avenue house where a man named “Heavy” lived. Also present at Heavy’s
house were Gary Drayton, Leslie Johnson, Edward Bunkley, and Denicholas
Stoutmire. The talk among the group centered on retaliation for the earlier shooting
of McGaha. The plan of action was to kill Boom Miles. Although McGaha later
admitted on cross-examination that he knew that Boom was not the person who had
shot him, he went along with the plan to seek out and kill Boom.
       {¶ 5} That night, Bunkley and Stoutmire stole two vehicles, a Buick and a
Pontiac Bonneville, in order to facilitate the group’s search for Boom. During this
time, the rest of the group remained at Heavy’s place, drinking and smoking
marijuana. When Bunkley and Stoutmire returned to Heavy’s with the stolen cars,
the group (minus Heavy) went out to search for Boom around Youngstown. By
this time Antwan Jones and Damian Williams had joined the group. The group
used a third car, a Chevette belonging to a friend.
       {¶ 6} Stoutmire drove the stolen blue Bonneville while Williams rode with
him in the front passenger seat. Johnson sat in the back seat behind Williams, and
Cornwell sat in the driver side back seat behind Stoutmire. According to one
witness, the only people carrying weapons in the Bonneville were Williams, who
had a .45 automatic pistol, and Cornwell, who had a semiautomatic 9-mm black
gun. However, Bunkley testified that the other two passengers in the Bonneville
also had weapons. Nevertheless, Bunkley did corroborate several witnesses’
testimony that Cornwell was carrying a 9-mm weapon.
       {¶ 7} After driving around Youngstown for about an hour, the three cars
proceeded to Oak Park Lane because Stoutmire thought Boom might be there.
Susan Hamlett lived in Apartment No. 5 in the apartment building at 4 Oak Park
Lane in Youngstown. Hamlett’s friend, Marilyn Conrad, and Conrad’s son also




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                                January Term, 1999




lived with Hamlett, along with Hamlett’s nephew and two nieces, one of whom was
three-year-old Jessica Ballew. Hamlett was familiar with Boom and knew that he
frequented the Oak Park area. Earlier that evening, Boom had played with the
children who lived in Hamlett’s apartment, but Hamlett did not see him after that.
       {¶ 8} At approximately 2:00 a.m. on June 11, 1996, Hamlett was outside on
her porch talking to a friend, Donald Meadows. Jessica Ballew came to the
doorway on the porch to get a drink of water. At that time, three cars drove up Oak
Park Lane. The first two cars went past the apartment, but the light blue Bonneville
stopped in front of the apartment, and a voice came from the car asking for Boom.
According to Damian Williams, who was seated in the Bonneville with Cornwell,
the voice from the car was Cornwell’s. Both Hamlett and Meadows responded that
Boom was not there. Cornwell asked again where Boom was, and Hamlett said
that he did not live there. Cornwell then replied: “Well, tell Boom this.” A volley
of shots (more than five, less than ten) was fired at the apartment. Jessica Ballew
sustained two gunshot wounds, including a fatal one to her head. Meadows was
wounded, as were Conrad and a visiting friend who was inside. The three vehicles
fled the scene, and Damian Williams was dropped off because he “didn’t want
anything to do with a baby getting killed.”
       {¶ 9} Youngstown police officer Joseph Wess soon received a call
regarding the shooting at Oak Park Lane. He then noticed three cars, two of them
fitting the descriptions he had just received. He pursued the vehicles and saw the
Bonneville parked in the driveway of a vacant house. With his car lights off, Wess
pulled up behind the Bonneville. Then Wess turned on his headlights, and all of
the occupants jumped out of the Bonneville and ran away. Wess pursued one
suspect, who he said jumped out of the driver’s door, catching him after a brief foot
chase. That suspect turned out to be Sidney Cornwell, who was immediately
arrested. Upon conducting a search of the Bonneville, Wess found, among other
items, a spent 9-mm shell casing. However, no gun was found in the Bonneville.




