Habeas corpus petition challenging trial court's judgment ordering the final allocation of parental rights and responsibilities in a divorce action—Dismissal of petition affirmed.
.]
EVANS, APPELLANT, v. KLAEGER, APPELLEE.
[Cite as Evans v. Klaeger,
1999-Ohio-55
.]
Habeas corpus petition challenging trial court’s judgment ordering the final
allocation of parental rights and responsibilities in a divorce action—
Dismissal of petition affirmed.
(No. 99-1313—Submitted November 3, 1999—Decided December 1, 1999.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 99AP-297.
__________________
{¶ 1} In 1996, in a divorce action filed by appellant, Charles R. Evans,
against appellee, Christina Klaeger, f.k.a. Evans, the trial court granted Klaeger
temporary custody of the parties’ minor child. In 1998, the trial court entered
judgment granting permanent custody of the parties’ child to Klaeger.
{¶ 2} In March 1999, Evans filed a petition in the court of appeals for a writ
of habeas corpus against appellees, Klaeger and the state of Ohio, to provide
“permanent injunctive relief for the unconstitutional deprivation of Petitioner’s
protected liberty right to equal legal custody and companionship” of the child.
Evans challenged the constitutionality of R.C. 3109.04 and Civ.R. 75(M), as well
as the trial court’s judgment ordering the final allocation of parental rights and
responsibilities. Evans did not verify his petition. After appellees filed motions to
dismiss the petition, the court of appeals granted the motions.
{¶ 3} This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right.
__________________
Charles R. Evans, pro se.
__________________
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Per Curiam.
{¶ 4} Evans asserts that the court of appeals erred in dismissing his habeas
corpus action. For the following reasons, Evans’s assertion is meritless.
{¶ 5} Habeas corpus relief is the exception rather than the general rule in
child custody actions, and the writ will ordinarily be denied if there is an adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Pegan v. Crawmer (1996),
. Evans is not entitled to the writ because he has or
had an adequate legal remedy by appealing the trial court’s permanent allocation of
parental rights in his divorce action. See, e.g., R.C. 3109.04(H), providing for an
appeal from decisions granting or modifying a decree allocating parental rights and
responsibilities for the care of children.
{¶ 6} In addition, Evans was not entitled to habeas corpus relief because the
petition he filed in the court of appeals did not comply with the pleading
requirements of R.C. 2725.04, i.e., his petition was not verified. Holloway v.
Clermont Cty. Dept. of Human Serv. (1997),
.
{¶ 7} Further, even assuming, as Evans contends, that Klaeger’s motion to
dismiss was not timely filed, the court of appeals properly dismissed the matter
based on the state’s motion. The court would also have been entitled to dismiss
Evans’s action sua sponte because it was obviously without merit. See State ex rel.
Thompson v. Spon (1998),
.
{¶ 8} Finally, to the extent that Evans requested prohibitory injunctive
relief, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to grant it. See State ex rel. Forsyth
v. Brigner (1999),
.
2
January Term, 1999
{¶ 9} Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of
appeals.1
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
__________________
1. We also deny Evans’s request for oral argument. Evans has not established that oral argument is
necessary for the resolution of his appeal. State ex rel. McGinty v. Cleveland City School Dist. Bd.
of Edn. (1998),