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       {¶ 10} On July 26, 1996, a grand jury indicted Cornwell for aggravated
murder (prior calculation and design) and three counts of attempted aggravated
murder. Each count also carried a firearm specification. In addition, a death-penalty specification alleged that Cornwell had committed aggravated murder as
part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of, or attempt to kill,
two or more persons (R.C. 2929.04[A][5]).
       {¶ 11} At trial before a jury, Donald Meadows, one of the victims of the
Oak Park Lane shooting, identified Cornwell as the man who had shot him. Damian
Williams, one of Cornwell’s accomplices in the blue Bonneville on the morning of
June 11, also identified Cornwell as the sole gunman in the fatal shooting at Oak
Park Lane.
       {¶ 12} Officer Robert Mauldin testified that he and other officers recovered
several 9-mm shell casings from the area of Elm Street and New York Avenue on
June 10, 1996, and from the area of Oak Park Lane, Apartment No. 5, on the early
morning of June 11. Although Mauldin stated that .380 shell casings were also
found at the scene of the Elm Street and New York Avenue shooting, only 9-mm
shell casings were recovered from the Oak Park area. Mauldin also identified two
9-mm shell casings that were recovered from the Bonneville that was at the Oak
Park shooting.
       {¶ 13} Michael Roberts, a forensic scientist with the Ohio Bureau of
Criminal Identification and Investigation, testified that, to a reasonable degree of
scientific certainty, all ten 9-mm Luger shell casings recovered from both the Elm
Street and Oak Park Lane shootings came from the same handgun. The murder
weapon was never recovered. After deliberation, the jury found Cornwell guilty as
charged.
       {¶ 14} At the mitigation hearing, nine witnesses testified on Cornwell’s
behalf, including his mother, three siblings, and other relatives. Psychologist James
Eisenberg concluded that Cornwell had grown up in a violent and chaotic family,




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                               January Term, 1999




which caused him serious problems of identity and dependency.
       {¶ 15} The jury recommended death, and the trial court imposed the death
sentence on Cornwell. The court then sentenced Cornwell to prison on his other
convictions.
       {¶ 16} The cause is now before this court upon a direct appeal as of right.
                              __________________
       Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, and Janice T.
O’Halloran, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
       John B. Juhasz and Mary Jane Stephens, for appellant.
                              __________________
       PFEIFER, J.
       {¶ 17} Appellant has raised nine propositions of law. We have reviewed
each and have determined that none justifies reversal of appellant’s convictions for
aggravated murder and the other crimes he committed.             Pursuant to R.C.
2929.05(A), we have also independently weighed the aggravating circumstance
against the evidence presented in mitigation and reviewed the death penalty for
appropriateness and proportionality.     For the reasons that follow, we affirm
appellant’s convictions and death sentence.
                        VOIR DIRE/PRETRIAL ISSUES
                         Failure to Excuse Biased Jurors
       {¶ 18} In his first proposition of law, Cornwell contends that the trial court
erred in failing to excuse for cause six prospective jurors who expressed views in
favor of the death penalty. Cornwell asserts that he was forced to exercise
peremptory challenges on five of these biased jurors, but that one juror who should
have been excused, Angela Reichenbach, sat on the jury that recommended that he
receive the death penalty.
       {¶ 19} Trial courts have discretion in determining a juror’s ability to be
impartial. State v. Williams (1983), 

, 6 OBR 345, 351, 452




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N.E.2d 1323, 1331. R.C. 2313.42(J) states that good cause exists for the removal
of a prospective juror when “he discloses by his answers that he cannot be a fair
and impartial juror or will not follow the law as given to him by the court.” A
prospective juror who has been challenged for cause should be excused “if the court
has any doubt as to the juror’s being entirely unbiased.” R.C. 2313.43. See State
v. Allard (1996), 

, 

. However, a
ruling “will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly arbitrary … so as
to constitute an abuse of discretion.” State v. Tyler (1990), 

,

. Accord State v. Williams (1997), 

, 

.
         {¶ 20} While a review of the voir dire examination cited by Cornwell
indicates that all six jurors favored capital punishment, all of them stated that they
would consider a lesser sentence and would follow the law as instructed by the trial
judge.
         {¶ 21} Cornwell asserts that he was prejudiced by a less-than-impartial jury
because he had exhausted his peremptory challenges and juror Angela Reichenbach
sat on the jury. During voir dire, Reichenbach stated her belief that the death
penalty serves as a deterrent and should be imposed if the crime was severe,
intentional, malicious, or brutal. Yet Reichenbach also agreed that she could follow
the law as instructed by the trial judge even if she disagreed with it. Moreover, she
expressed the view that the death penalty should not be imposed “in every case
where someone dies,” and that there are mitigating circumstances in determining
who should get the death penalty in any murder case.
         {¶ 22} Here, the trial court considered the defense’s challenge for cause on
Reichenbach, but determined that her views were not biased in favor of death, since
she believed that the death penalty should apply only in certain cases if the facts
would warrant it. Under these circumstances, no abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court is apparent. “[D]eference must be paid to the trial judge who sees




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                                January Term, 1999




and hears the juror.” Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 

, 

, 

.
       {¶ 23} The other five prospective jurors who Cornwell contends should
have been excused for cause were peremptorily challenged by the defense and thus
never sat on Cornwell’s jury. In Ross v. Oklahoma (1988), 

, 

, 

, the United States Supreme Court stated that
any claim asserting that a jury was not impartial must focus on the jurors who
ultimately sat. In addition, the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion
that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional
right to an impartial jury. 

, 

, 

. In
contrast, however, this court has recognized that where the defense exhausts its
peremptory challenges before the full jury is seated, the erroneous denial of a
challenge for cause in a criminal case may be prejudicial. Hartnett v. State (1885),

, paragraph four of the syllabus; 

-
31, 

; Williams, supra, 

, 

.
       {¶ 24} Nevertheless, none of the five peremptorily challenged jurors in
issue merited an excusal for cause by the trial court, since all appeared to be
impartial with regard to whether the death penalty should be imposed. Prospective
juror Sharlene Bica stated that she could follow the law even if she disagreed with
it, and could vote for a life sentence. Although Bica supported the death penalty,
she stated that she would give meaningful consideration to life-sentencing options
and would follow the court’s instructions.
       {¶ 25} Prospective juror James Studacher stated in his questionnaire that he
believed in the death penalty as “a life for a life” and had “trouble” with murderers
getting life sentences.     Yet Studacher stated that he would consider life
imprisonment options and agreed that he would follow the law even if it conflicted
with his personal beliefs. He also agreed that the death penalty was not automatic
and that a life sentence was a severe penalty.




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       {¶ 26} Prospective juror Suzanne Murphy favored the death penalty but
agreed that she could return a verdict recommending a life sentence. In addition to
affirming that she would give life-sentencing options meaningful consideration,
Murphy declared that she would need to see the facts of the case to determine
whether death or a life sentence would be the more appropriate sentence.
       {¶ 27} Prospective juror Judith Keefer stated that she believed “the death
penalty is Biblical.” Nevertheless, Keefer stated that she would follow the judge’s
instructions and consider the mitigating circumstances, regardless of her personal
beliefs. The trial court’s decision to reject the defense challenge for cause on
Keefer was not an abuse of discretion, especially in view of the deference that must
be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. State v. Wilson (1972), 

, 

, 

.
       {¶ 28} Prospective juror Sally Smolek also favored the death penalty but
indicated that she would set aside her personal believes and follow the law, and that
she could recommend a life sentence.
       {¶ 29} Based on the foregoing, we reject Cornwell’s first proposition of
law.
                        Duration of Voir Dire Interrogation
       {¶ 30} In Proposition of Law II, Cornwell argues that the parties were not
given the “wide latitude in voir dire questioning” required by R.C. 2945.25(C).
Cornwell asserts that the court set an arbitrary time limit on voir dire that disrupted
the jury selection process and undermined constitutional safeguards. Cornwell
points out that the court twice informed defense counsel of the time they had left in
questioning juror Reichenbach and that the trial court erred by unreasonably failing
to grant the defense sufficient time to question Reichenbach concerning her death-penalty views.
       {¶ 31} “The scope of voir dire is within the trial court’s discretion and varies
depending on the circumstances of each case.” State v. Bedford (1988), 

                                January Term, 1999




St.3d 122, 129, 

. No prejudicial error can be assigned to the
examination of veniremen in qualifying them as fair and impartial jurors unless a
clear abuse of discretion is shown. State v. Ellis (1918), 

, 

, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Beuke (1988), 

,

. “[T]he trial court reserves the right and responsibility to
control the proceedings of a criminal trial pursuant to R.C. 2945.03, and must limit
the trial to relevant and material matters with a view toward the expeditious and
effective ascertainment of the truth.” State v. Durr (1991), 

,

, citing State v. Bridgeman (1977), 

, 109-
110, 

, 

.
       {¶ 32} The trial judge allotted each side one-half hour to question each
prospective juror. Defense counsel did not object to the court’s time allotment.
Nor did counsel request more time to question juror Reichenbach during voir dire.
In fact, at the close of Reichenbach’s voir dire, defense counsel stated, “We have
no further questions at this time.”
       {¶ 33} Cornwell cites several instances where he claims the trial court
unreasonably restricted defense counsel’s voir dire of Reichenbach.               Yet
Cornwell’s claims in this regard do not withstand scrutiny. The court’s statement
to defense counsel that he had fourteen minutes left in questioning Reichenbach
was in response to defense counsel’s inquiry: “May I inquire of the time, Your
Honor?” In addition, Cornwell misrepresents the trial court’s actions during
Reichenbach’s voir dire when the court stated, “[W]e’re getting pretty far afield
here …, and let’s move on.” The court did not sustain the prosecutor’s objection
as Cornwell states in his brief; it overruled it and permitted the particular question
objected to. The trial court’s later reminder to defense counsel that it had four
minutes left in questioning Reichenbach does not appear to be the abrupt,
unreasonable interruption that Cornwell implies. Rather, it appears to be more in
the nature of a courtesy reminder, made at the time the court sustained an objection




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by the prosecutor.
          {¶ 34} Since no abuse of discretion is apparent, we reject Proposition of
Law II.
                                    TRIAL ISSUES
                                    Jury Instructions
          {¶ 35} In Proposition of Law III, Cornwell asserts that the trial court denied
him due process in instructing the jury on complicity, since it was never pleaded or
argued that Cornwell was anything but the shooter. Cornwell contends that the
complicity instruction essentially invited the jury to find him guilty of something,
and that it ensured a conviction, since it gave the jurors more theories and verdict
forms on which to find Cornwell guilty of something.
          {¶ 36} Cornwell failed to object to the complicity instruction and thus has
waived all but plain error. State v. Underwood (1983), 

, 3 OBR
360, 

, syllabus. Plain error is not present here. Cornwell is correct
in pointing out that none of the evidence and arguments proffered by the state
implicated him otherwise than as the sole gunman. Yet some testimony regarding
the gunman’s identity could be construed as conflicting. Officer Wess identified
Cornwell as the driver of the Bonneville, whom he chased shortly after the shooting,
whereas Cornwell’s accomplices generally testified that Cornwell was a back-seat
passenger. Also, Meadows at one point testified that he did not remember whether
the gunman drove the Bonneville or was in the back seat.
          {¶ 37} Given the fact that some crucial testimony came from Cornwell’s
accomplices, a reasonable jury could have concluded that the accomplices’
testimony was less than reliable or was designed to pin the shooting on Cornwell
as a scapegoat. The evidence clearly showed that Cornwell was present at the
shooting. Yet the complicity instruction gave the jury the opportunity to convict
Cornwell as an accomplice, if, for instance, the jury had a reasonable doubt as to
whether he was the actual shooter.




                                            10
                                 January Term, 1999




        {¶ 38} Regardless of whether a complicity instruction was requested, a trial
court “must give all instructions that are relevant and necessary for the jury to weigh
the evidence and discharge its duty as the factfinder.” State v. Joy (1995), 

, 

, 505, citing State v. Comen (1990), 

, 

, paragraph two of the syllabus. Moreover, as we noted in
State v. Keenan (1998), 

, 

, under R.C.
2923.03(F), defendants are “on notice that the jury may be given a complicity
instruction even though the defendant has been charged as a principal offender.”
Proposition of Law III is rejected.
                              SENTENCING ISSUES
                              Sentence Appropriateness
        {¶ 39} In Proposition of Law VIII, Cornwell argues that there is a
reasonable doubt as to whether the aggravating circumstance outweighs the
aggregate mitigating evidence.         Whether Cornwell’s death sentence was
appropriate will be discussed in our independent sentence evaluation.
        {¶ 40} Cornwell also contends that the prosecutor’s statement requesting
that all relevant guilt-phase evidence be admitted during the sentencing phase
indicated that he was relying on the offense itself as an aggravating circumstance.
Cornwell’s assertion is incorrect.
        {¶ 41} The prosecutor stated: “Your Honor, the people of the State move to
introduce any and all evidence that was introduced at trial that is relevant to the
aggravating circumstance that the defendant was guilty of committing; namely, that
the aggravated murder was part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful
killing or attempt to kill two or more persons.”
        {¶ 42} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(D)(1), the prosecutor may introduce “any
evidence raised at trial that is relevant to the aggravating circumstances the offender
was found guilty of committing.” It is the trial court’s responsibility, not the jury’s,
to determine what evidence is relevant. State v. Getsy (1998), 

,




                                          11
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201, 

. To characterize the prosecutor’s statement as evidence
that he relied on the offense itself as an additional aggravating circumstance is
unpersuasive. Cornwell argues that the jury “relied on the underlying offense with
all of its emotional baggage” to recommend death, simply because the prosecutor
did not make a full-blown presentation of the trial evidence. Yet, as the prosecutor
noted during his opening statement: “We don’t put it [trial evidence] all back on
again because it would be repetitive ….” Proposition of Law VIII is rejected.
                           EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
       {¶ 43} In Proposition of Law IV, Cornwell contends that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel before trial, during voir dire, and when counsel
failed to object to the instruction on complicity. In Proposition of Law IX,
Cornwell asserts that he was denied effective assistance because counsel failed to
request definite terms of sentence on his three attempted aggravated murder
convictions.
       {¶ 44} A claim of ineffective assistance “has two components. First, the
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. … Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense[,]
depriv[ing] the defendant of a fair trial ….” Strickland v. Washington (1984),

, 

, 

. Accord State v.
Bradley (1989), 

, 

. However, in no instance does
Cornwell demonstrate prejudice, “a reasonable probability that, were it not for
counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” 

 at paragraph
three of the syllabus.
       {¶ 45} Cornwell first complains that defense counsel never asked five jurors
during voir dire whether they had a preference for the death penalty. Yet this court
has stated that “[t]he conduct of voir dire by defense counsel does not have to take
a particular form, nor do specific questions have to be asked.” State v. Evans
(1992), 

, 

. Examination of the entire




                                         12
                                 January Term, 1999




voir dire testimony of the five jurors in question indicates no deficient performance
or errors on the part of defense counsel.
        {¶ 46} Juror Linda Angelot stated that she really did not have “one opinion
or another about the death penalty.” She indicated that she would follow the law
and the judge’s instructions even if she disagreed with them.
        {¶ 47} Juror Matchette told the court “I don’t know” when asked whether
she could sign a death verdict. She also stated that she would follow the law and
the court’s instructions on whether to return a verdict for a life sentence or the death
penalty. She indicated that she would put any personal feelings aside and follow
the law as given by the trial judge in determining a sentencing verdict.
        {¶ 48} Juror Heather Blake indicated to the court that she could join in a
verdict for either a life sentence or a death sentence. She also stated that she would
follow the law as given by the trial court in rendering a sentencing verdict.
        {¶ 49} Juror Gertrude Garchar agreed that she could return a verdict for
either a death sentence or a life sentence. She told defense counsel she had no
opinion on the death penalty one way or the other but would follow the court’s
instructions. She agreed with defense counsel that death may not be the appropriate
penalty under certain circumstances.
        {¶ 50} Juror Richard Crnarich indicated that he could sign a verdict for
either a life sentence or a death sentence and that he really did not have an opinion
on the death penalty. He agreed that he would follow the trial judge’s instructions
as to the law.
        {¶ 51} As we noted in State v. Watson (1991), 

, 

, defense counsel “need not repeat questions about topics already
covered by group voir dire, opposing counsel, or the judge.” Moreover, we will
not second-guess trial strategy decisions such as those made in voir dire. State v.
Mason (1998), 

, 

. In view of the
applicable law and the testimony elicited during voir dire from the jurors in




                                            13
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




question, we believe that defense counsel was neither remiss nor ineffective in
failing to ask a question that was, in essence, already posed to each juror during
voir dire by the court.
       {¶ 52} Cornwell next claims ineffective assistance in that defense counsel
failed to object to the complicity instruction proposed by the trial judge. However,
as pointed out earlier, the instruction was not objectionable. Moreover, counsel’s
decision not to object to the instruction could be rightly characterized as a trial
strategy. Such tactics or strategies are viewed with the presumption that effective
legal counsel was rendered. See Bradley, 

, 

-
382.
       {¶ 53} Cornwell next contends that counsel were ineffective in failing to
file pretrial motions challenging the death-penalty law and the constitutionality of
the death specification. We have previously rejected the same arguments. In State
v. Davis (1991), 

, 

, we found that a
failure to file a pretrial motion challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s death-penalty statute “was not critical,” and therefore not ineffective assistance, because
the statute has been found to be constitutional. Similarly, counsel’s failure to file a
pretrial motion challenging the constitutionality of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) course-of-conduct specification was also not critical. The course-of-conduct specification
has withstood different constitutional challenges. See State v. Benner (1988), 

, 

, syllabus (“R.C. 2929.04[A][5] is not void for
vagueness”). Accord State v. Brooks (1996), 

, 

.
       {¶ 54} Cornwell also alleges that counsel failed to obtain data on the death
penalty in order to make a record or argue proportionality to the jury. Counsel’s
failure to obtain data on the death penalty with regard to proportionality analysis
was not ineffective. A jury or trial court does not engage in proportionality
analysis. See, generally, State v. Roe (1989), 

, 

                                 January Term, 1999




1351, 1361. That analysis is conducted by this court alone. R.C. 2929.05.
          {¶ 55} Cornwell’s claim of ineffective assistance under Proposition of Law
IX is also without merit. Cornwell argues that defense counsel were ineffective for
failing to request that he be sentenced pursuant to 1995 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 to
definite terms of imprisonment for his three attempted aggravated murder
convictions. Cornwell claims that R.C. 1.58 gives him the benefit of any decrease
in penalty as of the date of sentencing, even though Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 purports to
apply only to those felonies committed on or after July 1, 1996.
          {¶ 56} This court recently resolved precisely this issue in State v. Rush
(1998), 

, 

, paragraph two of the syllabus: “Because
the General Assembly has expressly stated that the amended sentencing provisions
of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 are applicable only to those crimes committed on or after its
effective date, R.C. 1.58(B) is inapplicable. The amended sentencing provisions of
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2 apply only to those crimes committed on or after July 1, 1996.”
          {¶ 57} Since Cornwell’s crimes were committed prior to July 1, 1996, he
was not eligible for any definite terms of imprisonment provided by Am.Sub.S.B.
No. 2. 

 Thus, counsel were not ineffective for failing to request something that
Cornwell was ineligible to receive. Accordingly, we reject Propositions of Law IV
and IX.




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                       PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
       {¶ 58} In Proposition of Law VII, Cornwell asserts that the prosecutor
vouched for the credibility of three state’s witnesses: McGaha, Jones, and Williams.
Cornwell points out that the prosecutor asked leading questions of McGaha and
Jones, and bolstered the testimony of all three by asking them questions about their
plea-bargain agreements with the state. As to each witness, the prosecutor asked
whether the plea agreement was made in exchange for “your truthful testimony” or
“truthful sworn statement.” The defense never objected when McGaha was asked
the question. However, Cornwell’s objections to the questions posed to Jones and
Williams were overruled. The issue with respect to McGaha is waived except for
plain error that would affect the outcome of the trial. State v. Long (1978), 

, 

, 

, paragraph two of the syllabus.
       {¶ 59} The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether remarks were
improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected substantial rights of the
accused. State v. Smith (1984), 

, 14 OBR 317, 318-319,

. The touchstone of analysis “is the fairness of the trial, not
the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips (1982), 

, 

, 

.
       {¶ 60} Even assuming that the prosecutor’s questions constituted error, they
did not affect Cornwell’s substantive rights. Cornwell submits that the testimony
of these witnesses linked him to the crimes and that since no physical evidence
linked him to the crimes, the cumulative effect of the prosecutorial questions was
overwhelming. However, the jury might well have believed all three witnesses’
testimony even if the prosecutor had not asked questions concerning the plea
agreement made in exchange for “truthful testimony.”            Moreover, Donald
Meadows, one of the victims and someone who did not testify as part of a plea
agreement, identified Cornwell as the gunman.
       {¶ 61} Arguably, all three witnesses might have seemed even more credible




                                         16
                                January Term, 1999




had the jury not been told of the plea-bargain agreements. Several courts have
noted that a “truthful testimony” clause in the plea agreement can be a two-edged
sword. Defense counsel can effectively argue to the jury that such a clause gives
the witness incentive not to tell the truth but to please the prosecutor. United States
v. Arroyo-Angulo (C.A.2, 1978), 

. See, also, People v.
Manning (1990), 

, 

. Prosecutors ordinarily
elicit information on plea agreements with witnesses during direct examination in
order to blunt or foreclose unfavorable cross-examination revealing that they
agreed to testify in exchange for favorable treatment by the prosecutor.
       {¶ 62} Moreover, courts have split as to whether a truthful-testimony clause
in a plea agreement invites the jury to rely on the prosecutor’s assessment that the
witness is testifying truthfully. Cf. United States v. Roberts (C.A.9, 1980), 

 (clause does invite reliance on prosecutor’s assessment) with United
States v. Isaacs (C.A.7, 1974), 

 (such an argument is
“fanciful”). See, also, Williams, supra, 

, 

-
658.
       {¶ 63} In our view, these prosecutorial questions were not improper and did
not prejudicially affect substantial rights of Cornwell. The questions concerning
the plea bargains were brief, not overly emphasized, and were made at the close of
the prosecutor’s examination of each witness. Given the isolated nature of these
particular questions to these three witnesses, these questions should not be
misinterpreted, taken out of context, or given their most damaging meaning.
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974), 

, 

, 

; State v. Hill (1996), 

, 

. In sum, these brief prosecutorial questions did not deprive Cornwell of a fair
trial. Therefore, we reject Proposition of Law VII.
                             CONSTITUTIONALITY
       {¶ 64} In Proposition of Law V, Cornwell argues that Ohio death-penalty




                                          17
                            SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




laws violate both the federal and state Constitutions. Cornwell concedes that this
court has repeatedly held the death penalty in Ohio to be constitutional but states
that we have not addressed some of the arguments he asserts in his brief. However,
examination of the constitutional arguments raised by Cornwell indicates that all
have been previously rejected by this court and may be summarily rejected. State
v. Poindexter (1988), 

, 

, syllabus. See, e.g., State v.
Jenkins (1984), 

, 15 OBR 311, 

; State v. Maurer
(1984), 

, 15 OBR 379, 

; Williams, 

, 

; State v. Buell (1986), 

, 22 OBR 203, 

; State v. Zuern (1987), 

, 

; State v.
Mapes (1985), 

, 19 OBR 318, 

; State v. Steffen
(1987), 

, 31 OBR 273, 

; State v. Green (1993),

, 

; State v. Lorraine (1993), 

,

.
       {¶ 65} In Proposition of Law VI, Cornwell contends that the voterapproved amendments to Sections 2 and 3, Article IV, Ohio Constitution, which
eliminate court of appeals review in death-penalty cases, deprive him of his federal
and state constitutional liberties. We rejected similar arguments in State v. Smith
(1997), 

, 

, and reject Cornwell’s arguments for the
same reasons.
            INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND PROPORTIONALITY
       {¶ 66} Upon independent assessment, we find that the evidence supports
beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance that Cornwell killed
Jessica Ballew and attempted to kill at least three other people as part of a course
of conduct involving the purposeful killing or attempt to kill two or more persons.
R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).
       {¶ 67} The nature and circumstances of the offense provide no mitigating
features. The facts of the drive-by shooting indicate that Cornwell and other gang




                                        18
                                January Term, 1999




associates planned to retaliate against a rival gang member for a shooting that took
place hours earlier. Upon arriving at the scene where he intended to exact revenge,
Cornwell indiscriminately committed his crimes in order to “tell Boom this.” All
four victims, including Jessica Ballew, were simply in the wrong place at the wrong
time. The fact that Cornwell and his associates had planned on killing Boom
instead is of no consequence. See, e.g., State v. Richey (1992), 

, 

.
        {¶ 68} We find some mitigating features in Cornwell’s history, character,
and background. Cornwell’s maternal grandmother described Cornwell as “a
lovable child” with whom she never had a problem. Two of Cornwell’s sisters and
a brother testified that Cornwell’s father, Sidney Cornwell, Sr., was a crack addict
and an alcoholic who was physically abusive to them and their mother. Cornwell’s
mother, Beverly Terry, testified that she bore one child prior to marrying
Cornwell’s father at age seventeen and that Cornwell was her fourth child. While
both of Cornwell’s parents had steady jobs, their marriage was always in a state of
turmoil. At one point during Cornwell’s childhood, Beverly removed herself and
her children to the battered women’s shelter at the local Y.W.C.A. for a short period
of time.
        {¶ 69} Eventually, Cornwell’s parents separated and later divorced. During
the separation, when Cornwell was approximately eight years old, Mr. Cornwell
removed the children from Beverly’s home in Youngstown while Beverly was at
work.      He took them to live with him at his home in nearby Wheatland,
Pennsylvania. Thereafter, for approximately five years, Cornwell and his siblings
lived with their father in Pennsylvania. During that period, Beverly was ordered to
pay child support and was allowed to visit her children on weekends. When
Cornwell was around thirteen years old, Beverly asked for custody of her children,
and they then returned to live with her in Youngstown with her present husband.
        {¶ 70} While growing up, Cornwell was overweight and was subjected to




                                         19
                               SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




recurring criticism and ridicule at school by his classmates. His mother nicknamed
him “Corky” to discourage his peers from calling him “Porky.” Cornwell was
particularly self-conscious of the size of his breasts and, at age thirteen, he
underwent cosmetic surgery to reduce their size in hopes of reducing the ridicule
he received.
        {¶ 71} While attending school in Youngstown, Cornwell was suspended
twenty-four times between 1990 and 1995 for fighting and insubordination, and for
being verbally vulgar and abusive to teachers and school authorities. According to
his mother, Cornwell was also pressured at school by his peers to join a gang.
        {¶ 72} The pastor of Cornwell’s mother’s church testified on Cornwell’s
behalf. He stated that after visiting Cornwell, he led him in a prayer of sincerity.
He further stated that he sees sincerity in Cornwell, since Cornwell openly
confessed his sinful life and received Christ into his life.
        {¶ 73} Psychologist James Eisenberg testified that Cornwell functions in
the low average to borderline range of intelligence, with a verbal IQ of 83. Based
on various tests that he administered to Cornwell, Eisenberg described Cornwell as
a person who is shy and fairly introverted and as one who lacks self-confidence and
has low self-esteem. Eisenberg pointed out that when Cornwell was a child, his
adult male role model was a crack-smoking father and that Cornwell was essentially
raised by his older sisters.
        {¶ 74} According to Eisenberg, no one was around to give Cornwell the
discipline, structure, support, and affection he needed on a continuing basis to limit
his dangerous behavior. Eisenberg thought that the gang gave Cornwell the kind
of discipline, structure, and support that he did not receive from an effective male
role model. Moreover, Cornwell’s mother was often not around when Cornwell
was suspended from school, and her influence on his conduct was minimal. Among
other things, Eisenberg concluded that while Cornwell has no mental disease or
defect, his intellectual ability is close to that of a thirteen- or fourteen-year-old. In




                                           20
                               January Term, 1999




essence, Cornwell grew up in a violent and chaotic family, which caused him
serious problems of identity and dependency.
       {¶ 75} With regard to the statutory mitigating factors, we afford some
weight to R.C. 2929.04(B)(4), since Cornwell was nineteen years old at the time of
the offense. We also assign weight to Cornwell’s lack of any prior criminal record
as an adult.
       {¶ 76} Under factor 7, several facts brought out during the sentencing phase
are mitigating. Cornwell’s chaotic family history and background, including
coming into the world as an unwanted child, and having been abused by his father,
a crack addict, should be given weight in mitigation. Also militating against the
death penalty is the fact that Cornwell has the love and support of his mother,
siblings, and other family members. See Smith, 

, 

, 696.
       {¶ 77} However, upon independent weighing, we find that the aggravating
circumstance outweighs the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The
testimony of Meadows identifying Cornwell as the gunman and the corroborating
testimony of Cornwell’s accomplices leave no reasonable doubt as to Cornwell’s
guilt in the course-of-conduct murder of a three-year-old child and attempted
murder of three adults who simply happened to be at the place where gang members
hoped to find their intended victim. Cornwell’s murderous conduct merits the
capital penalty to which he was sentenced.
       {¶ 78} We find the death sentence imposed in this case to be neither
excessive nor disproportionate when compared with similar cases of murder as part
of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of two or more persons. See,
e.g., State v. Davie (1997), 

, 

 (nineteen-year-old
offender, lack of a significant criminal history, conduct disorder); State v. Awkal
(1996), 

, 

 (poor background, did not finish school,
physically abusive father, remorseful, gainfully employed, no prior criminal




                                        21
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




record); Allard, 

, 

 (raised in foster homes,
sexually abused as a child, manic-depressive disorder, remorseful); and State v.
Mitts (1998), 

, 

 (loved by his family and was a
devoted father, gainfully employed, protective of siblings, honorably served in the
Coast Guard, remorseful, no prior criminal record). All four of those capital cases
featured as much mitigation as is present in the instant case, if not more. We
affirmed the death penalty in all four cases.
       {¶ 79} Based on all the foregoing, we affirm Cornwell’s convictions and
sentences, including the death sentence.
                                                               Judgment affirmed.
       MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG
STRATTON, JJ., concur.




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